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A boy, a President, and three economists: 
 
 
When I grow up, I want to have my own road block.1 
 
We heard the terminology around ‘fragile states’. We wish to 
underline the importance of being cautious in using this term.2 
 
There is quantitative data; and there is anecdote.3 
 
Data are vexatious; theory is quite straightforward.4 
 
Empiricists and theorists seem further apart now than at any period in 
the last quarter century.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Somali boy, reported by UNICEF Education Officer in Somalia, 2006. 
2 His Excellency Pierre Nkurunziza, President of Burundi, Doha, 30th November 2009. 
3 World Bank Economist, personal conversation, 2003. 
4 The Economist, 20th March 2010, page 34. 
5 Deaton, 2008, page 154. 
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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
 
PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE OF EDUCATION 
 
BUILDING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND THE ROLE 
OF AID IN ACHIEVING THE EDUCATION MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS IN FRAGILE STATES 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis aims to build a theory for understanding the role of aid in achieving 
the education Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in fragile states. In so 
doing, it responds to claims that both educational research (see e.g. Cohen et 
al., 2000), and the economic literature on aid and international development 
(see e.g. Deaton, 2008), are insufficiently grounded in theory. 
 
In finding a methodological voice for this thesis, I distinguish between three 
research paradigms: positivist, interpretive and critical theory. I ask whether 
theory is essentially a positivist project, better suited to quantitative methods 
and to the natural sciences. I argue for a 'mixed-method' approach, proposing 
that when qualitative methods generate data that are subjected to a stronger 
process of generalisation – including comparison between data derived from 
qualitative and quantitative methods, and from macro and micro level analysis – 
then that evidence may be sufficiently strong to underpin theory. 
 
I use a four step process to build theory: (i) categorising data into domains for 
analysis, (ii) hypothesising linkages between these domains, (iii) investigating 
these hypotheses through assessing the evidence supporting them, (iv) 
organising hypotheses into a theoretical framework. To assess the strength of 
evidence in support of each hypothesis, I use an instrument to ‘grade the 
evidence’, based on a threefold assessment of method, observer bias and 
corroboration. I include evidence from new research conducted for this thesis, 
including: a portfolio analysis of 145 DFID education projects in fragile states 
(1991-2007), and an analysis of primary data collected for the 2008 DFID 
‘Education Portfolio Review’. 
 
The findings of this research confirm a potential relationship between aid inputs 
and education outcomes in fragile states. Positing that this relationship might 
work through intermediate financing and institutional effects, it finds weak 
evidence for the former, but stronger evidence for the latter. With both aid and 
non-aid inputs (e.g. diplomacy, military engagement), external inputs appear 
better at supporting existing incipient reform than generating that reform, 
suggesting that donors should adopt a more modest and opportunistic approach 
to aid, as opposed to deploying a ‘transformational’ blueprint (Easterly, 2009). 
 
The inter-dependence between aid inputs and non-aid inputs points to the 
importance of deploying instruments within a single approach to strategy and 
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possibly delivery. There is relatively strong evidence for ‘pre-conditions’ for 
successful interventions – proposed here as political will, community ownership 
and security / stability – whereas evidence for conventional proxies of ‘aid 
effectiveness’ is weak relative to the importance generally ascribed to it. 
 
The evidence linking education and social stability is mixed, and weakly 
researched in developing country contexts – potentially significant for critical 
theorists who question the wisdom and motives of donor governments investing 
in education to counter radicalisation. 
 
I conclude by assessing whether the theory generated has validity or utility. I 
assess the theory against five key characteristics of theory: empirical grounding; 
explanatory power; predictive power; utility; verification / falsification. I conclude 
that my theory has explanatory power and utility, but that claims to 
generalisability are weak, given the importance of context. 
 
The thesis and its product (the ‘theory’) provide a framework that advances our 
understanding of the relationships between aid and education outcomes in 
fragile states.  It tests the evidence base for these proposed relationships and, 
notwithstanding limits of generalisability, offers a narrative and framework with 
practical utility for future research, policy development and programming. 
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1. Introduction, methodology and methods 
1.1 Purpose of the thesis and how it builds on the Critical Analytic 
Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to build a theory for understanding the role of 
overseas development aid in achieving the education Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) in fragile states. The thesis builds on a prior ‘Critical Analytic 
Study’ (CAS) submitted for the University of Sussex Professional Doctorate of 
Education (EdD) in September 2005, entitled: “Achieving the Education 
Millennium Development Goals in fragile states – what is the role of aid?” 
(Colenso, 2005a). The purpose of the CAS was to review and critique relevant 
literature, in order to inform the research conducted in this thesis. 
 
In this thesis, I seek to address two claimed deficits in research, policy and 
practice in the field of education and international development. First, that much 
educational research is merely descriptive, because of a failure to develop 
sound theory based on empirical work (see, e.g. Cohen et al., 2000). Second, 
that within the economic literature on aid and international development, that 
research, policy and practice is insufficiently grounded in theory: “…empiricists 
and theorists seem further apart now than at any period in the last quarter 
century.” (Deaton, 2008, page 154). 
 
In attempting to build a theory for understanding the role of aid in achieving the 
MDGs in fragile states, this thesis has gone beyond the CAS in 3 principal 
ways: 
(i) it has updated the literature review conducted in the CAS, 
including: 
a. reviewing and critiquing much of the published and grey 
literature available on this topic since 2005; 
b. broadening the scope of the CAS literature (e.g. 
examining more literature on governance and state-
building, as recommended in the CAS, and more of the 
economic literature); 
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(ii) it has conducted additional new research, including: 
a. conducting a portfolio analysis (quantitative and 
qualitative) of DFID education projects in fragile states 
(1991-2007), using DFID’s ‘PRISM’ information 
management system; 
b. analysing primary data collected for the 2008 DFID 
‘Education Portfolio Review’ (of which I was the co-
author); 
(iii) it has used the data derived from (i) and (ii) to attempt to build a 
theory, using a four step process: 
a. categorising the data into domains for analysis; 
b. hypothesising linkages between these domains, within an 
overall organising framework; 
c. investigating these hypotheses through assessing the 
evidence supporting them; 
d. organising the hypotheses into a theoretical framework. 
 
To assess the strength of evidence in support of each hypothesis, I use an 
instrument to ‘grade the evidence’, based on a threefold assessment of method, 
observer bias and corroboration. 
 
Before embarking on a discussion of methodology and methods, it is worth 
defining briefly the two key terms that form the subject of this thesis: 
 
 ‘Education Millennium Development Goals’ are internationally agreed 
targets in two areas: (i) universal primary completion by 2015 (MDG 2), 
(ii) the elimination of gender disparity in both primary and secondary 
education by 2005, and at all levels of education by 2015 (MDG 3); 
 ‘Fragile States’ is a contested term on which there is no international 
consensus. Fragile states are variously associated with state collapse, 
conflict, political instability, low administrative capacity and neo-
patrimonial politics. DFID defines fragile states as “states that can not 
or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, particularly 
the poor” (DFID, 2005, page 1). 
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These terms and their application will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.2 Finding a methodological voice: methodology and methods 
‘Methodology’ is understood as the orientation of the researcher towards the 
issues under investigation, in so far as it influences the methods of inquiry and 
the process of analysis. Pryor and Ghartey Appiah (2004) present a view of 
methodology as a rubber sheet, with competing pulls exerted on the sheet from 
different points of view, thereby determining its shape and nature. This suggests 
fluidity and inter-connectedness, rather than rigidity and compartmentalisation. 
In this thesis, I endorse such a characterisation. However, in shaping the 
methodology and methods adopted in this study, it is useful to begin with a 
more simplistic and polar characterisation – the positivist or scientific paradigm 
versus the interpretive paradigm – before then introducing a third paradigm: 
critical theory. This brief interpretation of different methodological approaches is 
a necessary pre-cursor to the central project of this thesis: to build a theory. 
 
1.2.1 Positivism, interpretive approaches and critical theory 
Positivism has its roots in natural science. It is a paradigm of knowledge based 
on seeking objective and verifiable facts that can be generalised into laws. It is 
strongly associated with quantitative methods, and with experimentation in the 
natural sciences and mathematical models. Positivism is underpinned by 
assumptions of empiricism, determinism and generality. Hitchcock and Hughes 
(1995: 23) suggest an eight-stage model of scientific method and its role in 
generating theory: 
  
 hypotheses, hunches and guesses; 
 experiment designed; samples taken; variables isolated; 
 correlations observed; patterns identified; 
 hypotheses formed to explain regularities; 
 explanations and predictions tested; falsifiability; 
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 laws developed or disconfirmation (hypothesis rejected); 
 generalisations made; 
 new theories. 
 
Critics of a positivist approach to social science focus on its mechanistic and 
reductionist nature, its inability to accommodate and explain human choice and 
action, and its irrelevance to practitioners. Anti-positivists reject the notion that 
generalisable laws underpin human behaviour and social phenomena. They 
claim that the ‘social’ world, as opposed to the (natural) ‘scientific’ world, is fluid, 
driven by shifting context and multiple ungraspable variables. As such it is to a 
large degree indeterminable. This leads to the contention that positivism lends 
itself better to natural science, and interpretive approaches to social science. 
 
Cohen et al. (2000) capture the difference well: 
 
Positivist and interpretive paradigms are essentially concerned with 
understanding phenomena through two different lenses. Positivism 
strives for objectivity, measurability, predictability, controllability, 
patterning, the construction of laws and rules of behaviour, and the 
ascription of causality; the interpretive paradigms strive to 
understand and interpret the world in terms of its actors. In the 
former, observed phenomena are important; in the latter, meanings 
and interpretations are paramount. (Cohen et al., 2000, page 26) 
 
It is important at this stage, and given the project of this thesis, to open up a 
third methodological front: critical theory. Critical theory contends that both 
positivist and interpretive paradigms present incomplete and partial 
perspectives on social phenomena. It proposes that politics and ideology should 
be the primary lens through which we examine and explain the world (see e.g. 
Fay, 1987; Eagleton, 1991; Morrison, 1996). Critical theory rejects the 
distinction between facts and values. Within this paradigm the value of theory is 
measured by its ability to reveal relations of domination which exist in society, 
and ideally to channel that analysis into practical action. Such an approach 
would view action research as critical praxis: emancipatory research with an 
explicit agenda which is as political / institutional as it is educational (see e.g. 
Grundy, 1987; Zuber-Skerritt, 1996). This is similar to Argyrsis’s (1990) 
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characterisation of moving from ‘single-loop learning’ (functional, technical, 
short-termist) to ‘double-loop learning’ (with a requirement to question and 
challenge context, systems, values). The lens of critical theory is particularly 
important in setting in context my own identity in writing this thesis; the possible 
tension between my identity as a professional (working for the UK government 
Department for International Development) and my identity as an EdD 
researcher. I expand on this issue in the next section. 
 
Habermas (1972) differentiates between the three paradigms on the basis of 
their respective epistemologies: (i) positivist (prediction and control), (ii) 
interpretive (understanding and interpretation), (iii) critical theory (emancipation 
and praxis). It is tempting to align methodologies with methods: positivism with 
quantitative methods; interpretive approaches with qualitative methods; critical 
theory with ideology critique and possibly action research. But this would be a 
mistake. Bryman (1996) points to a “productive tension” between positivist 
quantitative methods and interactionist qualitative methods. He questions strict 
linkages between epistemological paradigms and fixed research methods (e.g. 
positivist / quantitative; interpretive / qualitative). As an example of this, and 
interestingly for this thesis, Bryman notes that “…participant observation can be 
deployed within a theory testing framework with which the epistemological basis 
of quantitative research is conventionally associated.” (Bryman, 1996, page 
123, emphasis added). 
 
Snizek (1976) analysed 1,434 articles in sociological journals over a twenty year 
period (1950-1970) and, in support of Bryman, “…was unable to discern a clear 
pattern which linked the general orientation of each paradigm with the methods 
of investigation employed.” (Snizek (1976) reported in Bryman (1996), page 
124). Arguing for joint approaches, Bryman concludes as follows: 
 
The tendency to associate particular methods with particular 
epistemological positions is little more than a convention (which took 
root in the 1960s), but which has little to recommend it, either as a 
description of the research process or as a prescriptive view of how 
research ought to be done. (Bryman, 1996, page 125) 
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There is a parallel lively debate – equally relevant for this thesis where a 
substantial amount of the material drawn on derives from evaluations or 
evaluation research – within the field of evaluation. Evaluation, as a discipline, 
has been built from positivist traditions. Since the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
there has been a shift to accommodate more qualitative and subjectivist 
approaches to evaluation, built on different paradigms and employing different 
methods. These approaches have sought to challenge the putative infallibility of 
the scientific (hypothetico-deductive) method, exposing its limitations in 
handling complex and interactive social and educational phenomena (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1981). In distinguishing between 'objectivist' and 'subjectivist' 
methodologies in evaluation, House (1983a, 1983b) sees the former as 
characterised by externalised, scientific, verifiable, reproducible procedures, 
and the latter by internalised, personalised, non-verifiable, non-reproducible 
procedures. 
 
There is debate as to whether objectivist and subjectivist positions represent 
differences of methodology, or only differences of method. Guba & Lincoln 
(1981) argue that the two approaches are derived from fundamentally different 
ontological and epistemological positions, and are, as such, irreconcilable. 
However, similar to Bryamn’s (1996) point of view, Worthen & Saunders (1987) 
take a pragmatic stance, emphasising the compatible and complementary 
nature of quantitative and qualitative methods in evaluation. In so doing, they 
avoid a deeper methodological debate, noting that few evaluators who succeed 
in a wide range of evaluation settings can afford to consider philosophical 
ideologies as 'either-or' decisions. 
 
Positioning the debate in the realm of public policy and current practice, Martin 
& Sanderson (1999) cite Van der Knapp's (1995) distinction between 'rational-
objectivist' approaches to evaluation, which focus on measurement of impacts, 
and 'argumentative-subjectivist' approaches, which are likely to be the most 
effective in promoting policy learning. Examining public policy experiments in 
the context of the 'New Labour’ administration in the UK, Martin & Sanderson 
observe two shifts in evaluation strategies post 1997: (i) performance 
measurement systems that go beyond inputs, thoughputs and outputs, to focus 
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on impact ('results-oriented management')6, (ii) new demands being put on 
evaluators, who are increasingly asked to act as change agents, combining 
summative analysis of outputs and impacts with more formative approaches 
focused on detailed understandings of process7.  
 
They note that the approach advocated by the UK central government requires 
combining these two strategies; a difficult task requiring different methods and 
evaluation skills, and different sorts of behaviour from policy-makers. Their 
explanation is worth quoting in full. 
 
Accurate impact assessment is easiest where policies are informed by 
explicit theories of action, there is some measure of agreement about the 
criteria against which outcomes should be judged and evaluators have 
access to reliable performance data. It also requires pilot programmes to 
run for an extended period and to be designed in ways which deliberately 
hold most key variables constant - often through the use of controls. A 
formative policy learning approach needs to be less structured in order to 
accommodate unanticipated developments. It has to embrace a wider 
variety of experimental sites and pilot initiatives. Evaluative judgements 
are unashamedly 'subjective' and often based largely on qualitative 
information. The process is iterative and requires a high level of trust and 
interaction between pilots and evaluators with the latter adopting a 
'hands-on' approach which enables them to engage in an ongoing 
dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders. (Martin & Sanderson, 1999, 
page 247) 
 
What are the implications of this discussion for this thesis, and for the central 
project of building theory? The approach adopted by this thesis can be 
characterised in Martin & Sanderson's terms as a 'formative policy learning 
approach'. Within this approach, I have combined methods. I seek to generate 
and utilise quantitative data, and, where possible, to look for objective 
measurements of the different hypotheses under investigation (i.e. in a 
summative sense). I also seek to generate and utilise qualitative data. This 
                                            
6 DFID’s Education Portfolio Review and the broader work of the Investment Committee (see 
Section 1.4.3 below) with its heavy focus on results, can be cited as examples of this. 
7 Martin & Sanderson contrast this approach with the narrow definition of evaluation as 
'checking afterwards whether objectives have been fulfilled', as advocated by the UK Treasury 
guide to evaluation produced in the mid-1980s (HM Treasury, 1988, cited in Martin & 
Sanderson, 1999). 
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'mixed-method' approach8 is in part practically-driven (there are different data 
sources available), and in part methodologically driven (recognising the benefits 
of 'triangulating' different sources and types of data).  
 
Recognising the benefits of broad stakeholder engagement (see e.g. Eraut, 
1984), I have also sought to involve different stakeholders in data collection 
and, to the degree possible, analysis. This is also to accommodate the valid 
concerns expressed by, inter alia, Riddell (1999), who argues that evaluations 
of education aid projects consistently privilege the perspective of the donor at 
the expense of local stakeholders:  
 
…notwithstanding the increased emphasis on participation and local 
ownership, the different valuing and validity of different types of 
knowledge colour the extent to which any evaluation or research 
design is going to meet different stakeholders’ interests. (Riddell, 
1999, page 387) 
 
As this thesis tries to find its methodological voice, it is also worth reflecting at 
this stage on my dual role as both EdD researcher and professional working for 
the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and on the broader 
institutional and political context of international development. 
 
1.2.2 A critical perspective on identity, professional and institutional context 
As I also stated in the CAS, “…the [methodological] direction of this study is 
influenced principally by two competing pulls, relating to my two identities: (i) my 
academic identity as an EdD student, (ii) my professional identity as an 
employee of DFID.” (Colenso, 2005a, page 5). On the one hand, I am a 
researcher: quasi-objective enquirer, assessing fact and evidence with no 
further purpose than the advancement of knowledge. On the other, I am a 
professional: an employee of an organisation with clear policy and strategic 
direction, and conditioned to view the world through the clouded lens of my 
experiences, prejudices and institutional parameters. The critical theorist says 
                                            
8 Rao & Woolcock (2003) extol the benefits of such an approach in their 2003 paper on 
evaluation. 
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that the former is a myth and the latter inescapable. The nature of my own 
organisation arguably amplifies this point. I work for a government department, 
headed by politicians. Viewed from one standpoint, I am, therefore, necessarily 
an agent of politics and an ideological actor9. 
 
In the CAS therefore, I tried to adopt a ‘reflexive’ or ‘auto-ethnographic’ 
approach, being aware of my own positioning: the relation of my different 
identities to the process of data collection, analysis and application (see e.g. 
Ruch, 2000 & 2002; Darlington and Scott, 2002). It is equally important within 
this thesis to adopt a reflexive, and perhaps even critical theory, perspective on 
DFID and on the broader institutional and political context of international 
development. A critical theory perspective might contend that the work of 
western government aid programmes – and of the multilateral agencies such as 
the World Bank (WB), under the direction of those governments through their 
shareholding and board membership – is essentially a neo-colonial project to 
expand market access and political control over poor countries. The latter 
tendency being at its worst in fragile and post-conflict states, where donor 
governments and international financial institutions collude with global corporate 
interests to reconstruct post-conflict and post-disaster societies to suit their own 
ends, often focussed on the extraction of natural resources: “a predatory form of 
disaster capitalism…reshaping societies to its own design” (Klein, 2005). 
 
In adopting this reflexive approach to examining my own identities and 
professional context, I need to highlight an additional area of reflexive focus: the 
tendency of institutions, in their research and evaluation functions, to protect 
themselves. There are clear incentives against highlighting ‘bad practice’, 
including reputational risk. It is also often the case that analysts and evaluators 
are also practitioners. In this respect, the CAS concluded: 
 
I have not found any cases where the balance of evidence clearly 
contradicts a particular policy that I am professionally bound to 
uphold. However there does seem a strong tendency in the agency 
literature for selective use of evidence. There are strong risks of 
                                            
9 The ‘Civil Service Code’ guides civil servants in how to establish their independence from 
party politics. However most civil servants would agree that this distinction is not clear cut. 
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‘policy-based evidence-making’, rather than ‘evidence-based policy-
making’. Interestingly, there is little theory in the literature reviewed. 
(Colenso 2005a, page 54) 
 
This provides two clear directions for this thesis. First, the need to assess the 
degree to which evidence is valid or robust, including being free of observer 
bias. To counter this, in assessing how evidence is constructed and utilised, I 
have used in this thesis an instrument to ‘grade’ evidence. The purpose, design 
and application of this instrument are described in Section 1.3 below. Second, 
the need to have a clear and robust approach to moving from evidence to 
theory. It is this that I consider next. 
 
1.2.3 Building theory 
Cohen et al. (2000) note that much educational research is merely descriptive, 
because of a failure to develop sound theory based on empirical work. The CAS 
noted the following: “Perhaps the literature on fragile states will develop a 
stronger theoretical base as it matures and connects better with different 
disciplines” (Colenso 2005a, page 54). This thesis takes up the challenge posed 
by Cohen and by the CAS: in the areas of education, aid and fragile states, can 
we use empirical data, derived from both quantitative and qualitative methods, 
to generate reliable theory? 
 
The principal interest of this thesis is to build a theory, and to assess the degree 
to which this theory can be said to be robust. There are two initial questions: (i) 
what is theory and what is it good for? (ii) how should we go about building 
theory? 
 
Kerlinger (1970) described theory as follows: “…a set of interrelated constructs, 
definitions and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by 
specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and 
predicting the phenomena” (Kerlinger, 1970, cited in Cohen et al., 2000, page 
11). Theory is a metanarrative. It is an organising framework, grounded 
somehow in truth, and it is this truth that gives it its validity and, by extension, its 
predictive power. Kerlinger’s definition proposes a three-fold process of theory 
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building: break down the phenomenon under investigation into components; 
define the relations between these components; assemble these relations into a 
coherent conceptual framework with legitimate explanatory and predictive 
power. 
 
There are several assumptions that underpin this description: 
 ontological: the phenomenon under investigation and its constituent 
parts are real things that exist;  
 epistemological: not only are these real things that exist, but they are 
also somehow knowable; 
 deterministic: the relations between these real and knowable things are 
somehow deterministic – these relations are causal and therefore 
predictable;  
 methodological: the means of identifying and assembling into theory 
these real, knowable and causally related things, are legitimate and 
replicable. 
 
These assumptions will be revisited throughout this thesis, and particularly in 
the concluding chapter. For the time being, however, I need to say something 
about how we will assess the validity of the evidence presented in the literature 
(and in the new research conducted for this thesis) and relate this to my 
emerging methodological position. 
 
1.3 Grading the evidence 
The earlier discussion on methodology and on methods – within research and 
evaluation – noted a distinction, at times blurred, between three key paradigms: 
positivist, interpretive and critical theory. It noted a tendency to associate 
particular paradigms with particular methods, but also drew attention to a school 
of thought that rejected a clear and distinct correspondence between 
methodology and method. In assessing the validity of different sources of 
evidence, and in trying to move from evidence to the generation of theory, I 
have said that this thesis will try to adopt a ‘formative policy learning approach’ 
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that combines quantitative and qualitative methods. It will not privilege either 
method, but it will, in each case, assess the validity of the evidence presented, 
and seek to triangulate across evidence and methods. 
 
However, before turning to the instrument itself, it is worth saying something 
about the use of qualitative methods in generating evidence for theory, and 
specifically the use of case studies. This is for two reasons. First, there is a 
general sense, particularly within certain, often dominant, professional 
communities – particularly economists and clinical health professionals – that 
evidence derived from quantitative methods is the only reliable and admissible 
sort of evidence for serious scholarship10. Second, the literature reviewed in this 
project and subsequent marshalled as evidence, shows that two research 
methods dominate: the literature review, and the case study (with the former 
often a summary of evidence generated from the latter). We should take a view 
therefore on the legitimacy and admissibility of qualitative evidence for theory 
generation, and particularly on the use of case studies. 
 
1.3.1 The legitimacy and admissibility of qualitative evidence for building theory 
Building on the work of Becker and Geer (1960) and Lecompte and Preissle 
(1993), Cohen et al. (2000) suggest a seven-step process for how qualitative 
research can move from description to explanation to theory generation: 
(i) establishing units of analysis of the data; 
(ii) creating a ‘domain analysis’ (or ‘categorisation’ of unitised data (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985)); 
(iii) establishing relationships and linkages between the domains; 
(iv) making speculative inferences (hypothesis generation); 
(v) summarizing; 
(vi) seeking negative and discrepant cases; 
(vii) theory generation. 
 
                                            
10 My first assignment for this EdD – submitted when I was working for the World Bank in 2003 – 
noted the words of a former economist colleague at the World Bank: “There is quantitative data; 
and there is anecdote.” 
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There are many procedural tools for analysing qualitative data in this way. 
These include ‘analytic induction’ or ‘analytical induction’, defined over the years 
by Znaniecki (1934), Denzin (1970) and Bogdna and Biklen (1992), and 
‘constant comparison’, which lies at the heart of ‘grounded theory’. Znaniecki 
(1934) introduced analytic induction as an alternative to statistical methods of 
data analysis. Focussing on participant observation, Denzin (1970) set out a 
procedure that Cohen et al. (2000) describe as follows: “The procedure of 
examining cases, redefining the phenomenon, and reformulating the hypothesis 
is continued until a universal relationship is established, each negative case 
calling for a redefinition of a reformulation.” (Cohen et el., (2000), page 151). 
Bogdan and Biklen (1992) advocated a more deliberate identification of 
discrepant cases. 
 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) introduced ‘grounded theory’ as theory developed 
directly from data during research. This was distinguished in part from ‘grand 
theories’ in sociological sciences – such as Marxism – which offer an 
overarching explanation of events, behaviours and institutions, but may 
however be only loosely grounded empirically. Grounded theory is built from the 
bottom up: incidents are categorised, their properties are identified, and models 
are constructed. 
 
There are probably three key concepts behind grounded theory: (i) theory 
emerges from the data – theory generation is derivative; (ii) constant 
comparison; (iii) emergence, as opposed to hypothesis testing. Glaser (1992) 
felt that Strauss and Corbin (1990) had misrepresented grounded theory; 
specifically forcing theory into preconceived frameworks, rather than allowing it 
to emerge. Wary of this potential pitfall, and in the interests of choosing a 
research methodology and methods appropriate for the task in hand, I decided 
not to use ‘grounded theory’ as the primary method for this thesis. However I 
have taken from this brief analysis the belief that qualitative evidence is indeed 
admissible for theory generation as for other purposes; with the caveat, 
however, that there can be significant issues to address in terms of reliability 
and validity. Silverman (1993) suggests that these methods fail to address early 
implicit theorising that guides research (i.e. data are not theory neutral but 
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theory saturated), and that these methods may be stronger on categorisation 
than on explanation. In assessing and deploying evidence generated from 
qualitative research methods, I have tried to be aware of these risks, and to 
accommodate them within the design of the grading instrument.  
 
1.3.2 The special case of case studies 
Yin (1984) identifies three kinds of case study: (i) exploratory (as a pilot to other 
studies or research questions), (ii) descriptive (providing narrative accounts), 
(iii) explanatory (testing theories). Merriam (1988) similarly identifies three types 
of case study (i) descriptive (narrative accounts), (ii) interpretive (developing 
conceptual categories inductively in order to examine initial assumptions), (iii) 
evaluative (explaining and judging). Stake (1994) also identifies three main 
types of case studies (i) intrinsic (undertaken to understand the particular case 
in question), (ii) instrumental (examining a particular case to gain insight into an 
issue or theory), (iii) collective (groups of studies undertaken to gain a fuller 
picture). 
 
Case studies are typically aligned with the interpretive paradigm. This can open 
up the case study method to criticism, principally on the basis of treating 
peculiarities rather than regularities: “The case study method is the logically 
weakest method of knowing…Recurrent patterns are the main product of the 
enterprise of historic scholarship” (Smith, 1991, p. 375). However, most 
researchers believe that there is a role for case studies to generate evidence, 
including “…for wider theoretical purposes such as the verification and/or the 
generation of theory” (Cohen et al., 2000, page 181). Cohen et al. continue: 
 
Case studies can penetrate situations in ways that are not always 
susceptible to numerical analysis. Case studies can establish cause 
and effect, indeed one of their strengths is that they observe effects 
in real contexts, recognising that context is a powerful determinant of 
both causes and effects. (Cohen et al., 2000, page 181) 
 
Case studies in isolation may be a logically weak method of generating theory 
(the weakness derived from generalising from a specific instance). However, 
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when case studies generate data that are subjected to a logically stronger 
process of generalisation – such as analytical induction and constant 
comparison, including comparison against data derived through quantitative 
methods – then claims to theory may be stronger. In all cases, we should be 
aware of the risks of observer bias, including though over-interpretation and 
selective reporting (see e.g. Nisbet and Watt, 1984). Lincoln and Guba propose 
that the ‘trustworthiness’ of a case study is defined in terms of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). For 
the purpose of this thesis, I have therefore treated case studies as ‘admissible’ 
evidence, while trying to control for the weaknesses of this method through the 
grading instrument, as described below. 
 
1.3.3.Grading the evidence – designing an instrument 
As I wrote this thesis, DFID was designing an instrument to ‘grade the evidence’ 
across priority areas in the DFID Research Strategy (DFID, 2009). The starting 
point for the DFID work was a paper published by the Health Development 
Agency of the National Health Service (Weightman et al., 2005). The objective 
of this work was to develop a practical scale of grades of recommendation for 
public health interventions, adapted from the current National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) methodology. A literature review was carried out on 
the subject of incorporating research evidence into grades of recommendation 
for public health interventions. The literature search looked at publications from 
January 2000 to May 2004 retrieved from 16 databases. The views of a range 
of public health experts were also sought. The paper concluded as follows. 
 
The literature review indicated general agreement that the 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) has the highest internal validity 
and, where feasible, is the research design of choice when evaluating 
effectiveness. However, many commentators felt the RCT may be too 
restrictive for some public health interventions, particularly community 
based programmes. In addition, supplementing data from quantitative 
studies with the results of qualitative research is regarded as key to 
the successful replication and ultimate effectiveness of interventions. 
(Weightman et al., 2005, page 1) 
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Given that this instrument was being designed within the medical community 
and with a focus principle of specific measurable (clinical) interventions11, it is 
not surprising that the authors expressed a preference for randomised 
controlled controls. There are two reasons not to adopt such a strict preference 
in this thesis: (i) the type of intervention under discussion is in many ways 
different, e.g. a specific public health intervention, the conduct of which can be 
controlled and the benefits measured and attributed, including through 
experimental design using intervention and control groups; many or most of 
these conditions do not pertain when assessing the effect of aid on education in 
fragile states (which is not to say, however, that there should not be more 
randomised trials conducted in this area – indeed I believe there should), (ii) as 
described in the last section, my emerging methodological stance is one that 
embraces the value and potential validity of qualitative evidence, particularly 
when used within a mixed-methods approach. From a purely practical point of 
view, if I was only to treat as admissible evidence derived from randomised 
controlled trials, this would be a very short thesis. 
 
It is also important to note that while development agencies are increasingly 
using randomised controlled trials, views from academics and practitioners on 
their value and pre-eminence as a research tool have differed widely. 
 
Creating a culture in which rigorous randomized evaluations are 
promoted, encouraged and financed has the potential to revolutionize 
social policy during the 21st century, just as randomized trials 
revolutionized medicine during the 20th. (Duflo, 2004, page 731) 
 
Randomised controlled trials cannot automatically trump other 
evidence, they do not occupy any special place in some hierarchy of 
evidence. (Deaton, 2008, page 125) 
 
As noted in Easterly (2009), Deaton (2006, 2008) and Rodrik (2008) both point 
out that while the benefits of randomisation may hold for internal validity, it is not 
necessarily correct to extrapolate to other settings than the experimental 
situation. This is particularly important for the project of this thesis: to build a 
                                            
11 It is worth noting however Weightman’s proviso that ‘”…some public health interventions, 
particularly community based programmes” pose challenges for this approach. 
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theory. Deaton particularly emphasises the sensitivity of randomised 
experiments to context, including in education: 
 
The effectiveness of flip charts clearly depends on many things, of 
which the skill of the teacher and the age, background, and previous 
training of the children are only the most obvious. So a trial from a 
group of Kenyan schools gives us the average effectiveness of flip 
charts in the experimental schools relative to the control schools for 
an area in western Kenya, at a specific time, for specific teachers, 
and for specific pupils. It is far from clear that this evidence is useful 
outside of that situation. (Deaton, 2006, cited in Easterly, 2009, page 
49) 
 
Deaton implies the risks of extrapolating from experiment to policy. The same 
could equally be said of theory.  As noted by Cartwright (2007), to have 
predictive power, we would need a method that tells us more about causality. I 
will return to this issue in the concluding section of this thesis. 
 
While critiquing the current vogue for randomised experiments, it is also worth 
questioning the dominance of regression analysis and other econometric 
methods in international aid agencies. There is a clear preference by some 
agencies for quantitative research methods; notably the World Bank but also 
increasingly DFID. As an example, the influence of Paul Collier’s research in the 
field of conflict and fragile states – both during his time with the World Bank and 
subsequently – has been significant. Indeed, Collier’s work is much cited in this 
thesis. It is worth noting, however, that (i) econometric work done badly, is as 
limited and misleading as the most casual form of qualitative research, and that 
(ii) it is ill-advised to extrapolate from correlation to causality. In a report on the 
World Bank research that underpinned some of Collier’s earlier work on fragile 
states, while praising the research for raising interesting issues, Acemoglu 
(2006) made the following observations:  
 
The econometric framework is very deficient. It has a number of 
serious conceptual and methodological problems. First of all, at the 
end the regression is one of endogenous variables on endogenous 
variables. But all of the results are interpreted as causal effects… 
Contrary to the claims in the paper, the regression evidence does not 
test any well-specified hypothesis, and the correlations that are 
interpreted as causal effects are really no more than correlations…. It 
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is too early to jump to policy conclusions.12 (Acemoglu, 2006, cited in 
Easterly, 2009, page 100) 
 
In developing an instrument to grade the evidence, we might find good reason 
therefore to question the current preference for both randomised trials and for 
regression analysis. 
 
To return to Weightman’s paper, I believe we can make better use of it by 
moving beyond the narrow preference for method to the broader framework that 
they adopt (although they are not explicit in doing so). Stripped down to its 
essentials, there are three features or domains used in their grading instrument: 
(i) method, (ii) degree of bias, (iii) degree of corroboration. I propose to use 
these three categories in combination, but using a considerably simpler 
typology than that proposed in Weightman’s three tables. 
 
For this thesis, I propose therefore to grade evidence using a simple three-fold 
categorisation, whereby each piece of evidence is judged against these three 
criteria, as follows. 
 
 Method Bias Corroboration 
Strong Systematic literature 
reviews 
No evidence; 
low risk 
Strong 
corroboration 
Medium Literature reviews (not 
systematic); good RCTs; 
good econometric methods; 
good case studies 
Some 
evidence; 
medium risk 
Some discrepant 
cases 
Weak Interviews; weak case 
studies; anecdote 
Strong 
evidence; 
significant risk 
Many discrepant 
cases 
 
Table 1.1 
 
An approximate overall judgement is given against any chosen hypothesis, 
according to whether the balance of the evidence is considered strong, medium 
or weak against the three criteria. It should be noted that the categorisation of 
                                            
12 Easterly notes that Acemoglu was commenting upon Collier et al. (2003).   
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strong / medium / weak is neither exact nor robust. It is a judgement, but one 
that has an explicit and to some degree reasonable and defensible basis. 
 
In the visual depiction of the theoretical framework, I will depict the strength of 
the evidence by the degree of shading of the arrow, as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Key for denoting strength of evidence linking variables within theoretical framework 
 
For example, if, through grading the evidence, we were to find strong evidence 
of the link between ‘education outcomes’ and measures of ‘social cohesion’ – 
reviewing the balance of the evidence against our three criteria – but only weak 
evidence of the link between ‘education outcomes’ and measures of ‘economic 
growth’, this would be depicted in the draft theoretical framework as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Example of graphic depiction of theoretical framework 
 
On this basis, I will attempt to build a theory linking aid and education in fragile 
states, depicting the strength of the proposed relationship between variables in 
each case, based on grading the evidence found in support of each 
relationship. The bulk of this work is done in Chapter 3, with conclusions drawn 
strong evidence 
medium evidence 
weak evidence 
Education 
outcomes 
Social 
cohesion 
Economic 
growth 
= 
= 
= 
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on the success or not of this enterprise in the final chapter. As noted above, this 
is not an exact approach, but it should bring more rigour and a specific, and 
explicit, method to assessing the relative strength and weakness of evidence in 
support of any given proposition. 
 
The final section of this introductory chapter will describe briefly the new 
research conducted for this thesis. 
 
1.4 New research conducted for this thesis 
 
1.4.1 Portfolio Analysis of DFID education projects in fragile states (1991-2007) 
I conducted a portfolio analysis for this thesis, using DFID’s project database 
‘PRISM’, of all DFID education projects in DFID’s ‘proxy list’ of 42 fragile states 
covering the period 1991 to 200713. Two pieces of analysis were carried out. 
The quantitative analysis of ‘project risk’ and ‘project rating’ considered 145 
records. The qualitative analysis search of the ‘lessons learnt’ section of ‘Project 
Completion Reports’ considered 59 records (the balance records had no data 
under ‘lessons learnt’). 
 
The analysis was conducted using the following steps: selecting within the 
PRISM databse the 42 countries on DFID’s proxy list of fragile states; selecting 
within these countries all projects primarily coded to education; transferring 
quantitative data (e.g. ‘project ratings’) into a separate Excel spreadsheet for 
manipulation14; transferring qualitative data (e.g. ‘lessons learnt’) into a separate 
spreadsheet for synthesis and analysis. 
 
In interpreting the results of this analysis, a number of constraints should be 
noted. ‘Lessons learnt’ fields of ‘Project Completion Reports’ are not 
systematically completed. Nor do project ratings and ‘lessons learnt’ reports 
                                            
13 PRISM has since been superceded by a new database that DFID has adopted, although 
records have been transferred between the two applications.  
14 See for example Figures 3.1 in Chapter 3 below. 
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necessarily represent objective assessments of the project, as suggested in 
Section 1.2.1 above. It is an internal process. Typically consultants are 
contracted by the DFID education adviser or programme manager; they cannot 
therefore be seen as completely independent, as there are clear incentives to 
score projects well. In assessing the validity of this evidence, therefore, we 
should beware observer bias. Easterly (2009) demonstrates how projects 
evaluations have historically been a weak source of evidence, not only for DFID 
but for all development agencies. 
 
The calculation of project rates of return had a number of problems. 
The estimation of the benefits of the project were done in an ad-hoc 
way that left a lot of room for subjective judgments. This was 
particularly problematic because the aid agency (and sometimes the 
specific individual who had led the project effort) were the ones 
calculating rates of return, implying a possible conflict of interest that 
would bias rates of return upwards. Even if the evaluators were 
completely objective, there was no mechanism to regulate their 
subjective judgments so that hypothesized benefits corresponded to 
real improvements enjoyed by the beneficiaries. (Easterly, 2009, 
page 33) 
 
Pawson and Tilley (1999) argued that thirty years of project evaluation in 
sociology, education and criminology was largely unsuccessful because it 
focussed on whether projects work instead of on why they work (reported in 
Deaton, 2008).   
 
Nor are the DFID project ratings and ‘lessons learnt’ reports systematically 
subjected to quality assurance. DFID has used different systems of quality 
assurance over the 16 year period in question, and quality assurance has at 
best been done on a sample basis. The length, scope and quality of the 
‘lessons learnt’ are also highly variable. This calls into the question both the 
independence (from bias) and the quality of the reports. 
 
In spite of these constraints however, DFID’s database of projects does present 
a rich source of data, and one, to my knowledge, that has not been 
systematically mined before in the field of education and fragile states. 
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1.4.2 DFID Education Portfolio Review 
The Education Portfolio Review is an internal, as-yet unpublished, piece of 
analytical work conducted by DFID staff through 2008 and 2009, which I 
designed and co-led with a DFID colleague. It was commissioned by the 
Investment Committee of DFID’s Management Board; a relatively new 
committee whose mandate is to strengthen DFID’s focus on results and value-
for-money. The purpose of the Education Portfolio Review was to assess what 
results DFID’s education investments are achieving and the degree to which 
these results represent value-for-money, and so to make recommendations 
about the allocation and delivery of DFID’s future education investments (in the 
context of annual DFID expenditure on education rising from £529 million in 
2007/08 to £1 billion in 2010/11). The Education Portfolio Review also provided 
the basis for part of DFID’s submission to Her Majesty’s Treasury for the ‘Public 
Value Programme’ – a cross-Whitehall programme, under the previous 
government, to identify and drive efficiency savings in the UK public sector. 
 
The Education Portfolio focussed its analysis on investment choices in three 
areas: allocation of education aid to multilateral agencies (e.g. World Bank; 
European Commission; UN agencies); allocation of education aid within the 
bilateral programme (which countries DFID should allocate aid to, based on 
need and likely effectiveness); delivery choices within the bilateral programme 
(choices of aid instrument and delivery channels). The Education Portfolio 
Review drew on a number of pieces of research, including the following: 
 
 building a resource allocation model to indicate ‘appropriate’ levels of aid 
to education to countries, on the basis on need and predictors of 
performance (see Chapter 2 for detail on the model and its results); 
 a literature review to determine what education policies and investments 
achieve results and value-for-money, and under what conditions 
(notwithstanding the risks of being too reductionist); 
 a survey of DFID country offices, to investigate what results DFID is 
achieving; policies and investment choices and rationales underpinning 
these; models of delivery; opportunities and constraints; 
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 a review of a random sample of 61 annual reviews of DFID education 
projects; 
 unit cost analyses, to determine, for example, costs of items such as 
textbooks and classroom construction; to explore  comparability across 
countries, and possibilities of driving down unit costs, with estimated 
savings. 
 
The thesis will report results and implications of some aspects of the Education 
Portfolio Review in detail, particularly where those results and implications are 
relevant to fragile states. However, the key findings, and those with particular 
significance for this thesis, can be summarised as follows. 
 DFID aid to education is achieving significant results, and is making 
sound strategic choices: 
o there is good progress on MDG 2 (universal access to and 
completion of primary education); DFID is supporting around 5 
million children in school, based on assessing support through 
government systems alone; 
o using DFID’s ‘portfolio quality index’15 as a measure, the 
education portfolio performance is good and improving (improving 
from 67% in 2005/6 to 72% in 2007/8 – this means that DFID’s 
projects and programmes largely achieve their objectives); 
o DFID is allocating money well, across countries and institutions, 
as assessed by comparing actual allocation against ‘optimal’ 
allocation; 
o DFID is delivering through the right instruments (e.g. budget 
support is providing influence & leverage beyond our direct 
financial contributions and is supporting expansions in service 
delivery); 
                                            
15 Projects are scored annually and at completion. The logical framework score measures 
whether a programme has achieved its purpose. Scores range from 1 to 5; a score of 1 means 
that the programme achieved its purpose, 2 the purpose is largely achieved, 3 partially 
achieved, 4 to a limited extent, and 5 not achieved. The Portfolio Quality Index is calculated by 
converting each purpose level score into a percentage: a score of 1 - 100 %, 2 – 75%, 3 – 50%, 
4 – 25%, 5 – 0. Each percentage is multiplied by the expenditure on the programme and the 
aggregate is divided by the total scored expenditure for each year. 
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o country offices are by and large making good strategic choices 
(e.g. investing in what works; playing to DFID’s comparative 
advantage); 
o DFID’s influence greatly exceeds its spend, at both the country 
and international levels; 
 but there is scope to improve value for money: 
o by focussing more on education quality (e.g. protecting cognitive 
functions in early childhood; measuring learning outcomes; 
prioritising teachers and teaching; investing more in knowledge 
products such as research and impact evaluations); 
o by further expanding DFID’s investments below (early childhood) 
and beyond (secondary) primary education; 
o by supporting governments to drive down unit costs of key inputs; 
 there are at least three good reasons to increase education investments 
in fragile states, in both absolute and proportionate terms: 
o one third to one half of out-of-school primary aged children are in 
fragile states; 
o fragile states are severely under-aided, on both need and 
performance bases; 
o education investments in post-conflict settings can have a high 
dividend, in terms of both state-building and social stability; 
 DFID should continue to lobby for more resources to go to basic 
education in low income countries, and to fragile states, and continue to 
focus its own resources on basic education in low income countries, 
particularly fragile states. 
 
However, it is not clear that all of the conclusions presented above would stand 
up to close scrutiny. For example, the estimate that DFID supports five million 
children in school uses an imprecise methodology, including, for those countries 
where DFID was providing budget support, pro-rating a share of national 
enrolments based on DFID’s share of total education expenditure (domestic and 
external). While this provides a reasonable estimate, it does not give us a level 
of granularity or confidence to determine whether, for example, budget support 
is better than another instrument, nor that DFID’s instruments or ways of 
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working are better than those of another agency. In this respect, some of the 
value for money claims in the Education Portfolio Review are on relatively weak 
methodological ground, particularly if they are applied in a comparative sense 
(for which they were not intended).  
 
This opening Chapter has tried to describe the key methodological issues 
underpinning this thesis, and an emerging methodological voice for the thesis 
itself; it has introduced a basic approach to assessing the validity and reliability 
of evidence; and it has introduced new research conducted for this thesis.  
Chapter 2 will now summarise two outputs of the CAS, which are necessary to 
understanding the purpose and direction of the thesis: 
 the nature of the issue under investigation i.e. the role of aid in 
achieving the Education MDGs in fragile states; 
 preliminary findings and conclusions of the CAS. 
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2. Building on the Critical Analytic Study 
 
It is necessary to define at least in brief the key terms and concepts that will 
form the constituent parts of the proposed theory, given that each is complex 
and indeed contested. The CAS sought to define and understand the terms that 
are implicated in this research by answering three preliminary questions: 
(i) what are the Education MDGs? 
(ii) what are fragile states and why are they important? 
(iii) why is aid to fragile states problematic? 
 
The answers to these questions are briefly summarised below; however the 
summaries go beyond the CAS in incorporating new texts and analysis and thus 
bringing the analysis up to date. 
 
2.1 What are the Education MDGs? 
The MDGs were agreed by nearly 190 countries at the United Nations 
Millennium Summit in September 2000, as part of a global compact to focus 
developing countries and development agencies on specific development 
outcomes. The Education MDGs are understood as: 
 universal primary completion by 2015 (MDG 2); 
 and, as part of the Gender MDG (MDG 3), the elimination of gender 
disparity in both primary and secondary education by 2005, and all 
levels by 2015. 
 
Broader international education targets had previously been agreed as part of 
the Education for All (EFA) conferences in Jomtien in 1990 and in Dakar in 
2000. Critics have noted two connected problems with the process of 
consolidating broader education goals into two MDG targets: 
 
 a narrowing of the development agenda: according to King and Rose 
(2005), the Jomtien Declaration of 1990 had already weakened a 
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more holistic vision of education, by paying no attention to secondary 
education, skills development or higher education, although the World 
Education Forum in Dakar in April 2000 reinstated early childhood 
education and adult literacy within the six Dakar goals. Critics argue 
that the MDG targets further exclude key areas of education, 
including early childhood development, adult literacy (Robinson, 
2005) secondary education (Lewin, 2005), skills development (King, 
2005) and higher education. 
 excessive influence of donors in setting this agenda: according to 
King: “The global development agenda essentially gets fashioned in 
Paris.”16 (King, 2004, page 7). King and Rose (2005) point out that in 
countries which are highly aid-dependent; there may well be 
distortions in the national planning of education and training if the 
donors effectively make their financing conditional upon the 
prioritisation of the MDGs. 
 
In response to the critics, proponents of the MDGs emphasise that broader 
education goals have not been abandoned, and that countries are free to 
pursue the policies and investments that meet their national priorities. DFID 
maintains that the MDG targets should be understood within a holistic vision of 
education, and that national education sector plans and expenditure 
frameworks should be determined by sovereign governments in consultation 
with national stakeholders, according to their own needs and priorities17. The 
OECD DAC report that defined the MDGs stressed the need for context-specific 
interpretation of the MDGs18. 
 
In global terms, some significant progress has been made against the MDG 
targets, particularly MDG 2. Numbers of out-of-school primary school aged 
children dropped from 96 million in 1999 to 72 million in 2005. To illustrate 
where this progress has been made, Table 2.1 shows the 20 countries where 
                                            
16 The Millennium Development Goals were agreed through the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC), 
which is headquartered in Paris. 
17 Interview with former DFID Head of Profession (Education), 05/07/05. 
18 “these goals must be pursued country-by-country through individual approaches that reflect 
local conditions and locally owned strategies” (OECD, 1996, p. 2) 
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the numbers of primary aged out of school children reduced most in absolute 
terms. In total, these countries account for over 90% of ‘progress’ against MDG 
2. India alone accounts for one third. Fragile states, shaded below, account for 
20%. 
 
Year 
Primary Age 
Population (2005) 
Primary Aged 
Children Out 
of School 
1999 (or 2000) 
Primary Aged 
Children Out of 
School 2005 (or 
2004) Change 
1. India 117,415,666 14,461,154 6,394,577 -8,066,577 
2. Tanzania 7,113,061 3,405,002 604,378 -2,800,624 
3. Ethiopia 8,588,612 4,961,657 3,180,923 -1,780,734 
4. Iran 6,599,640 1,666,073 306,852 -1,359,221 
5. Mozambique 3,833,913 1,601,811 872,311 -729,500 
6. Bangladesh 16,526,136 1,120,659 398,556 -722,103 
7. Kenya 5,416,772 1,833,662 1,122,986 -710,676 
8. Nigeria 21,644,599 7,189,213 6,583,599 -605,614 
9. Madagascar 2,598,249 785,130 188,401 -596,729 
10. Morocco 3,827,702 1,114,332 524,848 -589,484 
11. Myanmar 4,966,002 1,051,077 487,384 -563,693 
12. Brazil 13,612,718 1,031,981 481,790 -550,191 
13. Zambia 2,308,246 760,379 227,759 -532,620 
14. Yemen 3,633,725 1,333,804 861,005 -472,799 
15. Nepal 3,556,958 1,046,432 701,581 -344,851 
16. Algeria 3,902,293 361,955 39,461 -322,494 
17. Cambodia 2,009,842 320,688 22,962 -297,726 
18. Senegal 1,841,652 807,980 517,682 -290,298 
19. Guinea 1,483,379 709,067 500,746 -208,321 
20. Philippines 11,633,692 853,813 647,639 -206,174 
 
Table 2.1 (Source: using data derived from UNESCO, 2007) 
 
The Education Portfolio Review notes how central fragile states are to the 
challenge of achieving the MDGs: 
 
The Education Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of ensuring 
that children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling and achieving gender 
parity in primary and secondary school, will not be met with current 
patterns of education investment and provision, particularly in fragile 
states. (DFID, 2009, page 3) 
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Approximately 40% of countries did not meet the 2005 gender equity target19. 
There is also some evidence to suggest that education access has been 
pursued at the expense of education quality (see e.g. Smith and Vaux, 2003), 
and that the emphasis on primary education has been accompanied by under-
investment at secondary, with potentially damaging educational and broader 
social impacts (Lewin, 2004). It is also questionable whether increasing primary 
enrolment / completion and achieving gender parity in primary and secondary 
education will result in poverty reduction, although this is the implicit logic of the 
MDGs. 
 
2.2 What are fragile states and why are they important? 
In recent years, development agencies have become increasingly concerned 
over the impact of weak and ineffective states. Definitions of and approaches to 
fragile states have variously emphasised ‘state fragility’ (USAID, DFID20), ‘poor 
performance’ (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNDP, AusAID), and 
‘difficult partnerships’ (OECD DAC, European Commission) (Moreno Torres and 
Anderson, 2004). Branchflower et al. (2004) associate fragile states with the 
following characteristics: state collapse, loss of territorial control, low 
administrative capacity, political instability, neo-patrimonial politics, conflict, and 
regressive polities. DFID defines fragile states as “states that cannot or will not 
deliver core functions to the majority of its people, particularly the poor” (DFID, 
2005, page 1).  
 
It is important to recognise the emergence, and indeed survival, of the concept 
of fragility through a political economy lens as much as a ‘technical’ one. The 
US in particular, and increasingly now the UK, have argued that intervention in 
‘fragile states’ – through a range of development, diplomatic and security 
instruments – is essential to safeguard the security of their own citizens. This 
narrative has been particularly prominent in the post 9/11 era, and in the 
Afghanistan / Pakistan region. This has prompted concern form others over 
policies combining development assistance with diplomacy and defence 
                                            
19 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/mdg/gender.asp, accessed 15/08/05 
20 DFID initially used the terminology “difficult environments”. 
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interests (see e.g. Beall et al., 2006; Sen and Morris, 2008; Sen, 2008), and 
with economic interests (see e.g. Klein, 2005, quoted in Section 1.2.2 above). 
 
…it is easy to fall in line with a strong security oriented definition [of 
fragile states] because it preys on real fear and is supported by 
strong discourse, and policies linking defence and diplomacy 
interests of nations with development assistance in the war against 
terrorism. (Sen, 2008) 
 
Pureza (2006) argues for the need to deconstruct definitions of fragility and 
fragile states, and to clarify the ideological political and economic dimensions 
that lie behind the concept. Some of the policy and operational implications of 
what has been referred to as the ‘militarization of aid’ (see e.g. Novelli, 2010)  
are further explored in Section 3.3.3 below, which looks at the interplay in 
external assistance between ‘non-aid inputs’ – such as diplomacy and peace-
keeping – with aid inputs. 
 
DFID’s typology of fragile states is represented diagrammatically below in 
Figure 2.1, with fragile states accounting for the three non-shaded boxes. 
 
‘high will, low capacity’ 
fragile states with political 
will but low capacity (e.g. 
Afghanistan, Timor Leste) 
‘good performers’ 
non fragile states relatively 
unconstrained by will and 
capacity (e.g. Uganda, 
Ghana, India) 
-  
   
   
   
W
IL
L 
   
   
 +
 
‘low will, low capacity’ 
fragile states where both 
political will and institutional 
capacity pose challenges to 
development (e.g. Somalia, 
Sudan, DRC) 
‘low will, high capacity’ 
fragile states that may be 
repressive (e.g. Angola, 
Myanmar) 
 -            CAPACITY          + 
 
Figure 2.1. DFID Fragile States typology (Sources: adapted from Moreno Torres and Anderson, 
2004; DFID, 2005) 
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Core functions include security, economic management, and the provision of 
basic services such as education and healthcare. The “cannot or will not” 
distinction is built on a policy-relevant typology of fragile states emphasising 
‘capacity’ and ‘will’. The DAC provides another typology of fragile states, for 
which there has been some uptake in the international community. 
 
Deterioration 
 
Conflict/risk of 
conflict; declining 
capacity or will 
 
e.g. Somalia, 
Sudan 
Arrested 
Development 
Lack of will; 
moderate or high 
capacity 
 
e.g. Angola, 
Myanmar 
Uzbekistan 
Post-conflict 
transition 
Risk of conflict; 
low capacity; high 
or low will 
 
e.g. DRC 
Early recovery 
 
May be post-
conflict or not; high 
will but low 
capacity 
e.g. Afghanistan, 
Timor Leste, 
Burundi 
 
Table 2.2 . OECD DAC typology of ‘fragile states’, with examples 
 
There is no internationally agreed list of fragile states. The lowest performers in 
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) are 
sometimes used as a proxy for fragile states21. 46 countries appear in the 
bottom two-fifths of the CPIA ratings at least once between 1998 and 2003. It is 
these that constitute DFID’s proxy list of fragile states (DFID, 2005). Fragile 
states are important for the achievement of the MDGs. 14% of the world’s 
population live in fragile states, but they represent 35% of the world’s poor 
(MDG 1), 44% of maternal deaths (MDG 5), and 51% of children dying before 
the age of five (MDG 4) (Colenso, 2005a). 
 
Fragile States also have spillover effects. They depress growth in neighbouring 
countries, they can destabilise neighbouring countries, create refugee flows and 
spread disease. Collier (2007) claims that the annual cost of one new conflict to 
the country and its neighbours is over $64 billion and that civil war reduces the 
affected country’s growth by 2.3% per year. Miguel (2004) reinforces the cyclical 
nature of this problem; he claims that a negative growth shock of 5% increases 
the likelihood of conﬂict by 50% the following year, with concomitant spillover 
                                            
21 The CPIA scores are unpublished World Bank assessments of the quality of policies and 
institutions of a given country, based on subjective judgements against over twenty indicators. 
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effects for neighbouring countries. Mack (2009) claims that the converse is 
equally true: rising GDP per capita reduces the risk of conflict. If countries can 
move from a $250 per capita annual income to $500, they reduce the five-year 
risk of conflict by half on average.  
 
Appendix 1 gives a breakdown – updated from the CAS – of key education 
indicators in fragile states (DFID proxy list). The table is notable for its data 
gaps, including in countries with large numbers of out of school children (e.g. 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan). 
 
The distinction between good performers and fragile states is in many ways an 
artificial distinction, which many commentators have found inaccurate or even 
unhelpful. Reasons cited for this include the following: measures of fragility are 
subjective (e.g. the World Bank’s CPIA ratings); fragility is dynamic – states 
move into fragility (e.g. Zimbabwe) and out of fragility (e.g. Rwanda); ‘good 
performers’ may have pockets of fragility and even conflict (e.g. northern 
Uganda, north-east Sri Lanka); a state-centric definition gives undue emphasis 
to the role of the state; fragility might be better analysed on a regional, rather 
than state basis (e.g. West Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Caucasus); 
defining ‘fragility’ as a lack of will to address poverty reduction risks defining 
fragility on donors’ terms. 
 
‘Fragile states’ is also a term that some have found stigmatizing and unhelpful:  
 
We heard the terminology around ‘fragile states’. We wish to 
underline the importance of being cautious in using this term. It is 
labelling countries in a negative way, where we are trying to develop 
and become stronger and prouder nations. (His Excellency Pierre 
Nkurunziza, President of Burundi, Doha, 30 November 2009) 
 
However, the concept of fragile states does potentially have a high degree of 
analytical, policy and operational utility. It can highlight a common set of 
conditions or constraints (e.g. instability, weak institutions, very low capacity) 
that the conventional ‘aid effectiveness’ paradigm is less able to handle, and it 
can help organise a policy and operational response based on addressing these 
 41 
constraints.22 For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of fragile states is 
grounded in a particular challenge: the challenge of forming successful aid 
partnerships for poverty reduction.23 
 
2.3 Why is aid to fragile states problematic? 
The dominant paradigm of aid effectiveness is premised on the existence of a 
strong state, with both the capacity and the will to generate sustainable 
economic growth, and to implement pro-poor policies in support of achieving the 
MDGs. However, it is precisely the absence of capacity and will that frames our 
understanding of fragile states (Leader and Colenso, 2005). This aid 
effectiveness paradigm, underpinned by a set of principles and targets, has 
evolved through agreements reached at the High-Level Forum on 
Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003), the Marrakech Roundtable on 
Managing for Development Results (February 2004), and the High Level Fora 
on Aid Effectiveness (Paris in March 2005; Accra in September 2008). The 
Paris Declaration has gone furthest in negotiating a series of aid effectiveness 
targets and indicators, binding both donor countries and developing countries. 
 
Leader and Colenso (2005) outline the challenges in applying the emerging 
consensus on ‘aid effectiveness’ to fragile states. At heart, the Paris consensus 
is a simple idea: donors should trust the plans of governments and other 
national stakeholders and programme their aid together (harmonisation) in 
support of national plans and priorities (alignment), with clear results (results), 
for which states are accountable to citizens (accountability). But this is the 
compact that is so hard to achieve in fragile states. It is what Sperling (2006) 
has subsequently described as ‘the trust gap’. Colenso and Leader (2005) cite 
the limited thinking of Radelet (2004) and others who say that the nature of 
fragile states means that aid should necessarily be less, more projectised, over 
                                            
22 It can also help raise the political profile of these countries in OECD governments and in 
development agencies. This is particularly significant given the relatively low levels of aid flows 
to fragile states (see section 2.4 below). 
23 Blanchflower (2004) notes that this is a perspective that emphasises the observer’s policy 
agenda. 
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a shorter time period, restricted in scope, and much of it distributed through 
NGOs. 
 
Much of the work done on aid and fragile states has sought to demonstrate that 
the Paris aid effectiveness principles still largely pertain in fragile states. This 
includes the OECD DAC ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States’ (OECD DAC, 2005), their subsequent piloting and extensive 
analysis. These principles are reproduced in full in Appendix 2, but can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
 
1. Take context as the starting point; 
2. move from reaction to prevention; 
3. focus on state-building as the central objective; 
4. align with local priorities and/or systems; 
5. recognise the political-security-development nexus; 
6. promote coherence between donor government agencies; 
7. agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors; 
8. do no harm; 
9. mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context; 
10. act fast… 
11. …but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; 
12. avoid pockets of exclusion. 
 
Table 2.3. Summary of OECD DAC ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States’ (OECD DAC, 2005) 
 
These principles have been recently tested in the IIEP monograph on donors’ 
support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states (Brannelly et al., 
2009). This monograph and its implications will be examined in Chapter 3. DFID 
has recently published revised guidance for ‘working effectively in conflict-
affected and fragile situations’, which builds strongly from the DAC principles 
but with some deviation (DFID, 2010b)24. It is worth noting that DFID’s policy 
and programmatic work on fragile states has shifted since I wrote the CAS in 
2005, to give greater focus to the twin objectives of state-building and peace-
building. This is further explored in Chapter 3 below. 
                                            
24 This guidance includes ‘Briefing Papers’ across nine areas closely linked to the DAC 
Principles: (i) analysing conflict and fragility, (ii) do no harm, (iii) links between politics, security 
and state development, (iv) promoting non-discrimination, (v) aligning with local priorities, (vi) 
practically coordination mechanisms, (vii) act fast…but stay engaged, (viii) risk management, 
(ix) monitoring and evaluation. (DFID, 2010b) 
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2.4 Is there a case for allocating more aid to education in fragile states? 
There appears to be a strong case for allocating more aid to fragile states, on 
grounds of both need and performance. 
 
Aid to fragile states is: (i) less than half that to better performing 
countries, on a per capita basis (Mackinnon, 2003), (ii) more volatile than 
better performing countries (Dollar and Levin, 2005; DFID, 2005), and 
(iii) in the context of post-conflict fragile states, well below absorptive 
capacity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). Fragile states are ‘under-aided’, even 
against a performance-based aid allocation model (Dollar and Levin, 
2005, cited in the CAS, page 14) 
 
Based on a literature review and some statistical modelling, Jones and Kotoglo 
(2005) compare actual aid allocations (1998-2003) with optimal approaches 
implied by the literature. The authors use two bases for estimating optimal 
allocations: a need element, based on poverty and population measures, and 
empirical analysis of a country’s capacity and effective use of aid (using CPIA 
scores). They find that there is a general bias against large countries, but that 
the influence of the policy and institutions variable is dwarfed by population and 
poverty/income measures. For fragile states, ‘donor orphans’ include a belt of 
countries in west and central Africa, plus Uzbekistan, and ‘donor darlings’ 
include Guinea, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone. 
 
For Africa, Nigeria is by a large margin the most under-aided country. The core 
problem for fragile states is not inappropriate models but the lack of a 
coordinated framework for cross-country allocations, particularly for bilateral 
donors. Fragile states require a different approach from non fragile states; the 
key issue is the form of engagement and type of aid that will increase the 
effectiveness with which aid is used (Jones and Kotoglo, 2005). It seems 
therefore that there is a strong case for allocating more aid to fragile states, 
although the literature cited above does not say anything about allocations to 
education specifically. 
 
DFID’s Education Portfolio Review constructed a resource allocation model to 
test whether DFID country programme allocations were being allocated 
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appropriately to meet education goals. A composite indicator (see Figure 2.2 
below) based on indicators of need and likely effectiveness of resources for the 
education sector was used to identify an ‘ideal’ expenditure pattern – both 
across all countries where DFID has a bilateral programme, and across DFID 
priority countries listed in DFID’s then Public Service Agreement with the 
Treasury. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Education resource allocation model designed by James Bianco for DFID’s 
Education Portfolio Review (DFID, 2009) 
 
Comparing DFID’s current plans for 2010/11 with these two alternative 
expenditure patterns shows that DFID’s planned spend across countries is 
about right, principally because of planned large increases in high population 
countries such as Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Pakistan (and 
existing high levels of spend in India and Ethiopia). It is clear however that DFID 
is a relatively ‘progressive’ donor in allocating a high proportion of its bilateral 
programme resources to low-income countries (a commitment to spend 90% in 
low income countries) and to fragile states (a commitment to spend half of all 
new bilateral programme resources in fragile states). In its recent Education 
Strategy launched in March 2010, DFID commits to spending around half of its 
bilateral education aid in fragile states (DFID, 2010a). 
 
There seems to be a strong case, which, among donors, the UK at least has 
found compelling, to invest more education resources in fragile states. For the 
UK in particular this puts a high premium on developing a sound analytical and 
Need: 
 Quality - survival rate to grade 5 
 Number of children out of school 
 Net Enrolment Rate 
 Gender Parity Index 
 
Effectiveness: 
 Average of CPIA components C and D  
C = Policies for social inclusion/equity  
D = Public sector management/institutions 
 Value for Money index of DFID’s Education 
Portfolio Performance 
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programming base for these investments. The project of this thesis is to attempt 
to construct a theoretical base for these investments: an organising framework 
or meta-narrative with strong explanatory and predictive power. This is the task 
of Chapter 3. 
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3. Building the theoretical framework 
 
Chapter 1 sought to establish the purpose of the thesis, how it builds on the 
CAS, and the methodology and methods it will use. Chapter 2 rehearsed and 
updated some of the ground covered in the CAS, defining key concepts and 
providing the context for the project of this thesis: to build a theory for 
understanding the role of overseas development aid in achieving the education 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in fragile states. This Chapter will 
attempt to build that theory, defining key variables, establishing the strength of 
relationships between these variables through grading the evidence 
underpinning those relationships, and organising these variables and their 
relationships into an explanatory framework. 
 
This process will follow six stages: 
 Stage 1 – linking aid inputs and development outcomes; 
 Stage 2 – establishing intermediate effects (financing; institutions / 
policy); 
 Stage 3 – understanding inputs (types & sequencing; non-aid inputs); 
 Stage 4 – understanding delivery (aid effectiveness; with a particular 
focus on harmonisation and alignment); 
 Stage 5 – establishing entry conditions (e.g. stability, political will); 
 Stage 6 – understanding the relationship between education and fragility. 
 
3.1 Stage 1 – linking aid inputs and development outcomes 
Stage 1 of building a theoretical framework is to assess whether there is an 
empirically validated link between inputs and outcomes. In short, is there 
evidence to suggest that aid can contribute in any way to development 
outcomes, including to education outcomes in fragile states? This would seem 
to be the initial proposition that needs to be established, before defining and 
investigating this relationship and its sub-plots in more detail. This section will 
briefly review the evidence, including evidence at the macro level, and evidence 
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at the project level. I will draw on a range of data, including from new empirical 
and desk based research conducted for this thesis. 
 
A review by Foster (2003) – reasonably thorough though not a systematic 
review – states that: 
 
…the balance of evidence strongly suggests that Aid has been a good 
investment. Econometric studies, project evaluations, and country case 
studies find typical rates of return above 20%. Aid has also contributed 
to a doubling of school enrolments and halving of infant mortality since 
1970... (Foster, 2003, page 6). 
 
Evidence from the econometric literature is mixed. Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
find that aid is more effective in good policy environments than in fragile states 
– a finding confirmed by Collier and Dollar (2002). However, subsequent 
research has found that the Burnside and Dollar results are not robust, after 
changing the definitions of ‘good policies’, ‘aid’ and ‘growth’ (Easterly, 2003), or 
after expanding the original dataset to cover more observations and additional 
years (Easterly et al, 2003). Using similar methods, studies have also found that 
aid is effective in increasing growth regardless of the quality of policies and 
institutions (Durbarry et al, 1998; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensink and White, 
2000). Hansen and Tarp (2000) survey three generations of aid-growth 
literature, concluding that “there is a robust aid-growth link even in countries 
hampered by an unfavourable policy environment.”25 Chauvet and Collier find 
that: “The investment of an incremental aid program to a typical failing state of 
$240.8 millions…results in a payoff of around $3.3bn…this suggests that 
expanded aid would be well worthwhile.” (Chauvet and Collier, 2005, page 18). 
 
The positive conclusions of these authors about the effectiveness of aid are not 
however universally shared within the empirical literature. Easterly in particular 
provides a strong critique of the effectiveness of aid (see, for example Easterly 
2001, 2003, 2009). In particular Easterly’s recent (2009) paper makes an 
                                            
25 The studies cited here focus on links between aid and economic growth. Economic growth 
does not necessarily equate to progress against the MDG targets or improved livelihoods for 
poor people. I will not consider this debate here, but I assume that economic growth is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for sustainable poverty reduction. 
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empirical case for the weakness of ‘transformational’ approaches to aid, 
advocating a more modest ‘marginal’ approach. Easterly notes two themes 
emerging from the literature he surveys. First, ‘escalation’: a tendency for aid 
agencies to follow each disappointing transformational effort with a more 
ambitious one. Second, ‘the cycle of ideas’: rather than a progressive testing 
and discarding of failed ideas, a cycle in aid ideas going out of fashion only to 
come back again later. He sees both of these phenomena as symptomatic of a 
lack of learning in the international aid community (Easterly, 2009). 
 
To understand the evidence better, we need to follow Easterly’s lead and further 
break down the complex variable that is aid. In their 2005 survey on aid-growth 
linkages, Harms and Lutz (2005) note that “…it is not surprising that a variable 
as aggregate as official development assistance does not have a robust effect 
on growth” (Harms and Lutz, 2005, page 12). Dreher (2006a) also notes that 
the heterogeneous nature of aid has received relatively limited attention in the 
empirical literature, although studies do exist: 
 
Most studies accounting for different types of aid focus on the 
distinction between project and program aid (or general budget 
support) or the distinction between grants and loans. Mavrotas 
(2005) as well as Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003) represent 
examples of the first group. Gupta et al. (2003), Cordella and Ulku 
(2004) as well as Cohen, Jacquet and Reisen (2006) represent 
examples of the second group. Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 
(2006b) account for both project aid versus budget support and 
grants versus loans in their analysis of US aid. (Dreher et al. 2006a, 
pages 3-4) 
 
The sectoral dimension of aid heterogeneity has also received surprisingly little 
attention. Dreher notes that “...an empirical literature on the effectiveness of aid 
to specific sectors, in particular education and health, is just emerging.” Dreher 
et al., 2006a, page 4). Dreher analyses the impact of education-specific aid to 
education outcomes for about 100 countries over the period 1970-2005. They 
conclude that aid significantly increases primary enrolment. Dreher’s analysis is 
further explored in Stage 2 below, including their investigation of the 
intermediate effects – particularly educational expenditure and the quality of 
institutions – linking aid inputs and education outcomes. 
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It would seem therefore, that there is an empirical case – albeit disputed –  with 
the respect to this measure of effectiveness, based on evidence derived from 
econometric methods, that aid to fragile states can indeed be effective, 
including in the education sector, although, as McGillivray (2006) notes, major 
disputes remain in the wider empirical literature about the impact of different 
forms of aid and the interaction with policy and institutional quality. 
 
The hypothesis that aid can be effective in fragile states seems to be confirmed 
at the project level by the portfolio analysis of DFID education projects in fragile 
states (1991-2007), conducted for this thesis. It is important to note however 
that the meaning of the term effectiveness may be somewhat different. 
‘Effectiveness’ in the project scoring is based on whether projects achieve their 
objectives. Each project will have a different objective, according to how it is 
constructed and the measures of performance identified in its ‘logical 
framework’. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of project scores for DFID 
education projects in fragile states over this 16 year period. 
 
It is worthy of note that almost three quarters of projects (72%) either ‘achieved’ 
(8%) or ‘largely achieved’ (64%) their purpose, with a further 21% that ‘partially 
achieved’ their purpose. However, as noted in the previous chapter, it should be 
noted that there is at least a medium risk of observer bias, in that project 
completion reports are commissioned by the education advisers and 
programme managers whose responsibility is to implement the programmes. 
There are also corporate incentives to score projects highly, as the performance 
of business units (country offices, regional divisions etc.) is in part assessed on 
the basis of project portfolio performance. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the profile of project ratings over time, with each point on the 
graph representing a project. 
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Figure 3.1. Project Scoring: DFID education projects in fragile states (1991-2007) 
(from 1 as highest score to 5 as lowest score; blank indicates project score not recorded) 
 
It is hard to draw additional conclusions from looking at these data as a time 
series. There appears to be no improvement over time, although there does 
appear to be a clustering of ‘2’ scores from late 2003 onwards, possibly driven 
by a period of closer internal scrutiny in DFID, supporting incentives to score 
projects more highly. 
 
The Education Portfolio Review provides further evidence on whether aid can 
support education outcomes in fragile states, using portfolio performance as a 
proxy. It compares education portfolio performance with overall portfolio 
performance. This is summarised in Figure 3.2 below, with fragile states 
shaded.  
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Latest score in 
the last 24 months 
Score in 07/08 or if no 
score then 06/07  
  All Education portfolio  Variance 
Africa DFID Burundi 75% 75% 0% 
 DFID Ethiopia 87% 98% 11% 
 DFID Kenya & Somalia 68% 75% 7% 
 DFID Malawi 60% 77% 17% 
 DFID Mozambique 61% 75% 14% 
 DFID Nigeria 63% 54% -9% 
 DFID Rwanda 70% 75% 5% 
 DFID Sierra Leone 66% 57% -8% 
 DFID Southern Africa 64% 75% 11% 
 DFID Sudan 68% 50% -18% 
 Africa Total 71% 72% 1% 
     
South 
Asia DFID Bangladesh 67% 61% -6% 
 DFID India 76% 73% -3% 
 DFID Nepal 72% 25% -47% 
 DFID Pakistan 75% 75% 0% 
 South Asia Total 72% 68% -4% 
     
MECAB DFID Burma 70% 75% 5% 
 DFID China 80% 77% -3% 
 DFID Vietnam 71% 75% 4% 
 MECAB Total 75% 72% -3% 
All DfID  72% 71% -2% 
 
Figure 3.2. DFID education portfolio performance compared to DFID overall portfolio 
performance; fragile states shaded (Source: DFID Education Portfolio Review)   
 
In overall terms, the difference in project performance between education 
projects and all projects is more marked in fragile states i.e. education projects 
performing worse. It is particularly Sudan that brings down overall performance. 
However, one should be cautious about accepting these conclusions at face 
value given the very small sample size. It is notable that Ethiopia has scored 
particularly well. This is the Protection of Basic Services Project which is 
explored in more detail later in this chapter. 
  
Thornton and Cox (2006) analyse a larger number of DFID projects in fragile 
states (3,211), but over a shorter time period (2002/3 to 2006/7), and assess 
overall project performance. Employing the DFID sliding scale Portfolio Quality 
Index, used by DFID for reporting under its Public Service Agreement, the 
analysis showed that overall performance in fragile states was almost the same 
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as the rest of the portfolio, at around 70%. This finding supports some of the 
cross-country analysis at the macro level, cited above – e.g. Durbarry et al, 
1998; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensink and White, 2000 – that aid can support 
development outcomes in countries regardless of the quality of their policies 
and institutions.  
 
In support of the emerging conclusion that aid inputs can support education 
outcomes in fragile states, can we find examples of specific outputs or 
outcomes that education projects have supported? In conducting the Education 
Portfolio Review, we asked DFID country offices to record some of the results 
that education projects – and broader aid inputs impacting on education 
outcomes, such as budget support – have achieved. Figure 3.3 below shows 
data from selected fragile states derived from the country survey instrument 
used in the DFID Education Portfolio Review. 
 
Number of primary and secondary classrooms constructed (unless 
otherwise stated)  
 2005 2006 2007  
Yemen 
 
- 
 
4 
 
99 
 
Basic Education 
Development 
Project 
Nigeria 
 
1,500 (estimate over 3 years) 
 
Girls Education 
Project 
Number of teachers trained and recruited 
 No of teachers 
trained 
No of teachers 
recruited 
 
Yemen 
 
7,735 (2006) 
11.050 (2007) 
 
 
Basic Education 
Development Project 
Ethiopia 
 
 
5,644 (secondary 
2006) 
 
171,079 (primary 
2005) 
203,309 (2006) 
225,319 (2007) 
Teacher development 
programme 
 
Nigeria 7,500 (over 2 years)  Girls Education 
Project 
 
Figure 3.3. Selected outputs achieved by DFID education programmes in selected fragile states 
(Source: DFID 2009)   
 
It is noticeable that these data are incomplete. This reflects at least two 
problems: (i) the lack of data, and poor data quality, in many fragile states, (ii) 
the difficulty of attributing outputs to aid inputs, particularly when the instrument 
uses government systems or other pooled funding mechanisms. It should also 
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be noted that the numbers of classrooms constructed and teachers trained are 
only proxies for development effectiveness and impact. They do not show 
progress towards the Education MDGs (the subject of this thesis), nor do the 
data above say anything about unit costs and value for money. Nonetheless, 
these data provide some support to the proposition – at project level – that aid 
can be effective in supporting some education outputs in fragile states. We can 
not, however, be fully confident that this translates into education outcomes 
such as better learning in the classroom.  
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Education Portfolio Review goes further 
than Figure 3.2 in estimating that DFID support through country offices alone is 
supporting around 5 million children in primary school worldwide. The Education 
Portfolio Review notes that “…the data underpinning this estimate is patchy and 
it therefore can only provide an indication of the scale of DFID’s support rather 
than an absolute number.” (DFID, 2009, page 21) 
 
It is notable, however, that of this 5 million, only one quarter come from 
countries that are listed as fragile states: 1.2 million of the 5 million total, of 
which only 200,000 come from budget support countries (Cambodia, Sierra 
Leone) from a DFID-wide total of 2.8 million, and 1 million come from non-
budget support countries (with almost 740,000 coming from Ethiopia alone). 
There are three likely explanations for this: (i) data are not available in many 
fragile states, (ii) UK-supported shares of national enrolments are easier to 
estimate in budget support countries where the Education Portfolio Review has 
calculated the number of UK-supported children by calculating the UK share of 
total sub-sector financing and attributing a UK share of enrolments pro rata, (iii) 
DFID is actually supporting fewer children in school in fragile states given the 
potential complexities in doing so. 
 
 
However, on the basis of the analysis in this section, the first building block of 
our theory can be assembled: there seems to be sufficient evidence that aid 
inputs can contribute to development outcomes, including education outcomes, 
in fragile states. Although disputed, there is evidence both at the macro level in 
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terms of economic growth (e.g. Durbarry et al, 1998; Hansen and Tarp, 2000 & 
2001; Lensink and White, 2000; Chauvet and Collier, 2005), and in terms of 
education outcomes (e.g. Dreher et al., 2006a; Foster, 2003). There is also 
evidence at the project level, in terms of overall development outcomes in 
fragile states (e.g. DFID’s Portfolio Quality Index), and education outcomes 
including in fragile states (e.g. DFID portfolio analysis). 
 
However, applying the grading instrument, this relationship can be described as 
medium only, and not strong: 
 methods used are mostly in the medium to weak category; for example, I 
found only one example of what might be described as a systematic 
literature review (Hansen and Tarp, 2000); 
 there is medium to strong risk of observer bias, particularly in the DFID 
self-reported data on performance of projects; 
 whilst corroboration is mostly medium to strong, it is argued that 
weaknesses in methods and observer bias bring the overall assessment 
down to medium. 
 
This relationship is described in diagrammatic terms in Figure 3.4 below, in 
which a grey-shaded arrow denotes the strength of the relationship for which 
the evidence is described as ‘medium’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Theoretical Framework (Stage 1) 
 
3.2 Stage 2 – establishing intermediate effects (financing; institutions / 
policy) 
However, it is clear that accepting this proposed relationship between aid inputs 
and education outcomes requires a considerable leap of faith in terms of 
attribution. To increase our confidence that aid inputs can be causally related to 
education outcomes – and to strengthen further the explanatory power of the 
Aid inputs Education outcomes 
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proposed theory – it may be necessary to introduce and test some ‘intermediate 
effects’ i.e. observable stages or effects that might establish a causal pathway 
between inputs and outputs/outcomes. 
 
The empirical literature has focussed on two observable areas that aid can 
impact, which might in turn have a reasonably identifiable impact on education 
outcomes: (i) financing, and (ii) the quality of institutions and policies. The 
hypotheses we will test is that aid affects education outcomes through one or 
both of the following effects: (i) increasing the volume and efficiency of financing 
available to support education inputs, outputs and outcomes, and (ii) improving 
the quality of institutions (and so efficiency) involved in managing and delivering 
education and broader developmental outcomes. This approach – 
hypothesising and testing intermediate effects to try to establish clearer 
explanatory and causal links between variables – draws in part from the OECD 
DAC Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support (IDD et al. 2006). The 
proposition I am testing is represented diagrammatically in Figure 3.5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Testing the proposition 
 
It should be noted that ‘institutions’ is broadly interpreted to encompass not only 
formally constituted institutions and organisations, but also broader measures of 
democracy, transparency and public participation. Critical theory would argue, 
with some justification, that including democracy leads to an ideologically 
loaded definition, i.e. the assumption that ‘democracy’ is both measurable and 
Education 
outcomes 
1. Inputs   2. Intermediate effects   3. Outcomes 
Financing 
Institutions 
? ? Aid Inputs 
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good. Where ‘institutions’ and ‘democracy’ are defined and measured in the 
studies reviewed here, I will explain and briefly analyse the measures used: e.g. 
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Analysis (CPIA; also used by 
DFID and others), and Freedom House data used by, inter alia, Dreher et al. 
(2006b). 
 
3.2.1 Exploring financing as an intermediate effect 
Intuitively, and following the logic and policies of many donor organisations, 
there should be a link between increased aid and increased total expenditure 
(domestic and external), and then, one would hope, between increased 
expenditure and improved development outcomes; the latter of course 
dependent on the efficiency of that expenditure. 
 
However the empirical literature is divided on the subject. In support of this 
hypothesis, Gupta et al. (1999) report a robust and significantly positive impact 
of combined primary and secondary education spending on combined primary 
and secondary enrolment rates, as well as on grade four completion (a 
traditional but weak proxy for education quality). Baldacci et al. (2004) find that 
spending is indeed the only determinant of combined primary and secondary 
enrolment which remains significant across a number of different econometric 
specifications. Gomanee et al. (2003) claim that aid affects poverty only through 
its effect on pro-poor public expenditures. 
 
However, Gomanee and colleagues come to exactly the opposite conclusion for 
a larger sample of aid-recipient countries considered in a later version of their 
paper (Gomanee et al., 2005). This is supported by other studies. In a paper 
commissioned by DFID, Roberts (2003) surveys the literature linking aid, public 
expenditure and social sector outcomes and concludes that per capita income 
tends to be the most powerful driving force of school attendance, whereas 
supply-side factors, and in particular education expenditure, are statistically 
insignificant in most instances. Roberts cites Filmer and Pritchett (1999) who 
examine the determinants of grade 5 completion rates among 15-19 year olds 
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in a sample of 35 countries and find that, once per capita income is controlled 
for, public expenditure on education loses explanatory power. 
 
Although Dreher et al. (2006a) find that aid significantly increases primary 
school enrolment, in contrast to what donors might expect, their empirical 
analysis rejects the hypothesis that this is at least in part caused by aid 
increasing overall expenditures on education. They find that aid for education is 
unlikely to result in more overall spending on education in the recipient country. 
Turning to the health sector, Easterly (2009) notes that there are a number of 
widely-cited regressions that find no impact of health spending on health 
outcomes (e.g. Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000; Pritchett and Woolcock, 
2004). 
 
These findings are supported by Pettersson’s (2006) finding that sector-specific 
aid is highly fungible2627. However, Dreher neither tests nor rules out the 
possibility that aid can be used to influence the allocation – sector-specific; pro-
poor – of domestic resources through the use of conditionality, performance 
indicators, policy dialogue or other means. It is this that might give the donors 
some comfort: a recognition that while unconditional and unchecked resource 
transfers may be highly fungible and may not therefore lead to increased public 
expenditure, that ‘additionality’ can be achieved through attaching conditions to 
aid, through the design of performance indicators, or through policy dialogue 
around the use of that aid. There is some empirical evidence on the use of 
‘conditionality’, but again the results are mixed. 
 
Collier’s (1997) seminal study provided an empirical basis – largely undisputed 
until recently – to say that conditionality has not worked. Mosley, Hudson and 
                                            
26 There is a burgeoning literature on the fungibility of aid – whether aid increases total 
resources to a sector or simply displaces domestic expenditure – but there is not sufficient 
space to review it in depth in this thesis. 
27 It is important to note that fungibility is neither the only, nor indeed probably principle, 
explanation for the disconnect between financing and outcomes. A simpler explanation is the 
various problems of implementation, including dysfunctional systems e.g. leakage of resources, 
absenteeism and poor performance of public servants, resource gaps (clinics but no drugs; 
schools but no books). 
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Verschoor (2004) have argued that a ‘new form’ of conditionality28 may indeed 
have achieved the desired effects, including affecting pro-poor expenditure. 
That aid can influence domestic policy and resource allocation – through the 
type of means that Dreher posits but does not test – is a key tenet of donors, 
particularly when using budget support.  
 
The Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support commissioned by OECD DAC 
and carried out by the International Development Department of Birmingham 
University and associates (IDD et al. 2006) found that on balance the use of 
general budget support has increased pro-poor expenditures, but with a mixed 
impact on education outcomes, i.e. increased enrolments, but no observable 
impact on equity or on learning outcomes. Investigating whether general budget 
support had affected the performance of public expenditure, the evaluation case 
studies found strong positive evidence in Uganda, Vietnam, Rwanda and 
Mozambique, moderate evidence in Burkina Faso, and weak evidence in 
Malawi and Nicaragua. This relates not only to the volume of resources but also 
to efficiency. The evaluation noted that in Rwanda, Uganda and Mozambique, 
general budget support had, significantly, allowed for a more efficient balance 
between recurrent and capital expenditures.29 
 
On the effect of aid on levels of public expenditure, particularly social sector 
expenditure, it is also worth noting that it is methodologically extremely difficult 
to obtain accurate data, particularly in making cross-country comparisons. Such 
data do not simply fall out of national budgets and accounts. The 2006 Global 
                                            
28 i.e. moving from ‘structural conditionality’ (withholding aid if specific policy reforms are not 
adopted) to the softer form of conditionality, suggested by Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 
based around the use of performance indicators and policy dialogue. In the words of the Joint 
Evaluation of General Budget Support: “The PRSP philosophy is that support for government-
owned PRSs replaces the attempt to impose external solutions through conditionality.” Clearly 
this is not a clear divide, particularly if viewed from a critical theory perspective. The Joint 
Evaluation of General Budget Support notes that government respondents in Rwanda and 
Vietnam clearly perceived less of a difference between new ‘performance indicators’ and old 
‘conditionality’ than did donors. 
29 The balance between recurrent and capital expenditure is one of the key levers available for 
public policy makers, as indeed is the composition of each. A high proportion – up to 90% in 
some countries – of recurrent expenditure in education is spent on salaries. Development 
agencies have sometimes argued for a higher share of recurrent education expenditure to go to 
non-salary inputs, such as textbooks and other ‘quality inputs’, to improve education quality. 
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Monitoring Report of the International Monetary Fund / World Bank notes the 
following difficulties:  
 
The incompleteness of the data makes all observations tentative. 
It also poses a real issue for efforts to link resources to results in 
monitoring MDG progress, at least in the human development 
sectors. The current data platform is wholly inadequate...no 
systematic cross country database unites these data. The only 
available series is produced by the [International Monetary] Fund, 
and it has significant country gaps and no data on subsectoral or 
subnational social spending. It is impossible to say today, for 
example, whether increased ODA for primary education in Sub 
Saharan Africa has been reflected in any increase in government 
spending on primary education across that region. (IMF/WB, 
2006, page 62) 
 
Dreher et al. conclude as follows: 
 
Positive aid effects on educational outcomes in recipient countries 
notwithstanding, our analysis points to some caveats that donors 
should keep in mind when giving aid. First of all, in contrast to 
what donors might expect, aid for education is unlikely to result in 
more overall spending on education in the recipient 
country…Moreover, the finding that aid does not affect 
educational outcomes through budgetary channels, i.e., its effect 
on government expenditure for education, casts into doubt the 
proposal by Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004: F221) to use 
aid as a means to influence “the orientation of public expenditures 
towards poverty reduction.” At least as concerns education, this 
“new form of conditionality” does not appear to have worked in the 
past. Whether the chances for donors to induce recipient 
governments to adopt a more pro-poor public expenditure mix by 
conditioning aid have improved recently, with the advent of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, is left open to debate. 
(Dreher et al., 2006a, page 21, emphasis added) 
 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 
(IDD et al. 2006) – the largest and arguably most rigorous examination of the 
impact of programmatic aid over the last ten years – suggests that the “new 
form of conditionality” may indeed have had some successes. 
 
We might conclude therefore – based on this brief review of selected 
quantitative and qualitative evidence – that there is weak evidence in support of 
 60 
the hypothesis that aid supports education outcomes through increasing the 
total resources available to the sector. Applying the grading instrument, we see 
medium methods, probably a medium to low risk of observer bias, but a low 
degree of corroboration. We also see, as noted by the IMF/WB report cited 
above, that there are significant gaps in data, which makes it difficult to gather 
evidence in support of this proposition. In addition to this, most of the evidence 
examined in this section has not been specific to fragile states, although 
research focussed on aid recipient countries and particularly on sub-Saharan 
Africa will usually include fragile states, subject to the availability of data. This 
reflects significant gaps and weakness in the available research. 
 
That the evidence in support of financing as an intermediate effect is weak, will 
be reflected in the next iteration of the theoretical framework (see Figure 3.6 
below). This relationship will be explored in further detail in the next section 
(Stage 3), which breaks down aid instruments to look at the evidence linking 
financial aid and technical assistance on financing and on education outcomes. 
This will include examining evidence from the DFID portfolio analysis conducted 
for this thesis.  
 
3.2.2 Exploring institutional quality as an intermediate effect 
In section 3.1 above, a review of the literature on the effect of institutional 
quality in the aid-growth relationship noted that some empirical studies have 
found that aid is effective in increasing growth regardless of the quality of 
policies and institutions (Durbarry et al, 1998; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensink 
and White, 2000). Furthermore, Hansen and Tarp (2000) surveyed three 
generations of aid-growth literature and concluded that “there is a robust aid-
growth link even in countries hampered by an unfavourable policy environment.” 
Is there empirical evidence on the role of institutional quality in the relationship 
between education sector-specific aid and education outcomes? 
 
Burnside and Dollar (2004) make the following observation. 
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…researchers coming from the left, the right, and the center have 
all concluded that aid as traditionally practiced has not had 
systematic, beneficial effects on institutions and policies. (Burnside 
and Dollar, 2004, page 4) 
 
However Dreher et al. (2006a) find that aid does improve democracy and 
institutional quality, corroborating the finding of Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2006). 
However, they also find that the impact of aid on education outcomes does not 
depend on democracy and institutional quality, in contrast to Svensson’s (1999) 
hypothesis that the impact of aid is dependent on ‘democracy’. Indeed they 
claim that “aid for education may help achieve universal education even in 
recipient countries characterized by less advanced democratic institutions.” 
(Dreher et al., 2006a, page 21). 
 
IDD et al. (2006) found evidence that general budget support had in some 
cases strengthened public financial management (fiscal space, efficiency, 
planning/budgeting), but that there was little observable evidence that general 
budget support had led to improvements in domestic accountability, 
empowerment of the poor, or reducing corruption. 
 
Again the empirical literature is divided. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2006) show that 
aid flows specifically directed to support democracy are positively associated 
with the likelihood of democratic transition in recipient countries. Tavares (2003) 
maintains that aid has reduced corruption while Knack’s (2001) analysis claims 
that aid has increased corruption. These findings are not necessarily 
contradictory, as they consider different data, and indeed different measures 
(e.g. democracy, corruption) of what our proposed theoretical framework is 
calling ‘institutional / policy effects’. It is plausible, and indeed likely, that 
evidence both for and against the propositions that aid can strengthen 
institutional quality is robust and will depend on contextual and institutional 
issues. 
 
Vallings and Moreno Torres (2005) state that “weak institutions are the central 
driver of fragility”. Colenso (2005a) examines successful examples from the 
health sector in Uganda (Carlson, 2004) and the education sector in Timor 
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Leste (Nicolai, 2004) of donors supporting capacity development in government 
counterparts, also citing evidence to the effect that institutional quality – while 
key – can be protected and developed through a range of means. World Bank 
(2005) analysis of post-conflict reconstruction of education sectors shows how 
in El Salvador and Sri Lanka, the state essentially survived the conflict and so 
led policy development and reform implementation. In Cambodia, Kosovo and 
Timor Leste, however, reconstruction of education systems took place in 
parallel with re-establishment of civil authority and civil administration, requiring 
a different pace and pattern of reform. By contrast, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
there was no shared political vision for system reform and the fragmentation of 
institutions presented major challenges for successful decentralization (World 
Bank, 2005). 
 
The DFID Portfolio Analysis pointed to mixed success in aid aimed at building 
government capacity. However there were projects and programmes that were 
successful in even the most constrained environments, particularly when 
working with local education authorities (Sudan; UNICEF Peace Education; 
2004)30. Experience from a secondary education project in Nepal pointed to the 
importance of reinforcing existing capacity and institutions, rather than creating 
parallel structures. 
 
If a project uses the existing line agencies rather than setting up 
parallel structures, capacity building is reinforced; opportunities 
should be taken to develop already established teacher training 
institutions rather than developing parallel institutions. (Nepal; 
Secondary Education Development Project; 2001) 
 
Mid-term reviews from two DFID education projects noted that links with UK 
institutions were key to building capacity in the public sector (Gambia; Technical 
Training Institute; 1997) (Nigeria; Technical Education; 1997). 
 
In examining the links between aid and the quality of institutions, there is a 
broader issue of whether and how aid can contribute to what has been called in 
                                            
30 The following format is used in this thesis to refer to individual projects analysed as part of the 
DFID Portfolio Analysis described in Section 1.4.1: (country; name of project; year of project 
inception) 
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the literature ‘state-building’. This notion is at the heart of the collective donor 
understanding of why and how to engage in fragile states. Principle 3 of the 
OECD DAC (2005) ‘Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States’ states that development assistance should “…focus on state-building as 
the central objective”. Many commentators – not least of all those adopting a 
critical theory perspective – question both the limits and motives of donor 
agencies in ‘state-building’: is it possible, is it right, to try to effect change on the 
national political economy of the state? It is worth considering briefly the 
evidence on this issue, and how some development agencies, taking DFID as 
an example, are approaching it. 
 
Can external assistance support state-building? The literature on state-building 
has increasingly been driven by the disciplines of political science and 
international relations. This is particularly the case in the aftermath of the Iraq 
and Afghanistan conflicts, where US-led and British-supported interventions 
have been closely scrutinised and widely criticised. While the development 
community has not written widely on ‘state-building’ (Hopp and Kloke-Lesche, 
2004), the rise of the ‘governance’ agenda has strong overlaps. Scott (2007) 
claims that there is little empirical evidence: “Very little research has been done 
that attempts to identify successful state-building and then analyse factors that 
facilitated transitions from weak to effective statehood.” Samuels and Von 
Esidiel (2004) note that there is little debate in the literature over what type of 
state the international community should try to build in fragile contexts (Samuels 
and Von Esidiel, 2004). The normative assumption is that the state is a liberal 
market democracy spread over a geographic territory. According to this 
interpretation, state-building potentially seeks to transfer Western values, 
institutions and norms, which is what exposes it to accusations of neo-
imperialism, in fitting with a critical theory perspective. Proponents of state-
building argue that this sort of neo-colonialism is unlike previous incarnations of 
colonialism in that it is more altruistic, it is multi-lateral, it involves the non-
government sector and interventions advocate early exits (see Paris, 2002). 
 
Commentators have also noted that it is misguided to assume that state 
weakness causes a power vacuum or equates to lack of direction or 
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organisation in fragile states (Reno, 2000; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Where the 
state apparatus seems weak, power may be invested in extremely strong and 
organised informal networks. 
 
Reviewing the literature on state-building, Etzioni (2004) notes that, historically, 
state-building has been most successful as states have sought to break away 
from external powers. The process has not been facilitated by them. Scott 
(2007) also takes up this theme.  
 
There is a particularly strong emphasis in the literature on the 
extremely limited role that external actors can play in state-
building processes. Virtually unanimously, writers on state-
building assert that the international community is not a major 
player in the reconstruction of the state. To be successful, they 
argue, state-building efforts must originate from within the state. 
Where external actors do play a leading role in state-building, they 
undermine the ability of the emerging state to learn to govern 
independently and they disrupt patterns of local ownership, often 
building resentment and creating spoilers (Chesterman, 2004; 
Narten, 2006; Carothers, 2007). Authors repeatedly call for 
external actors to have very modest expectations of their role and 
what they can achieve in other states (Samuels and Von Esidiel, 
2004). (Scott, 2007, original emphasis) 
 
Scott qualifies this statement by saying that the international community should 
not just ignore failing states and refuse to help, rather that their help should be 
designed through the lens of ‘facilitating’, not ‘guiding’ the process. Carothers 
(2007) notes that the international community needs to learn patience, and to 
be willing to let grassroots responses to state failures emerge rather than 
pushing for a particular outcome from outside. Scott concludes that there are 
two things that the international community can do: (i) provide both financial and 
human resources; military resources in conflict zones – Sierra Leone and 
Kosovo seem to present examples of successful military interventions; Iraq and 
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Afghanistan less so – and manpower in non-conflict areas, (ii) facilitate 
participation and create space for dialogue amongst local actors. 
 
DFID’s recently published (2010c) emerging approach to ‘Building the State and 
Securing the Peace’ brings together four objectives: 
 
(i) support inclusive political settlements; 
(ii) address causes of conflict and build resolution mechanisms;  
(iii) develop state survival functions (a basic level of functionality including 
security, revenue, rule of law); 
(iv) respond to public expectations (including provisions of basic 
services). 
 
The interplay of these four objectives is suggested in Figure 3.6 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. DFID’s proposed ‘integrated approach’ to state-building and peace-building (DFID, 
2010c) 
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The DFID paper concludes with six main operational implications of this 
‘integrated approach’: (i) prioritise and sequence, (ii) design interventions to 
support the four objectives, (iii) stay engaged for the long-term, (iv) think 
politically, (v) take a regional approach, (vi) adapt aid instruments. 
 
We might therefore conclude from this brief discussion of aid and state-building 
that this is both difficult (in terms of operating within the national political 
economy of institutional and state dynamics), and potentially questionable (in 
terms of the function of aid in national sovereign space), and also that the 
evidence base is weak. The implications of this for operations in the education 
sector – including whether and how education interventions can increase 
stability and social cohesion – are discussed in more detail in Section 3.6 
below. 
 
 
To conclude this section, when considering the proposition that aid is linked to 
education and broader development outcomes at least in part through 
strengthening the quality of institutions, the evidence can probably be described 
as mixed (although weak on whether collective institutional reform can sum to 
‘state-building’). Methods are best assessed medium; observer bias as medium 
and corroboration as low, although this may be due to different measures of the 
broad set of variables that I have called institutional / policy effects. 
 
Based on the analysis of Stage 2 therefore, in reviewing the evidence of what 
we have called ‘intermediate effects’, we might update our theoretical 
framework as follows, showing: (i) medium evidence for the overall relationship 
between aid inputs and education outcomes (Stage 1), (ii) weak evidence 
supporting the relationship between aid inputs, financing (as the proposed 
intermediate effect) and education outcomes, and (iii) medium evidence 
supporting the relationship between aid inputs, institutional effects and 
education outcomes. 
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Figure 3.7. Theoretical Framework (Stage 2) 
 
 
3.3 Stage 3 – understanding inputs (types & sequencing; non-aid inputs) 
It is clear from analysis in the first two chapters of this thesis that the category 
‘aid inputs’ is too broad to allow for meaningful interpretation of the role of aid in 
supporting education outcomes in fragile states. This section therefore 
proposes breaking down ‘aid inputs’ into two categories: (i) financial aid, (ii) 
technical assistance. I will also add to these a third category: (iii) non-aid inputs. 
 
There are three reasons for first breaking down aid inputs into two categories: 
financial aid and technical cooperation. First, it is a categorisation commonly 
used by aid agencies, including reporting to the OECD DAC, and so 
disaggregated data exist according to these categories. Second, there is 
existing econometric and other analysis that uses this breakdown, which will 
provide a useful starting point for an examination of the evidence of the 
effectiveness of these two different types of aid, including the conditions under 
which they have been effective. Third, if one of the functions of theory is to have 
Education 
outcomes 
1. Inputs   2. Intermediate effects   3. Outcomes 
Financing 
Institutions 
Aid Inputs 
 68 
predictive power with specific policy and operational implications, the 
breakdown of financial aid and technical cooperation is easy transferable to 
policy and operational decision-making. 
 
The additional, third, category of ‘non-aid inputs’ is proposed to reflect the 
significance given in the literature to the interaction between aid inputs and non-
aid inputs such as diplomacy, peacekeeping and other military interventions 
(explored briefly in Section 3.3.3 below). 
 
3.3.1 Financial Aid 
In examining the evidence linking financial aid with education objectives in 
fragile states, it is useful again to start at the macro level and using quantitative 
evidence: 
 
Financial assistance strengthens the preconditions for reform, but 
then becomes counterproductive in the first years of incipient 
reform… However, later in the reform period financial assistance 
probably becomes useful again… Simulation shows financial aid 
delivered in second four year period of reform is highly cost-
effective. (Chauvet and Collier, 2005, page 35) 
 
Chauvet and Collier’s key conclusion – using projections based on empirical 
data – is that financial aid in fragile states can contribute to building resilience 
and a path out of fragility linked to strong institutions and economic growth, but 
that this is contingent upon the timing of that financial aid. However, as noted in 
Section 3.1, this finding is not universally supported in the empirical literature. 
 
We further need to distinguish between different types of financial aid and 
different types of fragile state. In this respect, the conclusion that dominates the 
literature – principally based on qualitative case study evidence – on aid and 
fragile states can be summarised by two recent studies on donor engagement 
in education in fragile states: 
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Using a range of aid modalities depending on the context is more 
effective than following a one-size-fits-all approach. (Brannelly et 
al., 2009, page 54). 
 
…there is a wide range of fragile states, and consequently it is 
difficult to generalise across these diverse development settings. A 
one size fits all approach will not work…(Berry, 2009, page 4) 
 
In order to move beyond this generalisation, conduct analysis and reach 
conclusions that are of greater policy and operational relevance, most studies 
have adopted differentiated analytical frameworks, describing different types of 
fragile states and examining the effectiveness of different instruments and 
approaches in these different contexts. These frameworks are briefly described 
in Chapter 2 above, and in more detail in the Critical Analytic Study. However, it 
is worth analysing in brief how these different analytical frameworks have been 
used to assess the effectiveness of financial aid in fragile states, including to 
support education outcomes, where such analysis exists. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the DFID fragile states typology developed in 2005. Based 
on the DFID definition of fragile states as “states that cannot or will not deliver 
core functions to the majority of its people, particularly the poor” (DFID 2005), 
the DFID typology uses a four-fold framework based on ‘capacity’ and ‘will’. 
Unpublished work I did for DFID applies this framework to financial aid, 
recommending – on the basis of principally case study evidence and a non-
systematic literature review – the following instruments in the following types of 
state: 
 
 High will / low capacity: budget support with coordinated public financial 
management programmes to mitigate fiduciary risks resulting from weak 
capacity; common basket programmes for governance reforms; Sector 
Wide Approaches (SWAps); complementary support to non-state actors; 
 Low will / high capacity: project support to non-state actors for service 
delivery, advocacy and supporting communities; common basket 
programmes for governance reforms; SWAps or sector budget support; 
Global Funds; 
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 Low will / low capacity: project support to non-state actors for service 
delivery, advocacy, and supporting communities.  
 
Later published work by DFID (DFID, 2006), uses a different framework for 
differentiating fragile states – ‘conflict’; ‘post-conflict’; ‘limited pro-poor policies / 
high state capture’ – and explores the roles of different financial aid instruments 
(Figure 3.8 below). 
 
 FRAGILE STATES 
 Conflict post-conflict limited pro-poor policies 
/ high state capture 
Rationale 
for 
Support 
Support political transition, 
peacebuilding, 
delivery/management of 
humanitarian aid and non-
state service provision. Likely 
to be opportunistic and 
subject to diplomatic/political 
and international 
intermediary channels. 
Build consensus on 
development, security 
and political priorities, 
rebuild institutions (legal 
system, property rights, 
police, budgetary and 
audit processes), and 
support service delivery. 
Strengthen forces for 
reform and support non-
state delivery of services 
 
General 
Budget 
Support 
Highly unlikely in face of 
governance and fiduciary 
risks  
To provide incentives for 
pro poor reform with 
provision of adequate 
safeguards (possibly 
external management of 
funds through Trust 
Funds) 
To provide incentives for 
pro poor reform with 
provision of adequate 
safeguards (earmarking)  
Sector 
Budget 
Support 
 To support progressive 
sectors as a possible 
transition to GBS 
To support progressive 
sectors as a possible 
transition to GBS 
Projects  Humanitarian relief  
Importance of diplomatic, 
peacekeeping  
 Govt: rebuilding 
institutions and 
supporting service 
delivery (often externally 
managed) Support to civil 
society,  parliament, audit 
offices, and private sector 
development 
Focus on development of 
pooled support and at 
least shadow alignment  
Bypassing of state as 
necessary  
Moving towards state 
management Support to 
civil society,  parliament, 
audit offices), and private 
sector development 
Developing innovative pro 
poor pilots  
Global 
Funds 
and 
Partnersh
ips 
Tightly earmarked support for 
priority services. Associated 
TA to support proposals. 
Focus on rebuilding systems. 
External management    
  
 
Figure 3.8. (Source: DFID, 2006) 
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In the case of both the unpublished DFID work and of DFID’s (2006) ‘Guidance 
on Aid Instruments’ cited above, the principle methods deployed are general 
(not systematic) literature review and case studies. It is interesting to note that, 
for example, experimental designs to test different policy measures and 
financial aid instruments are almost non-existent within the literature. There is 
one notable and oft-cited exception: a World Bank financed evaluation in 
Cambodia (Loevinsohn, 2001), which found that districts where basic health 
services were ‘contracted out’ to NGOs outperformed control districts under 
existing state management and state-NGO ‘contracting in’ hybrids31, although 
the results of this evaluation has been subsequently challenged (see e.g. 
Soeters and Griffiths, 2003). Within DFID’s Guidance on Aid Instruments (DFID, 
2006), the risk of observer bias should be assessed as at least medium, and the 
research methods as best medium. 
 
Although DFID’s own policy position on education and fragile states is less 
clearly articulated than some other organisations, it is instructive that when 
former Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn was asked 
in Parliament to explain what his Department’s policy is on education in fragile 
states, he replied in terms that described a range of aid instruments according 
to country context, including government “commitment” and capacity”: 
  
In the 2006 White Paper, DFID committed to providing greater 
support to those fragile states furthest behind on the Millennium 
Development Goals. The UK will provide £8.5 billion over the next ten 
years to support education and this will include support for fragile 
states.  In some fragile states, we will work through United Nations 
agencies and civil society where they can make better progress than 
governments in improving education. But we will also work to 
strengthen government systems to deliver services, where they are 
demonstrating a clear commitment to improve education but lack the 
resources and capacity to deliver. 32 
 
                                            
31 The Cambodia experience influenced the design of the health sector contracting model used 
in Afghanistan; this sharing of experience was made easier by the fact that the World Bank 
Health Task Manager for Afghanistan had been heavily involved in the Cambodia programme 
(personal conversation with Ben Loevinsohn, formerly Senior Health Specialist, World Bank 
South Asia Region). 
32 Reply to Oral Question # 123724 from Mr David Evennet MP (Bexleyheath & Crayford), 28 
February 2007.  
 72 
As noted in Chapter 2, the OECD DAC adopted a different framework using four 
categories: ‘deterioration’, ‘arrested development’, ‘post-conflict transition’ and 
‘early recovery’. In their work for the DAC on education service delivery in 
fragile states, Rose and Greeley (2006) reach the following conclusions about 
the effectiveness of different instruments and approaches to education in fragile 
states (textbox below). 
 
 
Summary of evidence of effectiveness of different approaches to supporting 
education in different fragile state contexts (Rose and Greeley, 2006, adapted)  
 
Arrested development – The limited available evidence indicates that engagement with 
civil society through the UN system in this phase can be planned in such a way to 
enable transition to a state system when this becomes possible (e.g. UNICEF’s support 
in Sudan, Afghanistan and Timor Leste). 
 
Deterioration - 1) stay engaged with government as long as possible and use 
government systems but look at how the system is interacting with the conflict (e.g. 
Nepal’s SWAp) 2) where it is no longer possible to work with government (either 
because it has collapsed or it becomes politically impossible), education can be 
supported locally, with support of appropriate institutions (e.g. SC-Norway’s experience 
in Nepal; and SC-UK’s experience in Somalia and Somaliland). 
 
Post-conflict transition/early recovery - this is the area that has been most researched 
in education and where there is the most evidence from case studies. Where there is 
some political willingness, there may be an opportunity to re-engage through 
government systems. Opportunities may exist to build on community level activity (e.g. 
Afghanistan home-based schools’ integration into system-wide planning), and support 
decentralised planning (e.g. Mozambique’s Decentralised Support to Schools’ 
programme). Non-state actors are likely to play an important role in facilitating this 
process, especially in the area of community and local government capacity building, 
with simultaneous efforts needed at central level, which might be facilitated through 
contracting out (e.g. Pakistan Private-Public Partnerships). 
 
 
In his policy brief, Berry (2009) adopts a slightly different approach in his 
analysis of effective approaches to delivering financial aid for education in 
fragile states. This approach focuses on how different approaches relate in 
varying degrees to ‘government-led frameworks’: working ‘within…’, ‘towards…’, 
‘alongside…’ and ‘outside…’ government frameworks, and, as a fifth category, 
working ‘within a global framework’ (textbox below). 
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Summary of 5 successful approaches to delivering financial aid to education in 
fragile states (Berry, 2007, page 1) 
 
 
 SWAp (working within a government-led framework) – The Nepal Education for All 
programme (a partial SWAp) was an effective way to coordinate, deliver and 
monitor education support, even in the midst of armed conflict. The Nepal example 
indicates the importance of finding ways to channel financing through government 
systems that can reach the local level, supporting ministry efforts to take a lead in 
the sector, and investing in regular monitoring of progress with a wide range of 
stakeholders. 
 
 Trust Fund (working towards a government-led framework) – the Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was able to effectively stabilise the education 
sector by paying recurrent costs of teachers in a post crisis situation. The 
Afghanistan example indicates the importance of investing in early efforts to build 
ministry capacity to enable them to take a leadership role in planning, managing 
and monitoring the sector, and of channelling financing as far as possible through 
the sector budget.  
 
 Social Fund (working alongside a government-led framework) – the Yemen Social 
Fund was effective at building on community demand for education and has also 
made an important contribution to an improved gender balance in primary 
education. However, the Yemen example shows that unless the demand side 
inputs are complemented by a prioritised supply-side plan for the sector, they will 
not result in education systems development. A close working relationship with the 
line ministry is therefore crucial. 
 
 UN-led joint approach (working outside a government-led framework) -   In 
Somalia, UNICEF was able to work across all three regions in Somalia and was 
reasonably effective at building partnerships for the development of education 
programmes even in the complete absence of government structures. The 
effectiveness of the UNICEF programme was undermined by a weak coordination 
mechanism, divorced from local stakeholders, and short term funding cycles which 
made it difficult to support partners in institution building. 
 
 Global funds and partnerships (working within a global framework) – efforts to 
use the Fast Track Initiative to support the effective delivery of education in fragile 
states have to date focused on using it to build local planning capacity. The FTI can 
be no substitute for a country-led process, but a newly proposed ‘progressive’ 
framework could be helpful in getting stakeholders to focus on state building and 
education objectives. More work is needed to mobilise increased financing for 
fragile states through the FTI, and this will require significant political will. 
 
 
The key features of the frameworks and typologies described above are three-
fold: 
(i) a classification of states that ranges from most fragile (e.g. low 
capacity / low will; arrested development) to least fragile (e.g. high 
capacity / high will / early recovery); 
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(ii) a matching menu of financial and other aid types that moves from 
least aligned (e.g. ring-fenced projects) to most aligned (e.g. 
general budget support); 
(iii) an approach to delivery – consistent across types of state and aid 
but differently applied – that attempts to meet both service delivery 
objectives and capacity- / state-building objectives.  
 
As already indicated above, studies reveal a range of cases where financial aid 
instruments have contributed both to education and to state-building outcomes 
in fragile states. There is, almost in equal measure, evidence of lack of success 
or impact. This is confirmed by the portfolio analysis conducted for this thesis. 
 
The portfolio analysis of DFID education projects in fragile states shows cases 
where the same instrument has been used successfully and unsuccessfully in 
different cases. For example, reviewing lessons learned from two DFID 
education projects in fragile states, channelling financial aid through 
governments in fragile states has proved both effective and ineffective. Budget 
support programmes in Kenya over-estimated the commitment needed from 
(central) government for this instrument to achieve its policy objectives, and the 
instrument itself – specifically the disbursement triggers – was too blunt to deal 
with this problem33 (Kenya; Budget Support; 2003).  
 
However, the more recent ‘Protection of Basic Services’ instrument in Ethiopia 
successfully maintained levels of external financing in support of basic service 
delivery – with positive education outcomes – by channelling funds to the 
woreda (local government) level and overlaying additional fiduciary controls and 
measures to promote local accountability (Ethiopia; Protection of Basic 
Services; 2007). Research conducted for the 2008 DFID Education Portfolio 
Review shows measures of impact (although attribution of these results to the 
programme itself is not clearly established). 
                                            
33 The importance of prior political commitment is reinforced by the OECD DAC Evaluation of 
General Budget Support (IDD et al., 2006), which reinforced the importance of government 
commitment, in particular citing the example of Malawi. 
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Figure 3.9. Impact of DFID Ethiopia Protection of Basic Services Grant 
(Source: DFID 2008 Education Portfolio Review) 
 
These conclusions are broadly consistent with key findings from the literature. 
However, what can we conclude from the analysis of this section that will be of 
use to building a theory? The central question we must answer is: can financial 
aid contribute to education objectives in fragile states. From the analysis 
presented in this section, I would suggest that the answer is yes, but it is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient input to do so. This would imply a conclusion of 
‘medium’ in terms of the evidence to support this proposition.  
 
There is clearly evidence both for and against the proposition, with a great deal 
dependent on the context, timing and delivery of financial aid. In terms of the 
quality of the evidence, methods can be assessed as medium, dominated by 
case studies and non-systematic literature reviews and with some econometric 
analysis (that has been critiqued); with a strong risk of observer bias, given that 
much of the analysis is conducted either by development agencies themselves 
or by academics / consultants frequently under the employ of development 
agencies; and a medium to high degree of corroboration, dampened somewhat 
by agency incentives and the strong risk of observer bias. 
 
Ethiopia: Protection of Basic Services Grant  £94 million (40% Education) 
Primary education enrolment has increased from 11.5 million children in 2004/05 to 14.0 million in 
2006/07.  There have been corresponding increases in net enrolment rates – particularly at grades 
1-4.  Girls’ NER in grades 1-4 reached 77.2% and Boys’ NER in grades 1-4 reached 81.7% up 
from 65.1% and 69.9% respectively in 2004/05. 
At the same time the pupil teacher ratio has improved in primary education.  The average number 
of pupils per teacher has fallen from 71 to 65 in lower primary grades, and from 55 to 54 in upper 
primary, between 2004/05 and 2006/07. 
Overall, more children are completing primary education.  The completion rate for primary grade 8 
increased to 42.9% in 2006/07 from 34.3% in 2004/05.   
Indicators and progress Expected output 
(2006/07) 
Actual output Comments 
NER Grades 1-4 Girls 64.7% 77.2% Target met 
NER Grades 1-4 Boys 68.5% 81.7% Target met 
NER Grades 5-8 Girls 47.5%   
NER Grades 5-8 Boys 54.2%   
Pupil: teacher ratio 
Grades 1-4 
63 65 Below target 
Pupil: teacher ratio 
Grades 5-8 
52 54 Below target 
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While arriving at an overall judgement of medium, our draft theoretical 
framework invites us to assess the relationship between financial aid and two 
distinct intermediate effects: financing and institutional / policy effects. The 
previous section noted the lack of evidence linking increased aid to increased 
financing, explained by the issue of fungibility. This section has shed no further 
light on this issue, but it has provided some evidence for financial aid supporting 
institutional / policy improvements and overall education outcomes. Therefore I 
propose to assess: the overall relationship between financial aid and education 
outcomes as medium; the relationship between financial aid and financing 
effects as weak; and the relationship between financial aid and institutional / 
policy effects as medium. Put simply, there is some (medium) evidence that 
financial aid has increased outcomes, in part through effects on the institutional 
and policy environment, but there is little evidence that financial aid has 
increased education outcomes through increasing financial resources (these 
conclusions are shown graphically in Figure 3.9). 
 
3.3.2 Technical Assistance 
A review of the evidence suggests that technical assistance can be effective in 
supporting education outcomes, subject to at least 2 connected parameters: (i) 
government will to use it, (ii) supporting incipient reform, rather than directly 
influencing changes in policies and institutions. This is supported by macro-level 
quantitative evidence, and by project level quantitative and qualitative evidence. 
 
Econometric analysis conducted by Chauvet and Collier suggests that technical 
assistance34 can be highly effective in fragile states under certain conditions: 
 
TC [technical cooperation] is only useful when it is provided to 
governments that want and need to use it. Donors should not expect TC 
to influence changes in policies and institutions. However, when 
governments do want and need it, technical cooperation can be very 
productive. (Chauvet and Collier, 2004, page 15) 
 
                                            
34 Chauvet and Collier use the term ‘technical cooperation’, abbreviated to TC, for technical 
assistance. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘technical assistance’ and ‘technical 
cooperation’ are used inter-changeably. 
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In a later paper, Chauvet and Collier propose further evidence on the conditions 
under which technical assistance is effective: 
 
…aid is cost-effective both in inducing and assisting policy turnarounds 
in failing states. However, aid effectiveness depends upon the 
composition and the timing of the assistance…Technical assistance has 
no discernable effect prior to reform, but then becomes highly cost-
effective in accelerating an incipient reform in its early years. (Chauvet 
and Collier, 2005, page 35) 
 
On methodological grounds, we should perhaps be wary of the use of 
econometric methods to establish correlations or causal links between specific 
aid instruments and outcomes, given issues of attribution, causality, the 
different design of instruments and the very different conditions under which 
they might be deployed (Colenso 2005a). This a point emphasised by Easterly 
in his analysis of Collier’s later (2007) research:  
 
Unfortunately, even though the list of endogenous variables is even 
longer and more ambitious than in other cross-country literatures, there 
is either no attempt or a seriously inadequate attempt to find instruments 
or establish causal effects. (Easterly, 2009, page 98) 
 
However, Collier and Chauvet’s analysis is supported by other research that 
demonstrates the potential effectiveness of technical assistance in fragile 
states, particularly in the early years of incipient reform: 
 
DFID TC helped increase customs revenue by 38% in 2 years in post-
conflict Mozambique, and overall revenue collection from 9.5% to 13% of 
GDP over 6 years in post-conflict Rwanda. TC in Afghanistan has 
complemented financial aid provided through the ARTF, and supported 
successful elections. (DFID, 2006, page 25) 
 
The CAS also reviews additional quantitative and qualitative evidence in 
support of the effectiveness of technical assistance in post conflict fragile states, 
including to the health sector in Uganda (Carlson, 2004), and the education 
sector in Timor Leste (Nicolai, 2004) and in Rwanda (Obura, 2003). In the case 
of Rwanda, technical assistance – supported by strong government leadership 
– seems to have been instrumental in setting up a functioning post-genocide 
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education system from the mid 1990s35. Technical cooperation in this case 
helped Rwanda move from an emergency phase, in which the Ministry of 
Education was overwhelmed, to a development phase where the appropriate 
structures are in place to achieve Education for All by 2015. Net enrolment 
became the highest in the region at 91% and parity in enrolment for girls and 
boys at primary and secondary was achieved relatively quickly (Obura, 2003).   
 
These examples at a project level confirm the findings at a macro level of 
Chauvet and Collier (2004, 2005) that government will to use technical 
assistance can be a critical condition for success. 
 
However, there is some evidence at the aggregate level that technical 
assistance projects have less success, and perform less well than other forms 
of aid. 
 
Thornton and Cox (2006) conducted quantitative analysis of DFID’s projects in 
fragile states using project and financial data. Looking at aid modality, only 
Grant Aid, Humanitarian Assistance and Technical Cooperation had enough 
scored projects to support statistical analysis. Humanitarian Assistance 
appeared to be the best performing, yielding a Value For Money (VFM) rating of 
86%. Technical Cooperation was, however, the worst performer, with VFM of 
44% (compared to 62% in non-fragile states).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
35 Specific outputs from donor-funded technical assistance included: Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper; Education Sector Policy and Strategic Plan; the Provision and Management of 
External Financing and associated technical papers which coordinated and harmonised aid and, 
allegedly, increased resources available to the Government of Rwanda. (Personal conversation 
with Jo Bourne, DFID Education Adviser, Rwanda, 2006) 
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Projects 
scored 
Success 
Rate 
Average 
Score VFM PWE 
Fragile states      
Grants and Other Aid in 
Kind 
242 60.4% 0.65 65.2% 68.1% 
Humanitarian Assistance 103 81.2% 0.75 86.2% 75.5% 
Technical Cooperation 228 54.5% 0.64 44.3% 61.7% 
Other states      
Grants and Other Aid in 
Kind 664 66.7% 0.68 74.1% 69.2% 
Humanitarian Assistance 104 81.6% 0.77 88.0% 79.9% 
Technical Cooperation 911 64.7% 0.67 61.9% 65.7% 
 
Table 3.1. Performance36 of DFID projects, by aid type (Thornton and Cox, 2006) 
 
Thornton and Cox also find that technical cooperation proves to be less 
effective in fragile states than in non-fragile states (62% compared to 69%).  
General and sector budget support are both rated higher than project aid, while 
SWAps are rated less effective than projects – a finding that is consistent 
across both fragile and other states. 
 
The Portfolio Analysis of DFID education projects in fragile states finds that 
there is mixed evidence on the benefits of both short- and long-term technical 
assistance, but that the quality of technical assistance personnel is a key 
determinant of project success. High quality technical assistance in counterpart 
leadership posts was key to project success in some instances (e.g. Kiribati; 
Strengthening of Tarawa Technical Institute; 2001). Two projects noted that 
links with UK counterpart institutions were key to project success (Gambia; 
Technical Training Institute; 1997) (Nigeria; Technical Education; 1997). In 
terms of long-term expatriate technical assistance, key attributes included  
flexibility in adapting to changes in local hierarchies (Côte d’Ivoire; Professional 
Development for Secondary Schools Project; 1997) and a willingness to learn 
the language of the host country (Cambodia; Sec. English Teaching Project; 
2001). 
 
                                            
36 In Table 3.1, VFM stands for Value for Money (the percentage of expenditure scoring 1 and 2; 
this was the performance measure used by the Treasury at the time), and PWE stands for 
Performance Weighted Expenditure (a combination of project scores with expenditure data to 
provide a measure of the effectiveness of a given expenditure category).  
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In some cases continuity was key to project success (e.g. Eritrea; English 
Language Teaching, Seter; 1999), although in another case it was found that 
the benefits from continuity of staffing in-country needed to be balanced against 
potential declines in productivity: “successive short-term inputs maintained 
innovation and motivation" (Angola; Institute of Languages Project, Luanda, 
Phase 2; 1998). A familiar shortcoming of international technical assistance was 
that its impact was found to fade after departure of technical assistance 
personnel (e.g. Kenya; Moi University; 1997). 
 
The country survey of the Education Portfolio Review gave specific examples of 
the effective use of technical assistance for education in fragile states. In 
Yemen, technical assistance personnel to the World Bank and then the Ministry 
of Education had a significant impact in terms of setting up effective planning 
structures in the Ministry of Education. In Ethiopia, programme design was 
shown as having benefited significantly from technical assistance personnel, 
and the flexibility of DFID’s technical assistance is reported to have been 
considered particularly valuable by the government. In Nigeria, DFID’s entire 
programme is described as technical assistance; it is reported to have helped 
bring key issues to public attention, generate momentum for change, develop 
reform plans and processes, and pilot innovations in service delivery. As 
previously, however, a strong risk of observer bias should be noted with 
qualitative data derived from the Education Portfolio Review surveys, given that 
they are essentially self-reporting.  
 
In addition to the two types of technical assistance discussed above – technical 
assistance projects and technical assistance personnel – there is a third type of 
technical assistance that merits some brief analysis: the technical assistance 
provided as policy dialogue by development agency staff. Citing the example of 
Cambodia, Cox and Thornton note that budget support in fragile states, while 
inherently risky, “…offers an opportunity to establish a joint platform for dialogue 
on reform processes, and a set of mechanisms (performance reviews; 
benchmarking of progress) that increase the leverage available to donors to 
push forward reforms in difficult environments.” (Cox and Thornton, 2008, page 
50). 
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In response to the country survey instrument used for the Education Portfolio 
Review, DFID Education Advisers reported that they spent on average just over 
25% of their time on policy dialogue37. In the time advisers spent on policy 
dialogue, there is little difference between fragile states and those not 
categorised as fragile states: Sierra Leone, Yemen, Ethiopia, Nigeria and 
Sudan recorded an average of 27%, against 26% for Ghana, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The outliers were Ethiopia and 
India – each over 40%. DFID Education Advisers reported feeling that this is 
one of the most important and potentially effective instruments at their disposal. 
 
The Education Portfolio Review describes how in Rwanda DFID uses a 
combination of different financial aid instruments and technical assistance, 
which, in addition to their own merits, leverage additional finances for the 
education sector and provide a platform for policy dialogue. 
 
DFID Rwanda uses a mixture of general budget support, sector 
budget support and technical assistance to deliver their education 
aid. DFID’s leadership in developing a new sector budget support 
(SBS) modality, alongside a modest financial contribution (£13 mn 
over 5 years) has helped leverage upwards of $176 million for the 
sector (including through delegated co-operation arrangements).  
Associated policy dialogue with government and donors has helped 
to harmonise and strengthen donor interventions, establish strong 
budgeting, reporting and monitoring processes, and strengthen 
collaboration between Ministries of Finance and Education. (DFID, 
2009, page 24) 
 
In overall terms, therefore, in reviewing different sources of evidence at different 
levels, it can be concluded that under the right conditions, technical assistance 
can be effective in contributing to education outcomes, both in terms of 
financing effects and institutional / policy effects. The evidence in support of this 
seems to be medium. There is a significant body of evidence both for and 
against. In terms of the quality of the evidence, methods can again be assessed 
as medium, dominated by case studies and non-systematic literature reviews 
                                            
37 As distinct from the five other categories: donor coordination; oversight of programme 
resources; other sector / other office responsibilities; HIV/AIDS and education issues; gender 
equality and inclusion. 
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and with some critiqued econometric analysis, with a strong risk of observer 
bias, and probably a medium degree of corroboration. 
 
It is worth noting that this finding differs slightly from the findings for financial 
aid. It may seem counter-intuitive that financial aid is a weak instrument to 
increase financial resources, but technical assistance potentially much stronger. 
It is argued that it is principally technical assistance outside of the education 
field that is able to achieve financing effects. While sector-specific aid is in 
principle – and it seems in practice, if the empirical studies are to be believed – 
highly fungible, technical assistance to support revenue collection seems to be 
highly effective in increasing overall resources, including for social sectors. The 
examples were given above of DFID-funded technical assistance helping to 
increase customs revenue by 38% in 2 years in post-conflict Mozambique, and 
overall revenue collection from 9.5% to 13% of GDP over 6 years in post-
conflict Rwanda. In Rwanda this enabled poverty-related spending to increase 
from 4% of GDP to 6.5% of GDP between 2000 and 2003 (DFID, 2006). The 
same DFID paper also notes that technical support to both the Zambia 
Revenue Authority and the Uganda Revenue Authority had a clear positive 
impact on revenue collection and on pro-poor expenditure (DFID, 2006)38. 
 
3.3.3 Non-Aid Inputs 
Collier and Hoeffler (2000b) find that aid is by not necessarily the most effective 
of external inputs: “In a ranking exercise of different instruments for conflict 
prevention, external peacekeeping is far more cost-effective than aid”. The 
potential significance of peacekeeping and other military and diplomatic external 
inputs that complement aid is underlined by Piciotto:  
 
 
                                            
38 "…the support of DFID to the Uganda Revenue Authority since 1992 has been a critical factor 
behind its success in creating a viable institution that managed to double the revenue/GDP 
ration from about 6 per cent at the start of the 1990s to around 12 per cent in the late 1990s”. 
(DFID Evaluation Report EV636, cited in DFID TC Practice Paper). 
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…development cooperation in difficult environments requires a “whole of 
government” approach in donor countries. A host of political, security and 
development obstacles intervene to hinder the development 
effectiveness of donor countries’ engagement with fragile states. 
Therefore, along with well-conceived aid, non-aid interventions must 
connect to responsive segments of fragile countries to pursue realistic 
security and development objectives over time. Experience suggests that 
without sustained political and diplomatic action by all major 
partners…aid is wasted. (Piciotto, 2005, page 12) 
 
The significance of this analysis is that external inputs must be understood 
more broadly than aid inputs. To contribute to education outcomes, and 
particularly perhaps to processes of state-building that will help cement those 
outcomes in a sustainable way in the medium- to long-term, the theory must 
also include the non-aid inputs that contribute to these processes, including 
diplomacy and peacekeeping. 
 
There is also a body of evidence that points to the cost-effectiveness of 
peacekeeping and other military interventions. Chalmers (2004) claims that it is 
more cost effective to prevent states falling into conflict or major collapse than 
to respond once they have failed. He estimates that investing £1 in early / pre-
conflict prevention saves the international community £4 in post-conflict 
response. Brown and Rosencrance (1999) claim that conflict prevention in 
Macedonia cost the international community £0.3 billion, saving an estimated 
£14.7 billion if a conflict contained within Macedonia’s borders had broken out, 
and saving an estimated £143.9 billion if it had escalated to regional 
conflagration. This is the equivalent of between £50 and £500 saved for every 
£1 spent. 
 
There is also some empirical evidence in support of the claim that the 
international community is getting better at supporting peace-building and state-
building in fragile states. In the period 2000 to 2005, only 10% of negotiated 
peace agreements broke down, compared to over 40% in the 1990s. The UN 
estimates that this equates to a saving of around $256 billion per annum (the 
cost of approximately 4 conflicts restarting at $64 billion a year). Commentators 
have pointed out that UN Peacekeeping is not cheap – ($7.87 billion was spent 
on UN peacekeeping in 2009/10) – but that it can be both effective and cost-
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effective, reducing the risk of wars reoccurring by as much as 85% (Fortna, 
2008). Collier (2006) claims that given the cost of a typical civil war, successful 
peacekeeping missions (in the form of international military intervention under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter) can yield a cost-benefit ratio of around 1:7. 
 
However, the convergence of development, diplomatic and security interests 
has also attracted considerable criticism. This applies not only to development 
in broad terms – as outlined in Section 2.2 above (see e.g. Beall et al., 2006; 
Pureza, 2006; Sen and Morris, 2008) – but also within the education sector. 
Novelli (2010) points to an increasing militarisation of aid to education, whereby 
aid (including for education) is increasingly bound up in military / diplomatic / 
development strategies and delivery mechanisms. 
 
Focussing on the US and the UK, Novelli critiques the notion of ‘education as 
counterinsurgency’, pointing to: USAID’s June 2008 ‘3-D approach’ of defence / 
diplomacy / development; Colin Powell’s reference to NGO staff “…a force 
multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team”39; Gordon Brown’s 
September 2009 speech on Afghanistan linking education to a ‘hearts and mind’ 
strategy. Novelli contends that the increasing militarisation of aid has 
detrimental effects not only for long-term development progress but also for the 
personal security of development workers. 
 
The Education Portfolio Review makes a different point about the use of 
diplomacy and other political instruments, noting how development agencies 
have a role in driving political and institutional commitment to education, which 
in turn has the potential to translate into increased resources and better 
education outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
39 former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, ‘Remarks to the National Foreign Policy 
Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations’, at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/5762.htm 
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In addition to DFID’s £529m, rising to £1bn per annum, programmatic 
spend, the UK has significant political and diplomatic instruments at 
its disposal to secure progress on the Education MDGs. Principal 
among these instruments are the following: (i) a Prime Minister and 
Ministers prepared to commit the UK to ambitious targets (£8.5bn) 
and to leveraging major international change, (ii) UK membership of 
the major political blocks: G8, G20, EU, UN Security Council, 
Commonwealth, (iii) UK membership / shareholding in the major 
multilateral development institutions (WB, EC, UN), including the 
largest contributor to IDA. (DFID, 2009, page 2) 
 
The study claims that these instruments are arguably more important in 
securing progress on the Education MDGs than DFID’s direct programme 
spend, including to secure the following objectives: securing commitments from 
the G8, EU and other bilateral partners on aid volumes and on education 
financing and policy; shaping and reforming the multilateral system; forming a 
broader global coalition in support of the Education MDGs, involving faith 
groups, the private sector, schools, communities and individuals. As evidence of 
impact, the portfolio review cites the following: aid commitments secured at the 
G8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005; creation of the Education Fast Track 
Initiative; UN High Level Event raising $4.3 billion in commitments for 
education40. 
 
Therefore, although the evidence is not clear, there is a case to say that both 
military and diplomatic / political interventions may be important instruments to 
support aid instruments in delivering education outcomes for fragile states. 
There is also some evidence that the conflation of development, diplomatic and 
security interests may equally have detrimental effects. 
 
3.3.4 Summary  
Taken together, the analysis of this section on aid and non-aid inputs allows us 
to reach the following conclusions: 
 
                                            
40 To suggest that the $4.3 billion directly supports better education outcomes is to assume that 
it is both additional to existing resources, and that these additional resources support increased 
education expenditure and better education outcomes. It is not altogether clear that we can be 
confident of these claims. 
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 there is medium evidence to suggest that financial aid and technical 
assistance can contribute to education outcomes; supporting evidence 
comes from a wide range of sources and methods, including 
econometric analysis at the cross-national and national level and 
analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, at the project level; as in other 
areas, there is a risk of bias in some  of this analysis as much is written, 
commissioned or published by international development agencies 
themselves; none of the literature reviews can be said to be systematic; 
therefore, we might conclude that the evidence in this area is medium; 
 evidence linking financial aid with financing effects is weak, but there is 
evidence, assessed as medium, linking technical assistance with 
financing effects; 
 there is evidence, assessed as medium, linking both financial aid and 
technical assistance with institutional / policy effects; 
 there is some evidence linking non-aid inputs with institutional / policy 
reform, but not financing effects; 
 there is evidence of the interaction between financing effects and 
institutional effects (e.g. resource availability and implementation 
capacity). 
 
We might therefore expand our theoretical framework as follows. 
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Figure 3.10. Theoretical Framework (Stage 3) 
3.4 Stage 4 – understanding delivery (aid effectiveness; with a particular 
focus on harmonisation and alignment) 
Chapter 2 outlined a tension, explored in more detail in the CAS, between the 
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Principles as a framework for drawing lessons on the role of donors in 
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(International Rescue Committee, Save the Children (UK)), and one country 
(Liberia). The argument put forward in this monograph – supported by much of 
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two aspects of aid effectiveness – and arguably the most important – namely 
harmonisation and alignment. This section relies heavily on the analysis of 
Brannelly et al. (2009), given that it is the most recent, expansive and, probably, 
thorough.  
 
3.4.1 Harmonisation 
The DAC Principle most closely describing harmonisation is Principle 8 (‘Agree 
on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors’). Brannelly 
et al. record four lessons relating to Principle 8.  
 
First, that coordinating the humanitarian and development responses ensures 
the long-term sustainability of interventions. The authors cite examples of good 
practice, although offer less by way of evidence of effectiveness. This lesson is 
however supported by other evidence sources. For example, Laurence and 
Poole (2005) give the example of Haiti as a country “…in which rapid fall-off of 
funding effectively collapsed systems.” Carlson et al. (2005) note from interview 
data that “…many NGOs in particular complain of breaks in continuity of projects 
due to separations in funding.” Second, that coordinating with international 
bodies creates more strategic interventions (again, the IIEP monograph is 
stronger on good practice than on evidence). Third, that effective coordination at 
the country level with government and other stakeholders ensures the effective 
use of resources. The monograph cites case study evidence in support of this 
proposition, including an EC-funded programme in Myanmar, and donor 
coordination in the education sector in Afghanistan and in Liberia. Fourth, that 
while intentions to coordinate may exist among different stakeholders, 
implementation remains a challenge. This fourth lesson is a statement more 
about challenges in implementation, than a statement about what works. 
 
In his analysis for SPIRU, Berry (2007) cites ‘weak coordination mechanisms’ of 
one of three specific obstacles to effective delivery of education aid in fragile 
states. Again, using principally case study data, Berry cites five examples of 
successful approaches to delivering aid to education in fragile states, all of 
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which are good examples of good harmonisation, and indeed alignment (direct 
alignment where possible; ‘shadow alignment’ where not possible). Berry 
acknowledges however that evidence is thin. 
 
Getting stakeholders behind a joint planning process is probably the 
area over which donors have the most control, but even so there 
are only partial examples of success. The most effective 
approaches are in situations where the international community 
develops and supports national government capacity to lead a 
sector or sub-sector process which allows broad stakeholder 
involvement (including national and local level, and state and non 
state actors). Where donors cannot or will not work within 
government leadership, they can still coordinate their efforts in 
order, at a minimum, to share information and programming 
intentions. (Berry, 2007, page 8) 
 
Rose and Greeley note examples from fragile states of incipient attempts to 
promote transitional coordination in the education sector. These include the 
Nepal SWAp, and donors in the DRC, Southern Sudan and Somalia exploring 
common ways of pooling resources and using Joint Assessment Missions (e.g. 
the Joint Donor office that has been set up in Juba in Sudan, involving the UK, 
Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden). There are also joint 
Government/Donor groups for education engaged in policy dialogue and 
sharing of information and resources in Kinshasa and Nairobi (for Somalia) 
whose initial concern is to achieve a more coordinated intervention than was 
possible at the height of the conflict. 
 
These are examples where external partners have responded to the 
importance of holistic planning and coordination as a central part of 
the in-country process of whatever sequence of contributions and 
activities are undertaken. However, the education sector has not 
been in general been able to demonstrate good practice in managing 
the post-conflict transition. Donors are of course sensitive to the 
needs in managing transition, which are much discussed, and have 
reviewed opportunities for more effective engagement through 
greater flexibility in aid instruments.41 Moreover, these poorly 
coordinated decision taking processes are also due to lack of intra-
agency coordination between humanitarian and mainstream 
development parts of agencies and their sub-contractors, as well as 
those amongst those working within the education sector and those 
                                            
41 See Berry et al (2004) and Sommers (2004) on coordination. 
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supporting the governance agenda more generally. (Rose & Greeley, 
2006, page 26) 
 
Evidence from the Portfolio Analysis was mixed. While one project noted that 
direct cooperation between projects and partners had increased effectiveness 
and efficiency (Cambodia; Secondary English Teaching Project; 2001), another 
outlined potential inefficiencies, specifically that co-funding with the World Bank 
had proved ineffective due to slow dispersal of World Bank funds (Solomon 
Islands; Primary Education Project; 1999). 
 
As reported in the previous section, DFID Education Advisers reported in 
response to the survey conducted for the Education Portfolio Review that they 
spent on average 23% of their time on ‘donor coordination’. Many also noted 
that getting donors to work together was one of their principle achievements. 
However there was significant variance within this 23% average, including 
between advisers in fragile states (spending an average of 29% of their time on 
donor coordination), and advisers in other countries (only 17%). The outliers 
were: Sudan (50%; possibly given the high transaction costs of the joint donor 
office42, the use of joint instruments and the very difficult operating 
environment): Sierra Leone (40%; a relatively ‘immature’ operating environment 
for international development agencies where SWAps and other ways joint 
working are at an early stage); and India (8%; reflecting a very efficient donor 
operating environment where there are only three major donors – the World 
Bank, DFID, and the EC – who have all been using the same financial aid 
instrument for several years).  
 
Within the state-building literature, the international community has been heavily 
criticised for its lack of harmonisation in state-building activities (see for 
example: Ghani et al. 2005; Samuels, 2006; Paris 2006, Rubin, 2006), implying 
that it may be possible to achieve efficiency gains through greater collaboration. 
 
As in other areas, this section has not reviewed the literature systematically, nor 
can the original research conducted for this thesis claim to provide definitive nor 
                                            
42 This in itself might cast into the doubt the supposed efficiencies of a joint donor office. 
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particularly robust conclusions. However, there seems to exist evidence, 
principally from case studies, in support of the proposition that effective 
coordination and harmonisation can support more effective delivery of aid to 
education in fragile states. 
 
3.4.2 Alignment  
Similar to harmonisation, alignment and shadow alignment now form part of the 
donor lexicon and toolkit of working in fragile states. There is varied evidence 
on the benefits of alignment, including the idea of shadow alignment (e.g. ODI, 
2005) and decentralisation to avoid sponsoring central government. 
 
Returning to the 2009 IIEP monograph, the DAC Principle most closely 
describing alignment is Principle 7 (‘Align with local priorities’). Brannelly et al. 
(2009) record three lessons relating to Principle 8. First, that alignment is 
important. The authors cite examples from Myanmar, Yemen and Afghanistan, 
although it is not clear that these are examples of ‘evidence’ or of ‘emerging 
best practice’. Second, that having a country programme or education project 
that broadly supports the government’s education sector policy and plan, where 
available, leads to a more coherent and strategic intervention. Examples of best 
practice are cited from Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Third, that where 
governments “have issues of illegitimacy and governance or public perception 
concerns” it is still possible to plan a strategic response through ‘shadow 
aligned’ systems. Examples of Yemen and Somalia are given; once again it 
seems more as good practice than evidence. 
 
There is some evidence on the importance of alignment from the DFID Portfolio 
Analysis, such as the following insight from a project completion report from an 
education project in Nepal: “If a project uses the existing line agencies rather 
than setting up parallel structures, capacity building is reinforced; opportunities 
should be taken to develop already established teacher training institutions 
rather than developing parallel institutions." (Nepal; Secondary Education 
Development Project; 2001). 
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In overall terms, the evidence in support of ‘aid effectiveness’ principles can be 
said to be medium. Method – reliant principally on case studies – might be 
assessed as medium, with a medium to high risk of observer bias, but a 
medium to high degree of corroboration. This brief analysis of aid effectiveness 
justifies the following expansion of the theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Theoretical Framework (Stage 4) 
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instrument. The preceding analysis of this Chapter suggests that a similar 
approach be used here. There are emerging contextual themes that seem to be 
consistent across the literature and other evidence sources. For example, 
Nicolai (2009) notes “preferable conditions for reform”, including security, basic 
governance capacity and political consensus. Building on Nicolai’s conditions 
for reform, I propose three themes, for which supporting evidence will be sought 
in this section: (i) security / stability, (ii) political will / ownership, (iii) community 
ownership.  
 
3.5.1 Security / stability 
Intuitively, it would seem that there is a strong case that security and stability is 
a pre-condition for significant progress in education. This seems to be borne out 
empirically. Of the 20 countries assessed by UNESCO Institute of Statistics as 
having made the best progress on MDG2 between 1999 and 2005 (see Table 
2.1 in Chapter 2), only one country, Nepal, could be said to be undergoing 
armed conflict. 
 
There are many reasons why conflict and instability are not conducive to 
education outcomes, including but not limited to physical destruction (Colenso 
2005a). For example, it is not unusual for the majority of schools to require 
repair or reconstruction: Timor Leste (95%); Iraq (85%); Kosovo (65%); Bosnia-
Herzegovina (50%) (World Bank, 2005). 
 
One reason cited by analysts and lobbyists – notably Save the Children (UK) – 
for lack of progress on education in countries affected by conflict and by natural 
disasters is the low levels of humanitarian aid allocated to education. The CAS 
provides some data in support of this claim. Brannelly et al. (2009) provide more 
recent data, noting that humanitarian aid in 2007 totalled over US$7.5 billion in 
current prices, of which only 1.9% (US$146 million) was allocated to education. 
Of the major donors, France provided the lowest proportion (0.16%) and 
Denmark the highest (4.71%), with the UK at 0.84%.  
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Munoz (2008) argues that the de-prioritisation by donor agencies of education 
in emergency situations sits in contrast to the demands of refugees and 
internally displaced people themselves, who frequently list education as a 
priority need after food and shelter. 
 
The DFID Education Portfolio Analysis confirms that “conflict” and “social 
unrest” has been an impediment to project performance, with examples from 
Burundi (Burundi; English Language Teaching; 1993) and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC; English Language Training; 1993). This reinforces the 
earlier hypothesis that non-aid instruments are as key to achieving education 
outcomes as aid instruments, and that interventions outside of the education 
sector are critical to achieving education outcomes. 
 
We might conclude that, while progress can be made in countries affected by 
conflict and major instability, this progress may be short-termist and subject to 
patterns and cycles of conflict. It would seem therefore, that evidence in support 
of this hypothesis seems be strong. 
 
3.5.2 Political will 
Rose and Greeley’s (2006) analysis concludes that progress on education 
service delivery is likely to pertain in fragile states where there is some political 
will and the beginnings of policy turnarounds. 
 
As evidence from country case studies in the four different conditions 
of fragility illustrates, the importance of transition from international to 
national leadership, with emphasis on promoting domestic ownership 
of education sector development, is found to be crucial for promoting 
legitimacy, and resonates with principles associated with 
turnaround…The likelihood that donor support will help create 
turnaround conditions is very low where will is weak or non-existent. 
(Rose & Greeley, 2006, page 6) 
 
This is confirmed by Berry: “…in trying to get stakeholders behind a joint 
planning process, it is important to have government ownership of the planning 
process, even if this can only be achieved at sub-national levels” (Berry, 2009, 
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page 5). This is further reinforced by the econometric analysis of Chauvet and 
Collier (2004), who, as cited above, suggest that technical assistance can be 
highly effective in fragile states “…when governments do want and need it” 
(Chauvet and Collier, 2004, page 15). 
 
Agreement between the analysis of Rose and Greeley (principally literature 
reviews, case study and interviews) and of Collier (cross-country econometric 
analysis) is further corroborated by the Portfolio Analysis of DFID education 
projects in fragile states. Political will and government ownership are shown to 
be key to project success, particularly when introducing new concepts into the 
public sector, scaling up innovation, and using delivery channels aligned to 
government systems. The understanding, commitment and leadership of senior 
national officials have been central to the success of a number of projects: 
(Burundi; English Language Teaching; 1993); (Indonesia; Active Learning 
ALPS Schools; 1996); (Cambodia; Sec. English Teaching Project; 1997). 
 
Many projects noted the importance of working through existing government 
agencies: "…operating from within Ministry departments increases ownership, 
credibility, power of influence and access to counterparts" (Cambodia; 
Secondary English Teaching Project; 2001). "If a project uses the existing line 
agencies rather than setting up parallel structures, capacity building is 
reinforced…” (Nepal; Secondary Education Development Project; 2001). One 
project in Nigeria noted that strong governmental ownership was needed to 
introduce new concepts into public sector, and to scale up NGO innovations 
(Nigeria; Life Planning Education; 2003). The leadership of partners, rather than 
DFID, was frequently considered key to the success and potential sustainability 
of projects (e.g. Kiribati; Strengthening of Tarawa Technical Institute; 2001). 
 
Evidence cited above builds on evidence examined in the Critical Analytic 
Study. Post-conflict Uganda is a positive example of: a ‘turnaround’ country that 
has made progress in moving from conflict – at least from a national conflict to a 
localized conflict – into a period of relative stability and economic growth, 
accompanied by considerable progress towards the education MDGs. 
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…there again is now [sic] clear research evidence about whether there 
was some ‘magic mix’ of national leadership and donor leadership in the 
late 1980s that got it just right. What is known is that tremendous effort 
did go into rebuilding government infrastructure and human capacity, 
reasonably quickly (donors were initially hesitant just after the NRM 
[National Resistance Government] took power), and that this has reaped 
benefits in terms of pro-poor policies. (Carlson et al., 2005, page 13) 
 
The CAS also cites the negative example of the health sector in Angola. 
 
There appeared to be a minimum commitment to health and the provision 
of health services in general by government. As a result, and despite 
donor efforts at institutional strengthening at central Ministry of Health 
level, as well as provincial and municipality level, projects had limited 
impact as there was little strategic direction and little outreach to 
communities (Fustukian, 2004, cited in Carlson et al., 2005, page 9). 
 
Recent analytical and policy work from DFID emphasises the importance of 
‘inclusive’ political settlements in fragile states, particularly in post-conflict 
situations (DFID, 2010b). A political settlement is an agreement within a society 
about how power is allocated and exercised. This may be reflected in formal 
rules (e.g. through a constitution, laws governing elections and markets) or 
informal arrangements that underpin important relationships (e.g. between elite 
families, powerful tribal or ethnic groups). Inclusivity can refer both to the way in 
which in which a settlement is reached (a process in involving multiple 
stakeholders and, significantly, not alienating minority groups or groups with 
grievances), as well at the outcome of that settlement. DFID policy guidance 
(DFID, 2010a, 2010b) suggests that inclusive political settlements are better 
able to address the causes of conflict and meet public expectations (and 
therefore address poverty/development challenges).  
 
Evidence is cited in support of this claim. ODI (2007) claim that without a 
political settlement, alongside the ability to exercise security and basic 
administration, a state will be unable to deliver key functions (e.g. justice, 
economic management) effectively. Lindeman (2008) claims that while inclusive 
elite bargains permit the maintenance of political stability, exclusionary elite 
bargains give rise to trajectories of civil war. There is evidence to the effect that 
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authoritarian regimes and full democracies are the most stable, while partial 
democracies are more prone to instability.43 
 
Guelke (2003) claims that peace processes provide a window of opportunity to 
reshape existing political settlements; and that an inclusive peace process is 
essential to building a legitimate and comprehensive peace agreement that is 
more likely to be acceptable to the population. In a recent publication, the 
OECD DAC (2010) claims that interventions by donor agencies can influence 
the incentives for elites to buy into peacebuilding process. For example, donor 
support to electoral process in Sierra Leone led to a more inclusive political 
settlement. In contrast, the donor supported election in Afghanistan resulted in 
an exclusionary political settlement which contained incentives for the 
continuation of armed conflict. 
 
It would seem, therefore, that there exists strong evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that political will and ownership may form a key ‘entry condition’ to 
the effectiveness of aid in driving education outcomes in fragile states. Evidence 
is cited above from a variety of sources (albeit with potential for observer bias), 
using a number of methods, and with no discrepant cases found. 
 
3.5.3 Community ownership 
A number of sources of evidence point to the importance of communities – and 
aid interventions that empower and resource communities – in improving 
education outcomes in fragile states. 
 
The process of decentralization in post-conflict El Salvador was 
facilitated at the local level by incentives to schools that chose to 
directly manage their funds (quality bonus, teacher training 
allowance, food voucher schemes etc.) Part of the success of El 
Salvador’s Education with Community Participation Program 
(EDUCO) is that it built on the successful community-controlled 
                                            
43 The source of this claim is the Political Instability Task Force – a group of Harvard-based 
academics active in 2003.  have not been able to confirm the source of this claim but I believe 
that it is derived from a data set held by the University of Maryland. 
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schooling that emerged during the conflict44 (World Bank, 2005, page 
45).  
 
Nicolai (2004) claims that community action was a critical factor in ensuring [in 
Timor Leste] that 86% of classrooms and 80% of furniture were rehabilitated 
within 18 months, and that 50% of books were delivered to students. In Kosovo, 
communities initiated the resumption of schooling, with significant support from 
international agencies and a back-to-school advocacy campaign that delivered 
supplies, textbooks, tents and shelter materials (Sommers and Buckland, 
2004). In Cambodia, grants to schools and school clusters helped engage 
parents with teachers and school authorities in strategies to improve the quality 
of the learning environment (World Bank, 2005).  
 
The review of the literature in the CAS – see particularly Slaymaker et al. (2005) 
– on the determinants of successful community-based approaches notes a 
range of different objectives associated with such approaches. They note that 
care should be taken to define and differentiate between objectives, in 
particular: differentiating between adopting a community-based approach and 
simply implementing projects at a community level; avoiding the assumption 
that because community-based approaches can be used to achieve a range of 
different objectives, using them will achieve those objectives; identifying a 
hierarchy of objectives and acknowledging trade-offs between them. 
 
They note that challenges include defining the user community, the degree of 
local authority involvement, and targeting and financing. Key to the success of 
community-based approaches is “…the existence of an ‘enabling environment’ 
which can provide information to support identification of appropriate solutions, 
decide on the optimum level of provision, ensure maintenance of minimum 
standards, and respond flexibly to changing demand for services over time.” 
(Slaymaker et al., 2005, page 4). 
 
                                            
44 Sommers (2002) notes that “…emergency education is community-centred largely by default. 
Governments involved in wars are usually too weak or too negligent to lead the education 
sector during times of war.” (Sommers, 2002, page 27) 
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In the recent IIEP publication, Sullivan-Owomoyela and Brannelly (2009) note 
the following factors which contribute to promoting community participation and 
fostering partnerships between communities, the state and other education 
stakeholders: the restoration of trust; the importance of context; planning for the 
long-term; keeping expectations realistic; building partnerships.They trace the 
following policy implications: 
 promote the use of existing positive community structures; 
 work with existing community capacity and needs; 
 integrate capacity development and training for communities; 
 integrate education responses with broader community initiatives; 
 plan for the long term and utilise examples of good practice. 
 
It is hard to argue with these policy implications. They are generic to the point of 
being self-evident, as are the ‘implementation recommendations’ cited later in 
the study, e.g. “ensure education programmes are adapted to meet the specific 
needs of communities”; “build on local capacity to strengthen education 
programming” (Sullivan-Owomoyela and Brannelly, 2009). The methods 
involved in this study are: literature review; ‘field reviews’ of the West Bank, 
Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Liberia; desk review of Afghanistan, South Sudan 
and northern Uganda. Citing Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1989), the authors 
characterise this as a “mixed method complementarity design”, using multiple 
inductive and deductive methods of data collection and analysis. 
 
There is also considerable supportive evidence from the DFID Project Portfolio 
Analysis. The key message is that projects can catalyse community 
involvement, which in turn can increase the relevance, effectiveness and 
sustainability of reforms. In two projects in Kenya, community involvement and 
local ownership were considered critical to project success (Kenya; Secondary 
School Science Labs; 1991) (Kenya; English Language Teaching in Secondary 
Schools; 1992). There were examples of successful education projects in fragile 
states have been built specifically around community involvement (e.g. Nigeria; 
Community education programme; 2003). A 2004 project in Sudan noted that 
projects themselves can be the catalyst for community activity: "The benefits of 
the project have incentivised community involvement: community leaders' 
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participation in education and Parent Teacher Councils were strengthened." 
(Sudan; UNICEF Peace Education; 2004). 
 
Linked to the idea of community ownership is the critical issue of demand for 
education from communities, households and individuals. The CAS reports a 
2004 Nigeria Ed-Data District Household Survey which found that the most 
significant reason for children never attending school is that their labour is 
needed in the family (34%).  It is an even higher proportion for girls (37%). This 
is well ahead of the next most important reason: the monetary cost of education 
(23%).  Supply-side factors are less significant, including the school being too 
far from home (20%) and poor school quality (14%). This has significant 
implications for education strategies.  Demand-side financing of education – for 
example, through cash transfers – may be more effective than just simply 
abolishing fees, which may in turn be more effective than focussing resources 
on supply-side constraints. 
 
The need for local ownership also appears throughout the literature on 
governance and state-building (see for example Chesterman et al., 2005; 
Narten, 2006). 
 
In summary, evidence of the importance of community ownership as an entry 
condition and determinant of success seems to be medium to strong. While 
methods might be described as medium, corroboration is high and observer 
bias might reasonably be assessed as low to medium. 
 
Finally, we might reasonably point to a relationship between the three entry 
conditions: i.e. linkages – and the importance of understanding those linkages 
in theoretical, policy and operational terms – between political will, community 
ownership, and social stability / security. That these interactions are critical is 
clear, though we can not claim to understand them. Nor has a full examination 
of these relationships – requiring consideration of extensive literature in the 
fields of political science and sociology among others – been considered to be 
within the scope of this thesis. 
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The following adjustments might therefore be made to the theoretical 
framework. 
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3.6 Stage 5 – understanding the relationship between education and 
fragility 
A key hypothesis to investigate in building a theory linking aid to education 
outcomes in fragile states is the oft-cited, and intuitively plausible, connection 
between education and social cohesion: the idea that the more that people are 
educated, the more they are likely to co-exist peacefully. Is there evidence to 
confirm the proposition that education is linked to increased social stability? 
Stage 5 will take us through the evidence for and against this proposition, 
including different measures of peace, social stability and social cohesion45. If 
we can ascertain this linkage, it is potentially useful for our theoretical 
framework, providing an important loop back from education outcomes into 
addressing the very sources of fragility that define fragile states. 
  
The Critical Analytic Study notes an increase of analytical work since 2000 
focussing on the links between education and social cohesion. Bush and 
Saltarelli (2000) pointed to “the two faces of education in ethnic conflict”, 
highlighting the potential role of education in amplifying social divisions and as a 
precipitating factor in the outbreak of political violence. They identify a number 
of ways in which education has exacerbated hostility, including: the uneven 
distribution of education; education as a weapon of cultural repression; denial of 
education as a weapon of war; the manipulation of history for political ends; the 
manipulation of textbooks; and segregated education that can reinforce 
inequality, low self-esteem and stereotyping (Bush and Saltarelli 2000). These 
themes have subsequently been developed by, amongst others, CIDA (2002), 
Smith and Vaux (2003), UNESCO IBE (2004) and Colenso (2005b). Most of 
these studies have employed literature review, case study and interview 
methods. 
 
                                            
45 As Green, Preston and Sabates (2003) point out: “Social capital does not always translate 
into societal cohesion, since intracommunity bonding does not necessarily lead to inter-
community harmony. Some types of association may be beneficial for wider societal trust and 
harmony; others may not be.” (Green et al. 2003, page iii) 
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Using econometric methods, Stewart (2000)46 argues that civil wars occur when 
groups mobilise against each other, often on the basis of ethnicity or religion, 
and that such mobilisation is effective where there are substantial horizontal 
inequalities (e.g. inequalities between ethnic groups) which cause resentment. 
Stewart proposes four dimensions of inequalities: (i) political participation, (ii) 
economic assets, (iii) incomes and employment, and (iv) social aspects. Stewart 
draws the following policy implications with respect to basic services, including 
education: 
 
To ensure balance in group access to education at all levels; health 
services; water and sanitation; housing and consumer subsidies (if 
relevant). Equality of access in education is particularly important since 
this contributes to equity in income earning potential, while its absence 
perpetuates inequality in incomes. (Stewart, 2000, cited in Colenso, 
2005, page 19) 
 
Building on Stewart’s analysis, Østby (2003) uses data from Demographic and 
Health Surveys from 33 developing countries to establish indicators on 
inequality between ethnic groups along three dimensions: (i) social, (ii) 
economic, and (iii) health-related. He confirms the findings of World Bank 
studies of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000a, 2000b) that vertical inequality 
(i.e. between individuals) does not increase the risk of internal armed conflict. 
However, in support of Stewart’s (2000) thesis, he finds evidence that horizontal 
inequalities are positively related to domestic armed conflict. 
 
Putnam (2004) frames his investigation in positive terms. He makes the 
following claim about links between education, social capital and social 
cohesion: 
 
For any government concerned to increase social capital and social 
cohesion, the educational process is the single most important policy 
lever…in most (perhaps all) countries the best predictor of high social 
capital is simply years of formal education. (Putnam, 2004, cited in 
Colenso, 2005, page 19) 
 
                                            
46 Stewart refers to “general analysis of conflicts which is partly drawn from the findings of a 
recent research programme into the economic and social causes of conflict”, but does not 
elaborate further on methodology and methods underpinning the analysis of her paper. 
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Putnam cites empirical quantitative evidence to claim that quantity of education 
alone (i.e. aggregate years of schooling) is strongly associated with social 
cohesion. Although he uses data drawn from OECD countries, his research is 
potentially important for fragile states, if an empirical (and theoretical) link can 
be established between education and social unrest / conflict. 
 
In contrast to Putnam, however, Green & Preston (2001)47 claim that there 
appears to be no significant correlation at national level between aggregate 
levels of education and social cohesion. Green and Preston analyse cross-
national data on education outcomes (IALS data), income inequality (Gini 
coefficient and GNP per capita taken from World Bank, 2001), and measures of 
social cohesion. They conclude that while there appears to be no significant 
correlation at national level between aggregate levels of education and social 
cohesion, inequality of educational outcomes, however, is closely connected to 
income inequality, which is closely connected to many of the measures of social 
cohesion. In other words, it is not the total amount of education that is 
significant, as per Putnam’s claim, but the distribution of education outcomes. 
The authors point out, however, that in these relationships it is not clear in 
which direction the causal arrows might run. Green and Preston’s model is 
shown in Figure 3.13 below48. 
 
                                            
47 Green and Preston’s work on social capital and social cohesion is further developed in Green, 
Preston and Sabates (2003) and Green and Peston (2003). 
48 Green and Preston do not however test the ‘socialisation’ function of education, i.e. that 
children develop competencies such as tolerance and peaceful co-existence in the classroom. 
  
106
 
 
Figure 3.13. Framework for understanding linkages between education and social cohesion 
(Green & Preston, 2001) 
 
Putnam and Green & Preston arrive at different conclusions mainly because 
they have different definitions of what constitutes ‘social cohesion’. Green & 
Preston reject Putnam’s social capital model, which, they contend, treats social 
cohesion as an aggregation of individual-level characteristics (particularly 
‘associational membership’). Instead, they present a 'societal approach to social 
cohesion', identifying a set of variables that form a combined indicator of 
national-level social cohesion. These variables include measures of 'general 
trust', 'trust in government' and 'cheating' taken from the World Values 
Surveys49 of 1990 and 1995, and crime data50 taken from INTERPOL (1996). 
Green & Preston conclude that in addition to focusing on the development of 
shared or cooperative values, education policy-makers should focus more 
attention on the attenuation of inequalities in educational outcomes (Green & 
Preston, 2001). 
 
                                            
49 For the World Values Surveys survey instruments, see http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/wvs-
ques4.html. 
50 Sabates and Feinstein have developed further evidence on education and crime reduction in 
the UK. See for example, Sabates (2008, 2010), Sabates and Feinstein (2008). 
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Ritzen, Wang & Duthilleul (2002) use similar data sets to examine the role of 
education in building 'cohesive', productive societies, analysing 'trust' as a 
measure of social cohesion51. They confirm a negative relation between income 
inequality and trust (i.e. the higher the income inequality, the lower the level of 
trust), and between education inequality and trust (i.e. the higher the level of 
education inequality, the lower the level of trust). The authors conclude that 
“…from the perspective of cohesion, a new push is required to reduce the 
inequality in education achievement, in particular where this inequality lowers 
average achievement” (Ritzen et al., 2002, page 22). 
 
There is further quantitative evidence supporting the links between education 
and reducing fragility. Based on cross-country regression analysis, it has been 
estimated that each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by 20 percent, 
with secondary education found to be particularly important for promoting state 
‘turnaround’ (Meagher, 2005; Chauvet and Collier, 2005). However, it is difficult 
to disentangle education’s effect from other influences. Moreover, there is 
evidence of education contributing to increased fragility, for example through 
concentrating resources and opportunities in the hands of elites, or orienting the 
curriculum and learning materials towards a particular ethnic or language group 
(Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Smith and Vaux, 2003; Wickrema and Colenso, 
2003; Davies, 2004; Seitz, 2004; Burde, 2005; Vaux and Visman, 2005; World 
Bank, 2005).  
 
Taken together, the analysis – principally empirical and quantitative – of 
Vallings and Moreno Torres (2005), Stewart (2000), Østby (2003), Putnam 
(2004), Green & Preston (2001) and Ritzen et al. (2002), Meagher (2005), 
Chauvet and Collier (2005), supports the thesis that there exist links between 
education and social unrest / conflict. It should be noted that – with the 
exception of Chauvet and Collier – these studies use data sets principally from 
OECD countries. 
 
Davies (2004) analyses this issue from a different perspective and using 
different methods. Drawing heavily from theory in the social sciences and using 
                                            
51 The authors substitute the Program for International Student Achievement (PISA) scores for 
IALS scores. 
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principally qualitative data, Davies explores the relationship between schooling 
and conflict in terms of three analytic categories: (i) economic and class 
relations, (ii) gender and violence, and (iii) pluralism and identity. Davies uses 
the theoretical framework of complexity theory to underpin her analysis of 
education and conflict. She stresses that complexity is not a ‘grand narrative’52 
of social interaction, but more a way of seeing connections and possibilities. 
Davies emphasises as central to complexity and chaos theory the notion of 
dynamic and non-linear ‘complex adaptive systems’. 
 
This is an appealing framework for both education and conflict (or indeed 
fragility), as neither leads itself to a reductionist, mechanistic explanatory 
framework, in particular when the two are combined i.e. exploring the 
connections between education and conflict / fragility. Emphasising the non-
linearity of complexity theory, Davies observes: “…this is why the school 
effectiveness movement was destined to fail, in its simple cause-and-effect, 
factorial, decontextualised models of change (Harber and Davies, 1997; Byrne, 
1998; Brooke-Smith, 2001).” Davies concludes as follows: “…education 
indirectly does more to contribute to the underlying causes of conflict than it 
does to contribute to peace.” 
 
This is a bold assertion, and it is not clear that it is, or could be, empirically 
grounded. Davies goes on to explain why she believes this is the case. 
 
This is through reproduction of economic inequality and the bifurcation of 
wealth/poverty; through the promotion of a particular version of 
hegemonic masculinity and gender segregation; and through magnifying 
ethnic and religious segregation or intolerance. Schools are adaptive, but 
they tend towards equilibrium rather than radical emergence; hence at 
best they do not challenge existing social patterns which are generative 
of conflict. At worst, they act as amplifying mechanisms (Davies, 2004, 
page 203). 
 
Davies is not claiming that education per se does this. It is more that the 
institutions of schooling tend to generate conflict because of the way that they 
are constituted. 
 
                                            
52 See Chapter 2 for a short discussion of ‘grand theories’ in sociology. 
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Davies’ use of complexity theory poses an interesting challenge to the project of 
this thesis. Davies’s view is that the model of complexity theory poses two basic 
models of change: “major cataclysm”, and “…the small system nested in other 
systems which can work at the boundaries, and create the tiny perturbations 
which can have amplifying effects” (Davies, 2004). This may not sit easily with a 
theory-building approach that seeks to understand relationships between 
variables and to organise them into an explanatory and potentially predictive 
model. We will return to this challenge in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
Of all international development agencies, it is the biggest – the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) – who have gone furthest in 
embracing an analytical and policy model that links education directly and 
causally to reduced fragility. USAID (2006a) has developed the conceptual 
framework outlined in Figure 3.14 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14 Conceptual framework for a relationship between education and patterns of fragility 
/ resilience (USAID, 2006a) 
 
A USAID (2006b) assessment tool on education and fragile states outlines 
seven key ‘patterns of fragility’. It proposes the following strategic approach: 
Education  
Services  
Interface 
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The agency’s strategic approach is particularly concerned with issues 
of legitimacy and effectiveness in governance as it pertains to four 
domains: economic, social, political and security. The Fragility 
Framework analyzes specific patterns of fragility such as organized 
violence, corruption, exclusion and elitism, transitional dynamics, 
insufficient capacity and public disengagement. Conditions of fragility 
require new ways of conceptualizing, delivering and evaluating the 
impact of development assistance, particularly in education. (USAID, 
2006b, page 3) 
 
USAID (2006a) highlights five key areas of focus: (i) seek government 
recognition of alternative service delivery systems while rebuilding appropriate 
government capacity, (ii) target critical groups such as youth, (iii) involve key 
groups outside the education sector who can influence a wider perception of 
state legitimacy, (iv) work across sectors, (v) seek outcomes beyond education. 
 
The evidence base for these analyses and conclusions is not apparent in the 
published documents. The toolkit (USAID, 2006a) does however cite examples 
of education programmes designed in part to mitigate fragility: ending the 
issuance of false degrees and nepotism in hiring in Guinea; using radio 
networks for community awareness campaign on the consequences of 
exclusion in Burundi; working with security forces and parents to organize 
against school violence in Haiti. 
 
Among the implications that can be drawn from the analysis described in this 
section are the importance of: (i) inclusive structures of education governance, 
(ii) equitable distribution of education resources and opportunities, and (iii) 
opportunities to break down ethnic, religious and gender divides in the 
classroom. Colenso (2005b) attempts to draw together literature on education 
and social cohesion into a policy and operational framework founded on three 
propositions across three domains: 
 
(i) political economy / governance: education affects social cohesion 
through transparency and participation in education policy 
formulation, planning and management; 
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(ii) equity / equality of opportunity: education affects social cohesion 
through the distribution of education resources, opportunities and 
outcomes; 
(iii) teaching / learning: education affects social cohesion through the 
development of certain competencies in students. 
 
This framework is echoed in Berry’s recent (2009) article. 
 
… equitable access to education services and inclusive policies at 
the school level are crucial to long-term efforts to build social 
cohesion in fragile states. A combination of weak government 
capacity, limited geographical access, and contended curriculum, 
makes it extremely challenging to tackle these issues in the 
education sector. (Berry 2009, emphasis added, page 12) 
 
Based on the analysis of this section, we might conclude the following: 
 
 there is evidence both for and against the proposition that education can 
increase social cohesion and mitigate fragility; it clearly has the potential 
to do both; 
 there is both quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of the 
proposition that education can mitigate fragility, but most of the 
quantitative evidence is drawn from OECD countries, rather than low 
income countries or even fragile states; this may be a function of 
availability of data and the focus of existing studies, rather than a 
presumption that this relationship does not hold in low-income countries 
or fragile states; 
 to understand this proposition fully, we must unpack different 
dimensions of education, notably access, distribution and quality; this 
potentially has significant implications for the design and delivery of aid 
programmes; 
 we might therefore reasonably conclude that it is possible for external 
inputs, including aid, to support a positive relationship between 
education outcomes and measures of social cohesion related to peace-
building and state-building; for which the evidence can be assessed as 
medium. 
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This is reflected in a revised theoretical framework below, which incorporates a 
new grey-shaded arrow pointing back from education outcomes to the entry 
conditions examined in the previous section.  
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3.7 Linking evidence to policy and practice 
 
3.7.1 Summarising the evidence 
 
The following narrative summarises the findings from this Chapter that have 
informed the final theoretical framework presented in Figure 3.15 above. These 
are described in linear form from left (entry conditions) to right (education 
outcomes) in the framework. 
 
0. Entry conditions 
 There are factors extraneous to the relationship between aid and 
education outcomes in fragile states that seem to be key determinants of 
the relationship between these variables; these are described in the 
theoretical framework at Level 0 as ‘Entry conditions’, and are 
suggested to be political will, community ownership, security / stability. 
 The evidence suggests relatively strong evidence – denoted by dark-
shaded arrows – linking these three entry conditions and education 
outcomes, particularly when viewed in terms of sustainability. 
 There is also reason to signal the strong interaction between these 
‘entry conditions’ – denoted by grey-shaded arrows between them – 
although a full examination of these relationships has been beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
1. Inputs  
 On the basis of evidence emerging in the literature, inputs originally 
described as ‘aid’ have been disaggregated and further described in 
three ways: (i) aid has been broken down into ‘financial aid’ and 
‘technical assistance’, (ii) a third category has been added as a key 
interlinked input , i.e. non-aid inputs (e.g. peacekeeping, diplomacy), (iii) 
the literature has shown that the effectiveness of these three inputs 
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together is at least in part determined by the way they are delivered, 
described here as ‘aid effectiveness’. 
 Evidence suggests that the effectiveness of the three inputs is to some 
degree determined by their interaction; this is denoted by grey-shaded 
arrows connecting the three. 
 The evidence also supports a medium relationship overall between 
these inputs (Level 1) and the dependent variable, i.e. Education 
outcomes (Level 3), denoted by a grey-shaded arrow. 
 Relationships were tested between the different types of inputs and 
Level 2 Intermediate effects, as follows: (i) the evidence indicated a 
weak relationship between financial aid and financing effects (due in part 
to fungibility), but a medium relationship between financial aid and 
institutional / policy effects, (ii) it indicated a medium relationship 
between technical assistance and both financing and institutional / policy 
effects, (iii) the evidence indicated a weak relationship between non-aid 
inputs and financing effects, but a medium relationship between non-aid 
inputs and institutional effects; in each case the strength of the evidence 
in support of the relationship is again denoted by the degree of shading 
of the arrow. 
 
2. Intermediate effects 
 The evidence suggested a weak relationship between financing effects 
and education outcomes, and a medium relationship between 
institutional / policy effects and education outcomes. 
 
3. Outputs / outcomes 
 I also examined a relationship – suggested in the literature and 
particularly present in policy and operational approaches of 
organisations including USAID – between education outcomes and 
Level 0 Entry conditions, particularly whether the evidence supports a 
link between education outcomes (both type and distribution) and social 
stability; this relationship was found to be medium – education has the 
potential both to contribute to social cohesion, and to undermine it. 
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3.7.2 What are the lessons for policy and practice? 
The findings of this research confirm a potential relationship, though perhaps 
less strong than thought by some, between aid inputs and education outcomes 
in fragile states. Positing that this relationship might work somehow through 
intermediate financing and institutional effects, it finds stronger evidence for 
institutional effects than for financing effects. In particular, the evidence linking 
financial aid and financing effects, and finance and education outcomes, is 
found to be relatively weak. This seems counter-intuitive, and it should probably 
also be of concern for aid agencies, including my own. Financing effects seem 
to be a weak transmission mechanism between aid inputs and education 
outcomes. 
 
The relatively weak relationship between external inputs – aid and non-aid 
inputs – and financing effects suggest that the key interaction between external 
inputs and education outcomes in fragile states might be through the 
institutional changes that aid can support. There is also evidence to suggest 
that in the case of both aid and non-aid inputs, external inputs are better at 
supporting existing incipient reform, rather than generating or driving that reform 
in the absence of existing will or momentum. In terms of aid policy and practice, 
this would suggest a stronger focus on institutional change than on financial 
resources, and a need to match investments and interventions in a more 
‘opportunistic’ way to recipient ‘home-owned’ reform on a case-by-case basis. 
This argues against a blueprint approach that assumes the effectiveness of 
certain types of aid interventions regardless of context (see e.g. Easterly, 2009). 
 
The strong inter-dependence – described at Level 1 ‘Inputs’ – between financial 
aid and technical assistance, and also, albeit possibly slightly weaker, between 
aid inputs and non-aid inputs, would suggest the importance of deploying 
instruments in combination, and within a single approach to strategy and 
possibly even delivery. The evidence on ‘aid effectiveness’ is found to be 
somewhat weaker than the significance many agencies, including DFID, seem 
to ascribe to applying aid effectiveness principles. The arguments in favour of 
harmonisation and alignment in particular seem to be more compelling when 
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emphasising the counter-factual i.e. free-standing projects delinked from 
national priorities and systems struggle to reach beyond both localised and 
short-term impact. 
 
The lack of developing country evidence linking education and social stability in 
fragile states may be concerning for those advocating the importance of 
investing in education to mitigate fragility. This finding may be particularly 
significant for critical theorists who question the wisdom and motives of 
governments such as the US and UK investing heavily in countries including 
Pakistan and Afghanistan to counter radicalisation. This is an issue that has 
received limited critical scholarship, particularly from educationalists, although a 
literature may be emerging (see for example Davies, 2008). 
 
3.7.3 A short commentary on the availability of evidence 
Before turning to the concluding section, it is worth reflecting on the availability 
and nature of evidence. The literature review of the CAS used an organising 
principle for determining the sequencing and prioritisation of literature, 
expanding out through three concentric rings: (i) DFID policy, research and 
practice papers, (ii) similar literature defining and influencing policy and practice 
in other development agencies, (iii) academic and other literature (see Figure 
3.16 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16. Conceptual framework for sequencing and prioritisation of literature review, 
reproduced from Colenso 2005a 
1. DFID policy, 
research and 
practice 
2. other aid 
agency policy, 
research and 
practice 
3. academic 
and other 
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The decision to privilege DFID and other agency literature was in part 
determined by a wish to examine reflexively my own professional context, but 
also by the availability of literature, which was, and remains, dominated by 
agency literature including grey literature. Colenso (2005a) conducted a key 
word search of four academic databases, which yielded the following results53: 
 
 British Education Index, 1976 - June 2005: 
o word search for ‘education AND fragile states’ yielded 0 returns; 
o word search for ‘education AND reconstruction’ yielded 60 returns 
(reduced to 6 relevant records after screening); 
 ERIC – CIJE & RIE, 1990 – Sep 2004: 
o word search for ‘education AND fragile states’ yielded 0 returns; 
o word search for ‘education AND reconstruction’ yielded 545 
returns (reduced to 22 relevant records after screening); 
 Australian Education Index, 1976 - June 2005: 
o word search for ‘education AND fragile states’ yielded 0 returns; 
o word search for ‘education AND reconstruction’ yielded 184 
returns (reduced to 29 relevant records after screening); 
 Web of Science, 1995-2005: 
o word search for ‘education AND fragile states’ yielded 0 returns: 
o word search for ‘education AND reconstruction’ yielded 269 
returns (reduced to 10 after screening). 
 
This has 2 implications. First, availability: the data pool is relatively small. 
Second, quality: what is available will typically not have been subject to peer 
review and academic quality control process; there is also a higher risk of 
observer bias – one of the three criteria established in Chapter 1 to grade the 
evidence – given that the implementer is also frequently the assessor. Both 
availability and quality of data are compounded by the problem, referred to 
ealier in this thesis, of the lack of available data on education in fragile states, 
                                            
53 Criteria for screening were that articles were relevant to two or more of the following 
categories: education, fragile states, aid. 
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given weaknesses in data collection and in statistical capacity. This applies to 
both administrative data and survey data. 
 
Finally, the literature that is available is dominated by 2 methods: case study, 
and, to a lesser degree, cross-country regression analysis. There is relatively 
little literature available on, for example, what is happening in the classroom, 
and relatively little literature using, for example, ethnographic and micro–level 
research. This leads to perhaps three conclusions for this thesis. First, there is a 
need to strengthen data collection and also research in fragile states. Second, 
there are significant gaps in the research, and a huge agenda for the research 
community to pursue. Third, researchers and other development professionals 
should be acutely aware of the shortcomings of their evidence base – in terms 
of availability, quality and impartiality – when advancing conclusions on 
evidence, designing policy, and implementing operations. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
People often assume that data are simple, graspable and trustworthy, 
whereas theory is complex, recondite and slippery, and so give the 
former priority. In the case of climate change, as in much of science, 
the reverse is at least as fair a picture. Data are vexatious; theory is 
quite straightforward. Constructing a set of data that tells you about 
the temperature of the Earth over time is much harder than putting 
together the basic theoretical story of how the temperature should be 
changing, given what else is known about the universe in general. 
(The Economist, March 20th 2010, page 34, emphasis added) 
 
This article in The Economist is dealing with climate change, but the point has 
general application. Should we believe The Economist, or is the author of this 
article betraying a lack of rigour of which a researcher should be suspicious? To 
answer this question, and to assess whether the theory I have generated in the 
previous chapter has any validity or utility, I will return in this final chapter to 
issues of methodology and method, and particularly to the characteristics and 
tests of what might constitute theory. 
 
4.1 Methodology, methods and theory 
 
Section 1.2 of this thesis, entitled ‘methodology and methods’, established 
methodological distinctions within the overlapping disciplines of research and 
evaluation. Building on Habermas’ (1972) distinction between three research 
paradigms (positivist, interpretive, critical theory), it asked whether theory was 
essentially a positivist project, defined by “prediction and control” – better for the 
natural sciences than for the complexity (fallibility?) of the social sciences. It 
outlined a similar debate in the field of evaluation and evaluative research, 
contrasting “rationalist-objectivist” approaches to evaluation with 
“argumentative-subjectivist” approaches (Van der Knapp, 1995, cited in Martin 
& Sanderson, 1999). 
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Section 1.2 also proposed a pragmatic way through these distinctions. Within 
research, Bryman’s (1996) productive tension between positivist quantitative 
methods and interactionist qualitative methods, whereby “…participant 
observation can be deployed within a theory testing framework with which the 
epistemological basis of quantitative research is conventionally associated.” 
Within evaluation, Martin and Sanderson’s (1999) “formative policy learning 
approach”, embracing “a wider variety of experimental sites” and indeed 
methods, including subjective judgements based largely on qualitative 
information. 
 
I decided to adopt a 'mixed-method' approach. In so doing, I have argued in 
Section 1.3 for what I called “the legitimacy and admissibility of qualitative 
evidence for building theory”, giving particular attention to the research methods 
that dominate the literature on education and fragile states: the case study. I 
argued that when case studies and other principally qualitative methods 
generate data that are subjected to a logically stronger process of 
generalisation – such as analytical induction and constant comparison, 
including comparison against data derived through quantitative methods – then 
claims to evidence and then theory may be stronger than if the case study was 
the sole method utilised. 
 
In examining methods, I have given some particular consideration to the 
increasing use of randomised trials, and to some agencies’ preference for the 
seemingly hard facts derived from regression analysis. While welcoming both 
methods, I have recommended that the limits of each is thoroughly critiqued. 
This argues for a mixed-method approach, as proposed by Easterly below. 
 
The RE [randomised experiments] studies have suffered from over-
promising and dogmatism from their proponents, heroic extrapolation 
from results in small samples in particular contexts to general 
conclusions, and lack of a link to behavioral models. A more 
constructive approach might target REs more to shed light on 
behavioral parameters, perhaps use them more to hold aid 
accountable for results, and to be more open to using diverse types 
of evidence from case studies, other micro empirical research, and 
micro and macro stylized facts and some of the more well-executed 
  
122
122
macro regressions (with appropriate cautions on the severe 
limitations of the latter). (Easterly, 2009, page 105) 
 
Having established a methodological position, Section 1.3, ‘Grading the 
evidence – designing an instrument’, then went on to identify three features or 
domains to be adopted in this thesis for grading evidence: method, degree of 
bias, degree of corroboration. It was these criteria that helped guide my 
assessment of the evidence, for each hypothesis presented and tested in 
Chapter 3. This included evidence generated by new research conducted for 
this thesis. 
 
Through Chapter 3, I have attempted to build a theoretical framework to 
describe the complex relationship between aid and education outcomes in 
fragile states. I have also briefly assessed the implications of this theory for 
policy and practice. This concluding Chapter asks the question: does Figure 
3.16 constitute ‘theory’, or is it somehow something less? To answer this 
question, I will return to my earlier definition of theory, and further expand on 
this definition through proposing some characteristics of theory, and then 
assessing whether the theory developed in Chapter 3 does indeed possess 
these characteristics. 
 
4.2 The characteristics and tests of theory 
 
Chapter 1 introduced Kerlinger’s characterisation of theory as: “…a set of 
interrelated constructs, definitions and propositions that presents a systematic 
view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of 
explaining and predicting the phenomena” (Kerlinger, 1970, cited in Cohen et 
al., 2000, page 11). In assessing whether or not this thesis can be said to have 
generated theory, it is worth returning to Kerlinger, and specifically his 
description of the characteristics of effective empirical theory; as follows: 
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(i) a theoretical system must permit deductions and generate laws that 
can be tested empirically, providing the means for its confirmation or 
rejection; 
(ii) theories must be compatible with both observation and with 
previously compatible theories; grounded in verified empirical data 
and sound hypotheses; 
(iii) parsimony i.e. stated in simple terms; 
(iv) should have considerable explanatory and predictive potential; 
(v) should be able to respond to observed anomalies; 
(vi) should spawn research i.e. its ‘fertility’; 
(vii) should demonstrate precision and universality, and set the terms for 
its own falsification and verification; 
(viii) must be operationalisable; 
(ix) a test of theory must be replicable. 
 
May and Powell (2008) offers five characteristics, or ‘bases’, of theory: 
 
(i) its needing to be based solely in fact (inductivism); 
(ii) its being subjected to empirical falsification (deductivism); 
(iii) its reflecting the dominant trends of the discipline; not being based on 
rules of method but on preferences of sciences; 
(iv) its ability to diagnose and to inform change (critical theory); 
(v) being grounded in the same constructs as people use in interpreting 
their social environments in everyday life. 
 
Combining and distilling these two, I propose to adopt five key characteristics of 
theory, against which I will test the theory generated in this thesis: 
 
(i) empirical grounding: is it based in observable reality? 
(ii) explanatory power: does it satisfactorily explain a phenomenon or 
phenomena, in simple, intelligible and plausible terms? 
(iii) predictive power: can it help predict that phenomenon or 
phenomena? 
(iv) utility: can it be acted upon? can it inform change? 
  
124
124
(v) verification / falsification: can it be either proved or disproved? 
 
The rest of this section will consider each of the five characteristics, answering 
‘yes’, ‘partially’ or ‘no’ to each question posed. 
 
4.2.1 Empirical grounding: is it based in observable reality? 
 
It has been the central project of this thesis to base the theory in fact; to mine 
existing literature and evidence sources, both qualitative and quantitative, to 
generate data through new research conducted for this thesis, and to develop 
and deploy an instrument to test the reliability and validity of the evidence 
examined. From this point of view, it would seem to be well grounded 
empirically. However, in grading the evidence, the theoretical framework has 
also tried to indicate where evidence is mixed or weak. Where evidence is 
deemed weak, it could be said that the proposed theory is not grounded in fact, 
but in supposition or hypothesis, with insufficient or contradictory underlying 
evidence. 
 
In view of comments made in the last section of Chapter 3 relating to the 
dominance of agency literature, it is also worth reflecting on a challenge set by 
critical theorists: 
 
Data are not collected but produced. Facts do not exist independently of the 
medium through which they are interpreted, whether that is an explicit 
theoretical model, a set of assumptions, or interests that have led to the data 
being collected in the first instance. (May, 1999) 
 
Should we be suspicious of the fact that much of the literature on the subject of 
education, aid and fragile estates is commissioned and published by 
development agencies, with an incentive to reinforce existing policy and to 
promote positive results of their investments? At a minimum, the thesis has 
frequently noted the risk of observer bias, if not the manifestation of that risk 
(which may anyway be difficult to observe). 
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In response to the issue of empirical grounding, and the question of whether 
this theory can be said to be grounded in fact, I would propose therefore to 
answer only partially, on two grounds. First, in grading the evidence for different 
hypotheses in Chapter 3, the evidence underpinning these hypotheses has 
been assessed for the most part only as ‘medium’, and occasionally as ‘weak’. 
This would indicate at best a partial grounding in ‘fact’. Second, the strong risk 
of observer bias would seem to indicate an answer of ‘partially’. 
 
  
4.2.2 Explanatory power: does it satisfactorily explain a phenomenon or 
phenomena, in simple, intelligible and plausible terms? 
 
I would argue that the proposed theory does satisfactorily explain a relationship 
between aid and education in fragile states. The different levels – entry 
conditions, inputs, intermediate effects, outputs/outcomes – provide a logical 
and potentially causally linked sequence or relationship between the variables. 
At a minimum, it provides an explanatory framework to test whether and how 
these relationships work. In what is clearly a highly complex relationship, a 
balance has been sought between reflecting that complexity, while retaining 
sufficient economy and simplicity to make the relationships and overall 
framework intelligible. 
 
However, this is not to say that there are not significant gaps in how the 
relationship between aid inputs and education is described and validated in this 
proposed theory. First, there is little treatment in this thesis – reflecting a bias in 
the available literature – on the agency of national actors (citizens, 
communities, formal institutions including but not limited to the state), as 
opposed to aid agencies themselves and their instruments. This in part reflects 
a bias / preference on behalf of aid agencies and the literature to focus on 
supply-side, as opposed to demand-side, instruments and determinants of 
education outcomes. Once again, this could be remedied by more micro-level 
and ethnographic research that gets to grips with individual, household and 
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community level factors that are critical to driving education outcomes. Second, 
as noted in Section 3.7.3 above, the theory – again reflecting a shortcoming in 
the literature – is weak in how it describes what happens in the classroom and 
at the broader school level: learning, pedagogy, resource and people 
management. 
 
Nonetheless, I would argue that the theory passes the test of ‘explanatory 
power’; that it does satisfactorily explain the phenomenon under investigation, 
for the most part in simple, intelligible and plausible terms. 
 
 
4.2.3 Predictive power: can it help predict that phenomenon or phenomena? 
 
I would answer no. The evidence and analysis presented in Chapter has 
continually shown that the success of development interventions in fragile 
states is highly context-specific. There are no hard and fast rules as to what 
works where. This would call into the question the predictive power of the theory 
presented in Chapter 3. Section 3.3.1 cited Berry’s (2009) recent review of 
successful approaches to supporting education in fragile states: 
 
…there is a wide range of fragile states, and consequently it is 
difficult to generalise across these diverse development settings. A 
one size fits all approach will not work…(Berry, 2009, page 4) 
 
In order to explain better and test the relationships explored in this thesis, I 
posited and tested in Section 3.2 certain intermediate effects, and whether or 
not they might explain a transmission mechanism or some form of causality 
between inputs and outputs/outcomes. If I had been successful in establishing 
these relationships, the theory would arguably have had greater predictive 
power. However, this proved only partially successful in the case of policy and 
institutional effects (where evidence was assessed as ‘medium’), and 
unsuccessful in the case of financing effects (where evidence was assessed as 
‘weak’). 
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Indeed, as suggested by Berry above, it is arguable that for the subject of this 
thesis, the variables are too broad, and the relationships too complex, to be 
captured by any equation that tries to explain and predict the relationship 
between aid inputs and education outcomes. This is certainly the view of Harber 
and Davies (1997), as cited in Section 3.6, criticising the school effectiveness 
movement on the basis of “…simple cause-and-effect, factorial, 
decontextualised models of change.” 
 
As a comment on predictive power, it is worth reflecting on whether the 
explanation of any development intervention could be said to be sufficiently 
robust and bounded to have predictive power. It could perhaps be said of 
interventions such as vaccination – where the intervention is sufficiently 
bounded and sufficiently underpinned by laws of natural science – but less so of 
broader interventions, of the scale and complexity of the subject of this thesis. 
Indeed, some commentators have argued that it is the mistaken application of a 
conventional change paradigm that has contributed to aid’s lack of success. 
Easterley (2001) contends that aid does not work because of an over-reliance 
on a western planning paradigm that does not conform to the way that change 
happens in the real world. 
 
In later work, Easterly (2009) dwells further on the problem of ‘implementation’: 
i.e. if a randomised experiment shows positive results from a particular project 
or intervention that is executed, it does not follow that giving aid for that purpose 
will automatically result in project execution. He quotes Reinikka and Svensson 
(2005): 
 
When scaling-up a specific program found to work in a controlled 
experiment run by a specific organization (often an NGO with 
substantial assistance from the research team), it is crucial also to 
have an understanding of the whole delivery chain; from the 
institutional constraints that affect central government policy 
decisions, through the incentive constraints that influence different 
layers of government agencies and officials implementing a given 
policy, to the actions and incentives of the end-producers (schools) 
and beneficiaries (students and parents). Lack of attention to the 
service delivery system, and adjustment of policy accordingly, may 
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imply effects very different. (Reinikka and Svensson (2005), cited in 
Easterly, 2009, page 40) 
 
As noted in Section 3.6 above, Davies (2004) uses complexity theory to 
challenge conventional paradigms of change in what she calls “complex 
adaptive systems”: 
 
Within complexity theory, we can call on at least two directions for 
change. The first is the major cataclysm that can force a real radical 
emergence, a sudden leap to the edge of chaos, compelling 
reconsideration; the second is the small system nested in other 
systems which can work at the boundaries, and create the tiny 
perturbations which can have amplifying effects. (Davies, 2004, page 
35) 
 
Nicolai (2009) puts forward a theory of change that can be either radical or 
incremental, distinguishing between five types of change: major change; 
sudden change; unexpected change; rapid change; irreversible change. 
 
In conclusion, I would say that the evidence examined for this thesis suggests 
strongly that development interventions can be successfully planned and 
implemented. However, for the reasons cited above, I do not propose that the 
theory developed in Chapter 3 could be said to have predictive power; the 
variables are too many, their interactions too complex, and causality, and so 
generalisability, too difficult to establish. I will return to this point in the 
concluding section of this thesis. 
 
 
4.2.4 Utility: can it be acted upon? can it inform change? 
 
I would argue yes. Sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 summarise the key findings from 
the evidence examined in Chapter 3, and the implications for policy and 
operations. While the theory does not represent an ‘investment guarantee’ – i.e. 
predicting with confidence whether, where and how aid can support education 
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outcomes in fragile states – it does provide a framework that can guide policy 
and practice. 
 
Among the key lessons or benefits of the theory presented in Chapter 3 are the 
following: 
 specifying entry conditions (political will; community ownership; security / 
stability), analysis of which can help influence the design and 
implementation of interventions; 
 proposing how different inputs can be categorised (financial aid, 
technical assistance, non aid inputs), and understanding their 
interaction, and their role in delivering outcomes (including how they 
might draw on certain principles of aid effectiveness); 
 understanding not only whether and how inputs can contribute to 
education outcomes, but also how they may, or may not, contribute to 
certain intermediate effects (financing effects; policy and institutional 
effects); 
 understanding whether and how education outcomes can in turn 
contribute to increased stability. 
 
 
4.2.5 Verification / falsification: can it be either proved or disproved? 
 
I would argue no, for similar reasons cited above in Section 4.2.3 when 
assessing the theory’s predictive power. It is hard to see how a framework that 
attempts to describe such a complex and irreducible process could be verified 
or falsified. In terms of verification, no amount of successful examples of 
overseas development aid supporting education outcomes in fragile states 
could establish that the relationship described in the theory necessarily holds. 
Equally, in terms of falsification, counter-examples – examples of overseas 
development aid failing to support education outcomes in fragile states (and 
there are many) – should not be said to falsify the theory. 
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I would argue therefore that the theory described in Chapter 3 is not amenable 
to verification or falsification, in a way that that is conventionally understood i.e. 
following a positivist paradigm of experimentation in the natural sciences. Nor 
perhaps should we expect it to be, given the complexity of the issue under 
investigation. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
In testing my theory therefore against the five characteristics of theory I 
proposed in Section 4.2, I have concluded as follows:  
 
(i) empirical grounding: partially 
(ii) explanatory power: yes 
(iii) predictive power: no 
(iv) utility: yes 
(v) verification / falsification: no 
 
Is it reasonable therefore to conclude that I have failed in the project of this 
thesis: to build a theoretical framework to understand the role of aid in achieving 
the Education Millennium Development Goals in fragile states? 
 
My assessment against the five characteristics of theory has emphasised the 
‘explanatory power’ and the ‘utility’ of the theory. Where it falls significantly short 
– ‘predictive power’ and ‘verification / falsification’ – is arguably in its 
generalisability. To help us understand the issue of generalisability in social 
theory, it may be help to borrow from a theoretician in the field of management, 
given that management, like education, is a process less immediately amenable 
to positivist generalisable laws. 
 
Sensitivity to context is especially important for theories based on 
experience. According to the contextualist perspective (Gergin, 
1982), meaning is derived from context. That is, we understand what 
is going on by appreciating where and when it is happening. 
Observations are embedded and must be understood within a 
context. Therefore, authors of inductively generated theories have a 
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particular responsibility for discussing limits of generalizability…In the 
process of testing these ideas in various settings, we discover the 
inherent limiting conditions. In the absence of this breadth of 
experimental evidence, we must be realistic regarding the extent of a 
theorist’s foreknowledge of all the possible limitations on a theory’s 
applicability. (Whetten, 1989, page 492, emphasis added) 
 
It is interesting that Easterly (2009) develops the implications of the limits of 
generalisability in operational terms. He concludes that because sensitivity to 
context prevents us from predicting what interventions might work in a 
generalisable sense or on a large scale, we should stick to the small scale. He 
builds on the idea put forward by Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) that 
government services and aid perform the worst in areas that are both 
transaction-intensive and discretionary. His conclusion is that aid agencies shift 
from a “transformational" approach (West saves Africa)… to a "marginal" 
approach (West takes one small step at a time to help individual Africans).” 
(Easterly 2009). Whether or not we accept Easterly’s conclusion, when 
assessing the limits and utility of our theory, we must surely take the pill of 
humility that Easterly prescribes when citing Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments:  
 
The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own 
conceit; and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his 
own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest 
deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely 
and in all its parts, without any regard either to the great interests, or 
to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. He seems to imagine 
that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as 
much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-
board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board 
have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand 
impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human 
society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, 
altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse [sic] to 
impress upon it. (cited in Easterly, 2009, page 106) 
 
To conclude, my view is that I have indeed succeeded in inductively generating 
a theory, but that that theory – common to most social theory – should not make 
claims of generalisability. As Pawson and Tilley (2009) argue, it is a 
combination of mechanism and context that generates outcomes, and without 
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that combination, scientific progress is not possible. The advantage of my 
theory should be seen in its utility, in an industry and realm of professional 
practice that is light on theory. As Deaton notes: 
 
The demand that experiments be theory-driven is, of course, no 
guarantee to success, though the lack of it is close to guarantee of 
failure. (Deaton, 2008, page 154). 
 
Deaton goes on to say that, in the field of economics at least: “…empiricists and 
theorists seem further apart now than at any period in the last quarter century.” 
(Deaton, 2008, page 154). 
 
Both formal institutions and (bad) policy tend towards rigidity. I know this as a 
policy maker in a government department. This thesis has shown that, at least 
in this realm of social policy and practice, a closer examination of the evidence 
does not support certainty. But nor should that, however, diminish the need to 
seek a firmer basis on which to make policy and operational decisions. 
 
I would argue that this thesis and its product – the ‘theory’ – has provided a 
framework that advances our understanding of the relationships between aid 
and education outcomes in fragile states; that it has tested the evidence base 
for these proposed relationships; and that it has provided a narrative and a 
framework that has practical utility – notwithstanding limits of generalisability –
for future research, policy development and programming. 
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APPENDIX 1. Key education indicators for fragile states 
(DFID proxy list) (Source: updated from the CAS using data from 
UNESCO, 2010) 
 
 
Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) 
in Primary Education 
Primary 
out of 
school 
children  
Secondary  
 
Primary 
school-
age 
population 
(000) 1999 GPI 2007 GPI 2007 (000) 
% 
girls 1999 2007 
Country or territory 2006 Total  (F/M)  Total (F/M)  
  
%F %F 
                
Arab States              
Djibouti 122 27 0.73 45 0.89 56 52 42 41 
Sudan 5,966 ... ... ... ... … … … 47 
Yemen 3,803 56 0.59 75 0.76 906 70 26 32 
Central Asia             
Azerbaijan 443 89 1.01 95 0.99 20 55 49 48 
Georgia 325 … … 94 0.97 18 60 49 49 
Tajikistan 682 … … 97 0.96 17 86 46 45 
Uzbekistan 2,267 ... ... 91 0.97 145 59 49 49 
East Asia and the 
Pacific             
Cambodia 2,080 83 0.91 89 0.95 220 58 34 44 
Indonesia 25,412 ... ... 95 0.96 507 … … 49 
Kiribati ... 97 1.01 ... ... … … 53 52 
Lao PDR 758 76 0.92 86 0.95 104 57 40 43 
Myanmar … … … … … … … 50 50 
Papua New 
Guinea 988 … … … … … … … … 
Solomon Islands 77 ... ... 62 0.99 29 48 41 43 
Timor-Leste 191 ... ... 63 0.95 71 50 … 49 
Tonga 15 88 0.96 96 0.97 0.2 … 50 48 
Vanuatu 35 91 0.99 87 0.99 4 51 45 … 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean             
Dominica ... 94 0.98 … ... … … 57 50 
Guyana 97 … … … … … … 50 49 
Haiti 1,397 ... ... ... ... … … … … 
South and West 
Asia               
Afghanistan 4,600 ... ... ... ... … … ... 26 
Nepal 3,574 65 0.79 80 0.96 714 53 40 47 
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Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) 
in Primary Education 
Primary 
out of 
school 
children  
Secondary GPI 
 
Primary 
school-
age 
population 
(000) 1999 GPI 2007 GPI 2007 (000) 
% 
girls 1999 2007 
Country or territory 2006 Total  (F/M)  Total (F/M)  
  
%F %F 
Sub-Saharan Africa               
Angola 1,968 … … ... ... … … 43 ... 
Burundi 1,303 … … 81 0.98 244 53 ... 42 
Cameroon 2,846 ... ... ... ... … … 45 44 
Central African 
Republic 700 ... ... 56 0.74 310 60 … ... 
Chad 1,790 51 0.62 … … … … 21 31 
Comoros 132 49 0.85 ... ... … … 44 43 
Congo 587 ... ... 54 0.92 244 52 ... ... 
Côte d’Ivoire 3,022 52 0.75 … … … … 35 ... 
D. R. Congo 10,383 33 0.95 ... ... … … 34 35 
Eritrea 604 33 0.66 41 0.68 349 52 41 41 
Ethiopia 13,415 34 0.69 71 0.92 3,721 55 40 40 
Gambia 253 72 0.89 67 1.09 86 45 40 48 
Guinea 1,451 45 0.69 74 0.87 362 60 26 35 
Guinea-Bissau 274 45 0.71 … … … … ... ... 
Kenya 5,937 63 1.01 86 1.00 769 50 49 46 
Liberia 514 42 0.77 31 0.93 447 51 39 … 
Mali 2,065 45 0.70 63 0.80 753 59 34 39 
Niger 2,316 26 0.68 45 0.75 1,252 55 38 38 
Nigeria 24,111 58 0.82 54 0.88 8,221 55 47 44 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 25 86 0.99 97 0.99 0.1 … ... 51 
Sierra Leone 899 ... ... ... ... … … ... 41 
Somalia 1,581 ... ... ... ... … … ... ... 
Togo 1,052 79 0.79 77 0.88 222 63 29 35 
Zimbabwe 2,396 83 1.01 88 1.01 281 47 47 48 
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APPENDIX 2. ‘Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States’ (Source: OECD DAC, 
2005) 
 
PREAMBLE 
 
A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will 
need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can 
affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. 
International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but the 
adoption of the following shared principles can help maximize the positive 
impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm.54 The long-term vision 
for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers to 
build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions. Realisation of this 
objective requires taking account of and acting according to the following 
principles: 
 
1. Take context as the starting point. All fragile states require sustained 
international engagement, but analysis and action must be calibrated to 
particular country circumstances. It is particularly important to recognize 
different constraints of capacity and political will and the different needs of: (i) 
countries recovering from conflict, political crisis or poor governance; (ii) those 
facing declining governance environments, and; (iii) those where the state has 
partially or wholly collapsed. Sound political analysis is needed to adapt 
international responses to country context, above and beyond quantitative 
indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength. 
 
2. Move from reaction to prevention. Action today can reduce the risk of 
future outbreaks of conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term 
global development and security. A shift from reaction to prevention should 
include sharing risk analyses; acting rapidly where risk is high; looking beyond 
quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening the 
capacity of regional organizations to prevent and resolve conflicts; and helping 
fragile states themselves to establish resilient institutions which can withstand 
political and economic pressures. 
 
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective. States are fragile when 
governments and state structures lack capacity – or in some cases, political will 
- to deliver public safety and security, good governance and poverty reduction 
to their citizens. The long-term vision for international engagement in these 
situations must focus on supporting viable sovereign states. State-building rests 
on three pillars: the capacity of state structures to perform core functions; their 
legitimacy and accountability; and ability to provide an enabling environment for 
                                            
54 The piloting of the Principles will draw on the experience of the Good Humanitarian Donorship 
Principles endorsed in Stockholm (June 2003). 
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strong economic performance to generate incomes, employment and domestic 
revenues. Demand for good governance from civil society is a vital component 
of a healthy state. State-building in the most fragile countries is about depth, not 
breadth – international engagement should maintain a tight focus on improving 
governance and capacity in the most basic security, justice, economic 
and service delivery functions55. 
 
4. Align with local priorities and/or systems. Where governments 
demonstrate political will to foster their countries’ development but lack 
capacity, international actors should fully align assistance behind government 
strategies. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible 
due to particularly weak governance, international actors should nevertheless 
consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek 
opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Another 
approach is to use ‘shadow alignment’ – which helps to build the base for fuller 
government ownership and alignment in the future - by ensuring that donor 
programs comply as far as possible with government procedures and systems. 
This can be done for example by providing information in appropriate budget 
years and classifications, or by operating within existing administrative 
boundaries. 
 
5. Recognise the political-security-development nexus. The political, 
security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks 
failure in all others. International actors should move to support national 
reformers in developing unified planning frameworks for political, security, 
humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country level. The use 
of simple integrated planning tools in fragile states, such as the transitional 
results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities and improve the 
coherence of international support across the political, security, economic, 
development and humanitarian arenas. 
 
6. Promote coherence between donor government agencies. Close links on 
the ground between the political, security, economic and social spheres also 
require policy coherence within the administration of each international actor. 
What is necessary is a whole of government approach, involving those 
responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those 
responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. Recipient 
governments too need to ensure coherence between different government 
ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community. 
 
7. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international 
actors. This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. 
In these fragile contexts, it is important to work together on upstream analysis; 
                                            
55 For governments where political will exists and capacity is the main constraint, supporting 
state-building means direct support for government plans, budgets, decision-making processes 
and implementing structures. In countries where political will is the main constraint, support for 
long-term state-building does not necessarily imply short-term support for government - but it 
does mean moving beyond repeated waves of humanitarian responses to a focus on how to 
support and strengthen viable national institutions which will be resilient in the longer-term. A 
vibrant civil society is also important for healthy government and may play a critical transitional 
role in providing services, particularly when government lacks will and/or capacity. 
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joint assessments; shared strategies; coordination of political engagement; 
multi-donor trust funds; and practical initiatives such as the establishment of 
joint donor offices and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever 
possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in 
government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and 
priorities. 
 
8. Do no harm. International actors should especially seek to avoid activities 
which undermine national institution-building, such as bypassing national 
budget processes56 or setting high salaries for local staff which undermine 
recruitment and retention in national institutions. Donors should work out cost 
norms for local staff remuneration in consultation with government and other 
national stakeholders. 
 
9. Mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context. Fragile states 
require a mix of aid instruments, including, in particular for countries in 
promising but high risk transitions, support to recurrent financing. Instruments to 
provide long-term support to health, education and other basic services are 
needed in countries facing stalled or deteriorating governance – but careful 
consideration must be given to how service delivery channels are designed to 
avoid long-term dependence on parallel, unsustainable structures while at the 
same time providing sufficient scaling up to meet urgent basic and humanitarian 
needs. A vibrant civil society is important for healthy government and may also 
play a critical transitional role in providing services, particularly when the 
government lacks will and/or capacity. 
 
10. Act fast… Assistance to fragile states needs to be capable of flexibility at 
short notice to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to 
changing conditions on the ground. 
 
11. …but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Given low 
capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, investments in 
development, diplomatic and security engagement may need to be of longer-
duration than in other low-income countries: capacity development in core 
institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since 
volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement 
and field presence) is potentially destabilizing for fragile states, international 
actors commit to improving aid predictability in these countries, by developing a 
system of mutual consultation and coordination prior to a significant reduction in 
programming. 
 
12. Avoid pockets of exclusion. International engagement in fragile states 
needs to address the problems of “aid orphans” - states where there are no 
significant political barriers to engagement but few donors are now engaged 
and aid volumes are low. To avoid an unintentional exclusionary effect of moves 
                                            
56 The Addis Ababa principle developed in November 2001 as part of the Strategic Partnership 
for Africa Initiative states: “All donor assistance should be delivered through government 
systems unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary; where this is not possible, any 
alternative mechanisms or safeguards must be time-limited and develop and build, rather than 
undermine or bypass, governmental systems." 
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by many donors to be more selective in the partner countries for their aid 
programs, coordination on field presence and aid flows, and mechanisms to 
finance promising developments in these countries are essential. 
 
